CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.
White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Powell, Rehnquist, and O'connor, JJ., joined. O'connor, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 774. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 775. Blackmun, J., concurred in the result. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 777.
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
At issue in this case is the constitutionality of a New York criminal statute which prohibits persons from knowingly promoting sexual performances by children under the age of 16 by distributing material which depicts such performances.
In recent years, the exploitive use of children in the production of pornography has become a serious national problem.*fn1 The Federal Government and 47 States have sought to combat the problem with statutes specifically directed at the production of child pornography. At least half of such statutes do not require that the materials produced be legally obscene. Thirty-five States and the United States Congress have also passed legislation prohibiting the distribution of such materials; 20 States prohibit the distribution of material depicting children engaged in sexual conduct without requiring that the material be legally obscene.*fn2
New York is one of the 20. In 1977, the New York Legislature enacted Article 263 of its Penal Law. N. Y. Penal Law, Art. 263 (McKinney 1980). Section 263.05 criminalizes as a class C felony the use of a child in a sexual performance:
"A person is guilty of the use of a child in a sexual performance if knowing the character and content thereof he employs, authorizes or induces a child less than sixteen years of age to engage in a sexual performance or being a parent, legal guardian or custodian of such child,
he consents to the participation by such child in a sexual performance."
A "[sexual] performance" is defined as "any performance or part thereof which includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age." § 263.00(1). "Sexual conduct" is in turn defined in § 263.00(3):
"'Sexual conduct' means actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals."
A performance is defined as "any play, motion picture, photograph or dance" or "any other visual representation exhibited before an audience." § 263.00(4).
At issue in this case is § 263.15, defining a class D felony:*fn3
"A person is guilty of promoting a sexual performance by a child when, knowing the character and content thereof, he produces, directs or promotes any performance which includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age."
To "promote" is also defined:
"'Promote' means to procure, manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide, lend, mail, deliver, transfer, transmute, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, present, exhibit or advertise, or to offer or agree to do the same." § 263.00(5).
A companion provision bans only the knowing dissemination of obscene material. § 263.10.
This case arose when Paul Ferber, the proprietor of a Manhattan
bookstore specializing in sexually oriented products, sold two films to an undercover police officer. The films are devoted almost exclusively to depicting young boys masturbating. Ferber was indicted on two counts of violating § 263.10 and two counts of violating § 263.15, the two New York laws controlling dissemination of child pornography.*fn4 After a jury trial, Ferber was acquitted of the two counts of promoting an obscene sexual performance, but found guilty of the two counts under § 263.15, which did not require proof that the films were obscene. Ferber's convictions were affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court. 74 App. Div. 2d 558, 424 N. Y. S. 2d 967 (1980).
The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that § 263.15 violated the First Amendment. 52 N. Y. 2d 674, 422 N. E. 2d 523 (1981). The court began by noting that in light of § 263.10's explicit inclusion of an obscenity standard, § 263.15 could not be construed to include such a standard. Therefore, "the statute would . . . prohibit the promotion of materials which are traditionally entitled to constitutional protection from government interference under the First Amendment." 52 N. Y. 2d, at 678, 422 N. E. 2d, at 525. Although the court recognized the State's "legitimate interest in protecting the welfare of minors" and noted that this "interest may transcend First Amendment concerns," id., at 679, 422 N. E. 2d, at 525-526, it nevertheless found two fatal defects in the New York statute. Section 263.15 was underinclusive because it discriminated against visual portrayals of children engaged in sexual activity by not also prohibiting the distribution of films of other dangerous activity. It was also overbroad because it prohibited the distribution of materials produced outside the State, as well as materials, such as medical books and educational sources, which
"deal with adolescent sex in a realistic but nonobscene manner." 52 N. Y. 2d, at 681, 422 N. E. 2d, at 526. Two judges dissented. We granted the State's petition for certiorari, 454 U.S. 1052 (1981), presenting the single question:
"To prevent the abuse of children who are made to engage in sexual conduct for commercial purposes, could the New York State Legislature, consistent with the First Amendment, prohibit the dissemination of material which shows children engaged in sexual conduct, regardless of whether such material is obscene?"
The Court of Appeals proceeded on the assumption that the standard of obscenity incorporated in § 263.10, which follows the guidelines enunciated in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973),*fn5 constitutes the appropriate line dividing protected from unprotected expression by which to measure a regulation directed at child pornography. It was on the premise that "nonobscene adolescent sex" could not be singled out for special treatment that the court found § 263.15 "strikingly underinclusive." Moreover, the assumption that the constitutionally permissible regulation of pornography could not be more extensive with respect to the distribution of material depicting children may also have led the court to conclude that a narrowing construction of § 263.15 was unavailable.
The Court of Appeals' assumption was not unreasonable in light of our decisions. This case, however, constitutes our first examination of a statute directed at and limited to depictions of sexual activity involving children. We believe our inquiry should begin with the question of whether a State has somewhat more freedom in proscribing works which portray sexual acts or lewd exhibitions of genitalia by children.
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), the Court laid the foundation for the excision of obscenity from the realm of constitutionally protected expression:
"There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene . . . . It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Id., at 571-572 (footnotes omitted).
Embracing this judgment, the Court squarely held in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." Id., at 485. The Court recognized that "rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance" was implicit in the history of the First Amendment: The original States provided for the prosecution of libel, blasphemy, and profanity, and the "universal judgment that obscenity should be restrained [is] reflected in the international agreement of over 50 nations, in the obscenity laws of all of the 48 states, and in the 20 obscenity laws enacted by Congress from 1842 to 1956." Id., at 484-485 (footnotes omitted).
Roth was followed by 15 years during which this Court struggled with "the intractable obscenity problem." Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (opinion of Harlan, J.). See, e. g., Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967). Despite considerable vacillation over the proper definition of obscenity, a majority of the Members of the Court remained firm in the position that "the States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene material when the mode of dissemination carries with it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities
of unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles." Miller v. California, supra, at 18-19 (footnote omitted); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637-643 (1968); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, supra, at 690; Redrup v. New York, supra, at 769; Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964).
Throughout this period, we recognized "the inherent dangers of undertaking to regulate any form of expression." Miller v. California, supra, at 23. Consequently, our difficulty was not only to assure that statutes designed to regulate obscene materials sufficiently defined what was prohibited, but also to devise substantive limits on what fell within the permissible scope of regulation. In Miller v. California, supra, a majority of the Court agreed that a "state offense must also be limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id., at 24. Over the past decade, we have adhered to the guidelines expressed in Miller,*fn6 which subsequently has been followed in the regulatory schemes of most States.*fn7
The Miller standard, like its predecessors, was an accommodation between the State's interests in protecting the "sensibilities of unwilling recipients" from exposure to pornographic material and the dangers of censorship inherent in unabashedly content-based laws. Like obscenity statutes, laws directed at the dissemination of child pornography run the risk of suppressing protected expression by allowing the hand of the censor to become unduly heavy. For the following reasons, ...