ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEBRASKA
White, McKenna, Holmes, Day, Van Devanter, Pitney, McReynolds, Brandeis, Clarke
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.
A motion is made to dismiss on the ground, as contended, that the decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska was based upon a construction of the statutes of Arkansas and concluded therefrom that the District Court of Arkansas "had no jurisdiction to take the Nebraska lands of this plaintiff in error into consideration in fixing the amount of allowance to this defendant in error, and as a matter of fact did not do so." That this conclusion was reached "by reason of the peculiar statute of Arkansas which governs and controls the courts of that State in fixing the allowance of alimony to a wife, in all cases in which the divorce is granted on her petition " (italics counsel's) and the court "was limited and controlled by that statute." It is hence contended that the full faith and credit which the Constitution of the United States requires to be given to the judicial proceedings of another State was not denied to the Arkansas decree but that the Supreme Court of Nebraska, considering the statutes of Arkansas, gave to the decree the value those statutes gave to it.
But this is the question in controversy. The decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska is challenged for not according to the decree the credit it is entitled
to and it is no answer to the challenge to say that the Supreme Court committed no error in responding to it and that, therefore, there is no federal question for review. Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14. The motion to dismiss is denied.
The decision of the Supreme Court affirming the subsequent judgment of the district court on the merits was by a divided court and the opinion and dissenting opinion were well-reasoned and elaborate. The ultimate propositions decided were that the courts of Nebraska would entertain a suit for alimony out of real estate situated in that State after a decree for absolute divorce in another State, the latter State having no jurisdiction of the land, notwithstanding the decree awarding alimony, the decree not appearing to have been rendered by consent or not having taken such land into account; and that besides the Arkansas court had no jurisdiction to render a money judgment for alimony.
The propositions were supported and opposed by able discussion, some of which was occupied in reconciling a conflict of decision in Nebraska, a later decision made to give way to an earlier one. We are not called upon to trace or consider the reasoning of the opinion further than to determine the correctness of its elements, and this determination can be made by reference to the divorce proceedings in Arkansas and the decree of the court rendered therein.
The case is not in broad compass and depends upon the application of the quite familiar principle that determines the estoppel of judgments, and the principle would seem to have special application to a judgment for divorce and alimony. They are usually concomitants in the same suit -- some cases say must be -- or, rather, that as alimony is an incident of divorce, it must be awarded by the same decree that grants the separation. And it is the practice to unite them, as alimony
necessarily depends upon a variety of circumstances more adequately determined in the suit for divorce, not only the right to it but the measure of it, all circumstances upon which it depends being then naturally brought under the view and judgment of the court. Whether, however, the right to it should be litigated in the suit for divorce, or may be sought subsequently in another, the principle is applicable that what is once adjudged cannot be tried again. And this court has established a test of the thing adjudged and the extent of its estoppel. It is: If the second action is upon the same claim or demand as that in which the judgment pleaded was rendered, the judgment is an absolute bar not only of what was decided but of what might have been decided. If the second action was upon a different claim or demand, then the judgment is an estoppel "only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered." Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353; Virginia- Carolina Chemical Co. v. Kirven, 215 U.S. 252; Troxell v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 434; Radford v. Myers, 231 U.S. 725; Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294.
But how find the matters in issue or the points controverted upon the determination of which the judgment was rendered? The obvious answer would seem to be that for the issues we must go to the pleadings; for the response to them and their determination, to the judgment; and each may furnish a definition of the other. National Foundry & Pipe Works v. Oconto Water Supply Co., 183 U.S. 216, 234. If there be generality and uncertainty, to what extent there may be specification and limitation by evidence aliunde there is some conflict in the cases. ...