CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.
Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., dissented.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, mandatory subjects of collective bargaining include pension and insurance benefits for active employees,*fn1 and an employer's mid-term unilateral modification of such benefits constitutes an unfair labor practice.*fn2 This cause
presents the question whether a mid-term unilateral modification that concerns, not the benefits of active employees, but the benefits of already retired employees also constitutes an unfair labor practice. The National Labor Relations Board, one member dissenting, held that changes in retired employees' retirement benefits are embraced by the bargaining obligation and that an employer's unilateral modification of them constitutes an unfair labor practice in violation of §§ 8 (a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 177 N. L. R. B. 911 (1969).*fn3 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit disagreed and refused to enforce the Board's cease-and-desist order, 427 F.2d 936 (1970). We granted certiorari, 401 U.S. 907 (1971). We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Since 1949, Local 1, Allied Chemical and Alkali Workers of America, has been the exclusive bargaining representative for the employees "working" on hourly rates of pay at the Barberton, Ohio, facilities of respondent Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.*fn4 In 1950, the Union and the Company negotiated an employee group health insurance plan, in which, it was orally agreed, retired employees could participate by contributing the required
premiums, to be deducted from their pension benefits. This program continued unchanged until 1962, except for an improvement unilaterally instituted by the Company in 1954 and another improvement negotiated in 1959.
In 1962 the Company agreed to contribute two dollars per month toward the cost of insurance premiums of employees who retired in the future and elected to participate in the medical plan. The parties also agreed at this time to make 65 the mandatory retirement age. In 1964 insurance benefits were again negotiated, and the Company agreed to increase its monthly contribution from two to four dollars, applicable to employees retiring after that date and also to pensioners who had retired since the effective date of the 1962 contract. It was agreed, however, that the Company might discontinue paying the two-dollar increase if Congress enacted a national health program.
In November 1965, Medicare, a national health program, was enacted, 79 Stat. 291, 42 U. S. C. § 1395 et seq. The 1964 contract was still in effect, and the Union sought mid-term bargaining to renegotiate insurance benefits for retired employees. The Company responded in March 1966 that, in its view, Medicare rendered the health insurance program useless because of a non-duplication-of-benefits provision in the Company's insurance policy, and stated, without negotiating any change, that it was planning to (a) reclaim the additional two-dollar monthly contribution as of the effective date of Medicare; (b) cancel the program for retirees; and (c) substitute the payment of the three-dollar monthly subscription fee for supplemental Medicare coverage for each retired employee.*fn5
The Union acknowledged that the Company had the contractual right to reduce its monthly contribution, but challenged its proposal unilaterally to substitute supplemental Medicare coverage for the negotiated health plan. The Company, as it had done during the 1959 negotiations without pressing the point, disputed the Union's right to bargain in behalf of retired employees, but advised the Union that upon further consideration it had decided not to terminate the health plan for pensioners. The Company stated instead that it would write each retired employee, offering to pay the supplemental Medicare premium if the employee would withdraw from the negotiated plan. Despite the Union's objections the Company did circulate its proposal to the retired employees, and 15 of 190 retirees elected to accept it. The Union thereupon filed unfair labor practice charges.
The Board held that although the Company was not required to engage in mid-term negotiations, the benefits of already retired employees could not be regarded as other than a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. The Board reasoned that "retired employees are 'employees' within the meaning of the statute for the purposes of bargaining about changes in their retirement benefits . . . ." 177 N. L. R. B., at 912. Moreover, "retirement status is a substantial connection to the bargaining unit, for it is the culmination and the product of years of employment." Id., at 914. Alternatively, the Board considered "bargaining about changes in retirement benefits for retired employees" as "within the contemplation of the statute because of the interest which active employees have in this subject . . . ." Id., at 912. Apparently in support of both theories, the Board noted that "bargaining on benefits for workers already retired is an established aspect of current labor-management relations." Id., at 916. The Board also held that the
Company's "establishment of a fixed, additional option in and of itself changed the negotiated plan of benefits" contrary to §§ 8 (d) and 8 (a)(5) of the Act. Id., at 918. Accordingly, the Company was ordered to cease and desist from refusing to bargain collectively about retirement benefits and from making unilateral adjustments in health insurance plans for retired employees without first negotiating in good faith with the Union. The Company was also required to rescind, at the Union's request, any adjustment it had unilaterally instituted and to mail and post appropriate notices.*fn6
Section 1 of the National Labor Relations Act declares the policy of the United States to protect commerce "by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment . . . ." 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 151. To effectuate this policy, § 8 (a)(5) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section" 9 (a). 49 Stat. 453, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (a)(5). Section 8 (d), in turn, defines "to bargain
collectively" as "the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment . . . ." 61 Stat. 142, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (d). Finally, § 9 (a) declares: "Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment . . . ." 49 Stat. 453, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (a).
Together, these provisions establish the obligation of the employer to bargain collectively, "with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment," with "the representatives of his employees" designated or selected by the majority "in a unit appropriate for such purposes." This obligation extends only to the "terms and conditions of employment" of the employer's "employees" in the "unit appropriate for such purposes" that the union represents. See, e. g., Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 666 (1965); NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); Packard Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 192 (1941) (dictum); Pittsburgh Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146 (1941). The Board found that benefits of already retired employees fell within these constraints on alternative theories. First, it held that pensioners are themselves "employees" and members of the bargaining unit, so that their benefits are a "term and condition" of their employment.*fn7
The Court of Appeals, in contrast, held "that retirees are not 'employees' within the meaning of section 8 (a)(5) and . . . the Company was under no constraint to collectively bargain improvements in their benefits with the Union." 427 F.2d, at 942. The court reasoned, first, "retirement with this Company, as with most other companies, is a complete and final severance of employment. Upon retirement, employees are completely removed from the payroll and seniority lists, and thereafter they perform no services for the employer, are paid no wages, are under no restrictions as to other employment or activities, and have no rights or expectations of reemployment," id., at 944; and, second, "it has repeatedly been held that the scope of the bargaining unit controls the extent of the bargaining obligation . . . . [And] the unit certified by the Board as appropriate was composed . . . only of presumably active employees . . . ." Id., at 945. For the reasons that follow we agree with the Court of Appeals.
First. Section 2 (3) of the Act provides:
"The term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment . . . ." 49 Stat. 450, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 152 (3).
We have repeatedly affirmed that the task of determining the contours of the term "employee" "has been assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act." NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944). See also Iron Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701, 706 (1963); NLRB v. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398 (1947). But we have never immunized Board judgments from judicial review in this respect. "The Board's determination that specified persons are 'employees' under this Act is to be accepted if it has 'warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis in law." NLRB v. Hearst Publications, supra, at 131.
In this cause we hold that the Board's decision is not supported by the law. The Act, after all, as § 1 makes clear, is concerned with the disruption to commerce that arises from interference with the organization and collective-bargaining rights of "workers" -- not those who have retired from the work force. The inequality of bargaining power that Congress sought to remedy was that of the "working" man, and the labor disputes that it ordered to be subjected to collective bargaining were those of employers and their active employees. Nowhere in the history of the National Labor Relations Act is there any evidence that retired workers are to be considered as within the ambit of the collective-bargaining obligations of the statute.
To the contrary, the legislative history of § 2 (3) itself indicates that the term "employee" is not to be stretched beyond its plain meaning embracing only those who work for another for hire. In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, supra, we sustained the Board's finding that newsboys were "employees" rather than independent contractors. We said that "the broad language of the Act's definitions, which in terms reject conventional limitations ...