The opinion of the court was delivered by: John W. Sedwick United States District Judge
[Re: Motion at docket 22]
At docket 22 defendants Mark 0'Brien, James Cantor, and Richard Welsh (collectively "Defendants") move to stay further proceedings in this case pending resolution of certain litigation in the courts of the State of Alaska. Plaintiffs David E. Olson and Absolute Environmental Services, Inc. (collectively "Plaintiffs") oppose the motion at docket 30. Defendants' reply is at docket 36. Oral argument has not been requested, and it would not assist the court.
From the parties' papers the court discerns that the following facts are not in dispute. David Olson is the owner of Absolute Environmental Services, an Alaska corporation ("Absolute"). North Pacific Erectors, Inc. ("NPE") contracted with the State of Alaska to perform work on the State Office Building ("SOB") in Juneau. Among other things, NPE's contract with the State required removal of asbestos from the SOB. NPE subcontracted with Absolute to accomplish the asbestos removal. Absolute encountered what it believed to be conditions different from the conditions assumed in bidding the work. In Absolute's view, the conditions encountered rendered removing the asbestos more costly.
Absolute called upon NPE to present a claim for additional compensation for the asbestos work under a state review procedure calling for a decision by the Commissioner of the Alaska Department of Transportation and Public Facilities (DOTPF). A hearing was held before a hearing officer who eventually recommended a decision in favor of NPE. After his initial review, the Commissioner remanded the matter to the hearing officer for further consideration. The hearing officer responded with a modified recommendation in favor of NPE. Chief Assistant Attorney General Cantor then assigned Assistant Attorney General Welsh to review the second recommendation. Welsh did so with the aide of DOTPF Contract Manager O'Brien. At some point responsibility for rendering a final decision was delegated by DOTPF Commissioner von Scheben to DOTPF Deputy Commissioner Richards. After consultation with Welsh, Richards ultimately rejected the recommendation from the hearing officer and adopted Welsh's alternative recommendation denying relief to NPE.
NPE appealed to the Superior Court contending, among other things, that Welsh and O'Brien had wrongfully participated in the decision-making process such that NPE was denied due process of law. After conducting a hearing into the actions of Cantor, Welsh, and O'Brien, the Superior Court rejected the denial of due process claim and affirmed Richards' decision. NPE appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court in February of 2012. Rather than await resolution in the state court system, Absolute filed this lawsuit which advances a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Defendants denied Plaintiffs due process of law in the handling of the claim for additional compensation, a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 that Defendants denied Absolute's contract rights, a claim of conspiracy to deny constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985, a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1986 for failing to prevent the violation of constitutional rights, a civil RICO claim brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964 based on the allegation that Defendants' actions violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962, and state law tort claims based on the actions of Defendants. The exclusive focus for liability purposes in Plaintiffs' complaint is on the actions of Cantor, Welsh, and O'Brien. Although Plaintiffs' prayer for relief in the case at bar is multifaceted, it is clear that Plaintiffs' primary goal is the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages.*fn1
In the motion at docket 22, Defendants ask the court to stay this lawsuit, pending resolution of NPE's appeal. In Landis v. North American Co.,*fn2 the Supreme Court wrote that in exercising the inherent power to control its docket and to promote efficient use of judicial resources, a court has discretion to stay proceedings before it. The Court added that in exercising the discretion to stay:
[the court] must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance. * * * [The party seeking the stay] must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay . . . will work damage to someone else. Only in rare circumstances will a litigant in one cause be compelled to stand aside while a litigant in another settles the rule of law that will define the rights of both.*fn3 In Leyva v. Certified Grocers of California, Ltd.,*fn4 the Ninth Circuit elaborated on a court's power to stay proceedings:
A trial court may, with propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket and the fairest course for the parties to enter a stay of an action before it, pending resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the case. This rule applies whether the separate proceedings are judicial, administrative, or arbitral in character, and does not require that the issues in such proceedings are necessarily controlling of the action before the court. In such cases the court may order a stay of the action pursuant to its power to control its docket and calendar and to provide a just determination of the cases pending before it.*fn5 The Leyva court cautioned that a stay should only be granted where, "it appears likely the other proceedings will be concluded within a reasonable time in relation to the urgency of the claims presented to the court."*fn6
In the context of staying civil proceedings to await the outcome of related criminal cases, the Ninth Circuit has identified five factors which should be considered in addition to the extent to which a litigant's Fifth Amendment rights are implicated:
(1) the interest of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously with [the] litigation . . . (2) the burden which any particular aspect of the proceedings may impose on defendants; (3) the convenience of the court in the management of its cases, and the efficient use of judicial resources; (4) the interests of persons not parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the interest of the public in the pending civil and criminal litigation."*fn7 With ...