CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.
Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., Stewart, White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined, in Part III of which Brennan, J., joined, and in Parts I, II, and III of which Marshall, J., joined. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the result, post, p. 350. Marshall, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 354.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether a state prisoner may obtain a federal writ of habeas corpus by showing that his retained defense counsel represented potentially conflicting interests.
Respondent John Sullivan was indicted with Gregory Carchidi and Anthony DiPasquale for the first-degree murders of John Gorey and Rita Janda. The victims, a labor official and his companion, were shot to death in Gorey's second-story office at the Philadelphia headquarters of Teamsters' Local 107. Francis McGrath, a janitor, saw the three defendants in the building just before the shooting. They appeared to be awaiting someone, and they encouraged McGrath to do his work on another day. McGrath ignored their suggestions. Shortly afterward, Gorey arrived and went to his office. McGrath then heard what sounded like firecrackers exploding in rapid succession. Carchidi, who was in the room where McGrath was working, abruptly directed McGrath to leave the building and to say nothing. McGrath hastily complied. When he returned to the building about 15 minutes later, the defendants were gone. The victims' bodies were discovered the next morning.
Two privately retained lawyers, G. Fred DiBona and A. Charles Peruto, represented all three defendants throughout the state proceedings that followed the indictment. Sullivan had different counsel at the medical examiner's inquest, but he thereafter accepted representation from the two lawyers retained by his co-defendants because he could not afford to pay his own lawyer.*fn1 At no time did Sullivan or his lawyers
object to the multiple representation. Sullivan was the first defendant to come to trial. The evidence against him was entirely circumstantial, consisting primarily of McGrath's testimony. At the close of the Commonwealth's case, the defense rested without presenting any evidence. The jury found Sullivan guilty and fixed his penalty at life imprisonment. Sullivan's post-trial motions failed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed his conviction by an equally divided vote. Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 446 Pa. 419, 286 A. 2d 898 (1971).*fn2 Sullivan's co-defendants, Carchidi and DiPasquale, were acquitted at separate trials.
Sullivan then petitioned for collateral relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Hearing Act, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 19, § 1180-1 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980). He alleged, among other claims, that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel because his defense lawyers represented conflicting interests. In five days of hearings, the Court of Common Pleas heard evidence from Sullivan, Carchidi, Sullivan's lawyers, and the judge who presided at Sullivan's trial.
DiBona and Peruto had different recollections of their roles at the trials of the three defendants. DiBona testified that he and Peruto had been "associate counsel" at each trial. App. 32a. Peruto recalled that he had been chief counsel for Carchidi and DePasquale, but that he merely had assisted DiBona in Sullivan's trial. DiBona and Peruto also gave conflicting accounts of the decision to rest Sullivan's defense. DiBona said he had encouraged Sullivan to testify even though the Commonwealth had presented a very weak case. Peruto remembered that he had not "want[ed] the defense to go on because I thought we would only be exposing
the [defense] witnesses for the other two trials that were coming up." Id., at 57a. Sullivan testified that he had deferred to his lawyers' decision not to present evidence for the defense. But other testimony suggested that Sullivan preferred not to take the stand because cross-examination might have disclosed an extramarital affair. Finally, Carchidi claimed he would have appeared at Sullivan's trial to rebut McGrath's testimony about Carchidi's statement at the time of the murders.
The Court of Common Pleas held that Sullivan could take a second direct appeal because counsel had not assisted him adequately in his first appeal. App. to Pet. for Cert. 5F. The court did not pass directly on the claim that defense counsel had a conflict of interest, but it found that counsel fully advised Sullivan about his decision not to testify. Id., at 7F. All other claims for collateral relief were rejected or reserved for consideration in the new appeal.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed both Sullivan's original conviction and the denial of collateral relief. Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 472 Pa. 129, 371 A. 2d 468 (1977). The court saw no basis for Sullivan's claim that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel at trial. It found that Peruto merely assisted DiBona in the Sullivan trial and that DiBona merely assisted Peruto in the trials of the other two defendants. Thus, the court concluded, there was "no dual representation in the true sense of the term." Id., at 161, 371 A. 2d, at 483. The court also found that resting the defense was a reasonable tactic which had not denied Sullivan the effective assistance of counsel. Id., at 162, 371 A. 2d, at 483-484.
Having exhausted his state remedies, Sullivan sought habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The petition was referred to a Magistrate, who found that Sullivan's defense counsel had represented conflicting interests. The District Court, however, accepted the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's conclusion
that there had been no multiple representation. The court also found that, assuming there had been multiple representation, the evidence adduced in the state post-conviction proceeding revealed no conflict of interest. App. to Pet. for Cert. 5C-8C.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d 512 (1979). It first held that the participation by DiBona and Peruto in the trials of Sullivan and his co-defendants established, as a matter of law, that both lawyers had represented all three defendants. The court recognized that multiple representation "'is not tantamount to the denial of effective assistance of counsel. . . .'" But it held that a criminal defendant is entitled to reversal of his conviction whenever he makes "'some showing of a possible conflict of interest or prejudice, however remote. . . .'" Id., at 519, quoting Walker v. United States, 422 F.2d 374, 375 (CA3) (per curiam), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 915 (1970). See also United States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203, 210 (CA3 1973). The court acknowledged that resting at the close of the prosecutor's case "would have been a legitimate tactical decision if made by independent counsel."*fn3 Nevertheless, the court thought that action alone raised a possibility of conflict sufficient to prove a violation of Sullivan's Sixth Amendment rights. The court found support for its conclusion in Peruto's admission that concern for Sullivan's co-defendants had affected his judgment that Sullivan should not present a defense. To give weight to DiBona's contrary testimony, the court held, "would be to . . . require a showing of actual prejudice." 593 F.2d, at 522.*fn4
We granted certiorari, 444 U.S. 823 (1979), to consider recurring issues left unresolved by Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). We now vacate and remand.
At the outset, we must consider whether the Court of Appeals exceeded the proper scope of review when it rejected the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's conclusion that DiBona and Peruto had not undertaken multiple representation. Petitioners claim that this determination by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was a factfinding entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 (d).
Section 2254 (d) provides that "a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction . . . [and] evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct" unless the applicant for a federal writ of habeas corpus can establish one of the enumerated causes for exception. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding does not fall within this statute because it is a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact.*fn5
In Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), the Court examined the distinction between law and fact as it applies on collateral review of a state conviction. The Townsend opinion, the ...