Appeal
from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third
Judicial District, Anchorage, John Suddock, Judge. Superior
Court No. 3AN-13-08917 CI.
Robin
O. Brena, Laura S. Gould, and Jon S. Wakeland, Brena, Bell &
Clarkson, P.C., Anchorage, for Appellant.
Mary
Hunter Gramling, Assistant Attorney General, and Craig W.
Richards, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee State of
Alaska.
No
appearance by Appellees North Slope Borough and Fairbanks
North Star Borough.
Before:
Stowers, Chief Justice, Fabe, Winfree, Maassen, and Bolger,
Justices.
OPINION
BOLGER,
Justice.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Under a
Department of Revenue regulation, all appeals of oil and gas
property tax valuation must be heard by the State Assessment
Review Board (SARB), while appeals of oil and gas property
taxability must be heard by the Department of Revenue
(Revenue). Three municipalities challenged this regulation,
arguing that it contradicts a statute that grants SARB
exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals from Revenue's
" assessments" of oil and gas property. The
superior court upheld the regulation as valid, concluding
that it was a reasonable interpretation of the statute. But
we conclude that the regulation is inconsistent with the
plain text, legislative history, and purpose of the statute;
therefore, we reverse the superior court's
judgment.[1]
II.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A.
Regulatory Background
The
Alaska Constitution grants the legislature the authority to
set " [s]tandards for the appraisal of all property
assessed by the State or its political subdivisions."
[2]
In 1973 the legislature used this authority to establish an
overarching regime for the statewide assessment of oil and
gas property[3] in order to levy ad valorem
taxes.[4] Under this statewide regime, codified
at AS 43.56, the State taxes oil and gas property at 20
mills, and municipalities are permitted to tax oil and gas
property located within their boundaries at the same rate as
they do local property.[5] But the State, through Revenue,
manages this assessment process, determining whether property
is taxable under AS 43.56 and, if so, its taxable
value.[6]
The
assessment process begins each year in January when oil and
gas property owners file returns listing and describing their
taxable oil and gas properties.[7] Revenue may then choose
to investigate any information included or omitted on the
return.[8] It must also make an initial
taxability determination whether an asset is properly deemed
taxable oil and gas property under the statute.[9] Revenue then
ascribes a valuation to the property, which becomes prima
facie evidence of the property's full
value.[10] Next, Revenue issues an assessment
roll listing all taxable oil and gas property for that year
and its assessed value.[11] On or around March 1 of each
year, Revenue sends an assessment notice to each owner whose
property is included on the assessment roll, and a copy of
the notice to each relevant municipality.[12] The
statutory scheme provides both taxpayers and affected
municipalities with a series of appeals of this preliminary
assessment, first to Revenue,[13] then to
SARB,[14] then to the superior court for a
trial de novo.[15] Revenue must then issue a final
assessment roll by June 1 of each year.[16]
After
the legislature initially established this assessment scheme,
all appeals of Revenue's oil and gas property tax
assessments were heard by SARB.[17] In 1986 Revenue
promulgated a more detailed framework to govern these
appeals.[18] Under this framework, appeals of
Revenue's valuation of a property proceed on a separate
track from appeals of Revenue's determination that a
property is taxable under AS 43.56. A property owner or
municipality appealing Revenue's valuation of oil and gas
property must appeal first to Revenue; Revenue issues an
informal conference decision, which can be appealed to
SARB.[19] SARB's decision can then be
appealed to the superior court for a trial de
novo.[20] In contrast, a property owner or
municipality appealing Revenue's determination whether
property is taxable under AS 43.56 must also appeal to
Revenue, which issues an informal conference decision;
[21] but an appeal from this informal
conference decision is heard by a hearing officer appointed
by the Commissioner of Revenue, not by SARB.[22] The
hearing officer's decision can then be appealed to the
superior court,[23] but the decision to grant a trial de
novo is left to the discretion of the superior court
judge.[24]
This
regulation also modified who is granted party status in such
appeals. Previously, both property owners and affected
municipalities were afforded party status in all appeals,
while the new regulation affords affected municipalities
different rights depending on what the appeal concerns: in
valuation appeals before SARB both property owners and the
relevant municipality have party status,[25] but in taxability
appeals before Revenue only the appellant is afforded party
status.[26]
B.
Facts
The
Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) is an 800-mile-long oil
pipeline system that connects the North Slope oil fields to a
shipping terminal in Valdez. En route it crosses through the
North Slope Borough (NSB), the Fairbanks North Star Borough
(FNSB), and the City of Valdez. In February 2013 Revenue
issued a notice of assessment for oil and gas property held
by the TAPS owners[27] for Assessment Year 2013. The TAPS
owners appealed this notice of assessment, objecting both to
Revenue's assessed value of the property and its
determination that certain pieces of property were taxable as
oil and gas property under AS 43.56.
The
TAPS owners' two appeals proceeded simultaneously on two
separate tracks: Revenue issued an informal conference
decision on the valuation appeal, which the owners appealed
to SARB, then further appealed to the superior court for a
trial de novo. The affected municipalities also
cross-appealed SARB's decision on the valuation appeal to
the superior court. Revenue issued a separate, confidential
informal conference decision on the TAPS owners'
taxability appeal, dismissing the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction after it found that the appeal actually raised
issues of valuation, which " are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of . . . SARB under AS 43.56.120 [and] [AS
43.56].130." [28]
The
TAPS owners appealed this decision to the Commissioner for a
formal conference. The TAPS owners and the State then jointly
filed a stipulation and motion requesting that the decision
dismissing the taxability appeal for lack of jurisdiction be
adopted as the final administrative decision of Revenue for
purposes of further appeal to the superior court. The TAPS
owners also filed an unopposed motion to stay the taxability
appeal pending resolution of their separate valuation appeal
by the superior court,[29] which the hearing officer
granted.
C.
Proceedings
After
repeatedly attempting but failing to obtain information
regarding the status of the TAPS owners' taxability
appeal, the affected municipalities filed complaints for
declaratory and injunctive relief with the superior court.
NSB first filed, then Valdez and FNSB (collectively "
the intervenors" ) successfully intervened in the case
without opposition, and jointly filed a separate complaint.
The municipalities all challenged the validity of 15 AAC
56.015(b)-(d), Revenue's regulation governing taxability
appeals from assessments of oil and gas property; they argued
that this regulation impermissibly delegates the authority to
decide taxability appeals to Revenue, contravening the
statute's grant of authority to SARB to hear all appeals
from initial assessments of such property.[30]
The
intervenors then filed a motion for summary judgment, on
which the superior court ruled in a consolidated order,
denying the municipalities' requests to invalidate the
regulation.[31] The court conceded that
Revenue's interpretation was not the only or even the
most reasonable interpretation but nonetheless concluded that
the regulation was a permissible interpretation of the
statute. The superior court then entered a final judgment to
this effect. Valdez now appeals.
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When
reviewing the validity of a regulation, in the absence of any
contention that the agency failed to comply with the required
procedures for promulgation, we presume that it is valid and
place the burden on the challenging party to prove
otherwise.[32] We consider whether the regulation
is " consistent with and reasonably necessary to carry
out the purposes of [its enabling statute] and whether [it
is] reasonable and not arbitrary." [33] "
'[R]easonable necessity is not a requirement separate
from consistency' and the scope of review should center
around consistency with the authorizing statute."
[34] A regulation's consistency with
its enabling statute is a question of law to which we apply
" the appropriate standard of review based on the level
of agency expertise involved." [35]
If the
issue involves agency expertise or the determination of
fundamental policy questions on subjects committed to the
agency's discretion, reasonable basis review
applies.[36] In applying reasonable basis review,
we seek " to determine whether the agency's decision
is supported by the facts and has a reasonable basis in law,
even if we may not agree with the agency's ultimate
determination." [37]
If no
agency expertise is involved in the agency's
interpretation, we apply the substitution of judgment
standard.[38] Under this standard, we exercise our
independent judgment, substituting it " for that of the
agency even if the agency's [interpretation] ha[s] a
reasonable basis in law." [39] We will adopt "
the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of
precedent, reason, and policy, but in doing so we give due
deliberative weight 'to what the agency has done,
especially where the agency interpretation is
longstanding.'" [40]
The
parties disagree whether this regulation implicates agency
expertise or fundamental agency policy, and thus disagree
whether reasonable basis or substitution of judgment review
applies. They also disagree whether Revenue's
interpretation is longstanding. We conclude that this
regulation does not implicate Revenue's expertise or
fundamental policies and thus apply the substitution of
judgment standard in assessing the validity of Revenue's
interpretation of the statute.
In
upholding the validity of the regulation the superior court
applied reasonable basis review, citing Revenue's "
expertise regarding the most efficacious forum [for
taxability appeals] in terms of staff and year-round
availability, SARB's work load, the advantages of formal
motion practice and discovery in . . . taxability versus
valuation appeals, and any need for rapid decision as to both
genres of appeals." But if the subjects that the
superior court characterized as within Revenue's
expertise were sufficient for reasonable basis review to
apply, then substitution of judgment review would almost
never apply because an agency will nearly always be more
knowledgeable about its internal administrative functioning
and capacity than a court. But Revenue's expertise is in
tax policy, not relative efficacy of forums or procedural
needs.
In
determining which standard of review applies to this
regulation we must precisely identify the statutory term the
regulation is interpreting. We have previously held that the
substitution of judgment standard applies when reviewing an
agency's interpretation of " non-technical statutory
terms." [41] This is because " mere
familiarity in . . . application [of these terms] by the
[agency] does not render that agency any better able to
discern the intent of the legislature than the courts."
[42] Examples of such terms we have
deemed to be non-technical include " adjacent to,"
[43] " local authorized planning
agencies," [44] " disposal,"
[45] " interest in land,"
[46] and " revocable."
[47] Here the term "
assessment" is commonly used by the general public and
thus conforms with these other terms that we have previously
found to be non-technical terms and matters of pure statutory
construction.[48] Further we have also stated that the
substitution of judgment standard is appropriate where the
case concerns " analysis of legal relationships about
which the courts have specialized knowledge and
experience." [49] Here Revenue's interpretation of
the term " assessment" implicates such a legal
relationship: the scope of Revenue's jurisdiction in
relation to that of SARB. Because this case involves both
statutory interpretation of a non-technical statutory term, a
task in which courts are well versed,[50] and the question
of the scope of and relationship between Revenue's and
SARB's jurisdictions,[51] we will apply
substitution of judgment review in considering whether
Revenue's interpretation of AS 43.56 through its
regulation is consistent with the statute.
We
also may in some circumstances give more deference to agency
interpretations that are " longstanding and
continuous." [52] The State argues that Revenue's
interpretation is entitled to our deference due to its
longstanding nature. Revenue first promulgated this
regulation in 1986 and amended it in 2003 to afford
municipalities the right to appeal taxability determinations.
It has thus existed in its current form for 12 years and has
twice been the subject of public notice and comment, as part
of the required process for promulgating
regulations.[53]
But the
application of this regulation has not been consistent. After
the regulation was promulgated, SARB, an independent entity
from Revenue, continued to hear taxability appeals from oil
and gas property assessments. SARB decided a taxability
appeal regarding TAPS property as recently as
2008.[54] It was not until the following year
that SARB asserted that under 15 AAC 56.015, it had no role
in taxability appeals and would not hear them unless the
municipalities " prevail[ed] in a court challenge to the
validity of the regulations that give [Revenue] jurisdiction
over taxability issues." [55] Given the relatively
recent conflicting actions of Revenue and SARB, Revenue's
interpretation is not entitled to the additional deference
that we afford longstanding and continuous interpretations.
In
applying substitution of judgment review, we interpret the
statute at issue de novo.[56] When construing
statutes de novo, we consider three factors: " the
language of the statute, the legislative history, and the
legislative purpose behind the statute." [57] We "
decide questions of statutory interpretation on a sliding
scale" [58]: " the plainer the language of
the statute, the more convincing any contrary legislative
history must be . . . . to overcome the statute's plain
meaning." [59]
IV.
DISCUSSION
Revenue
promulgated 15 AAC 56.015 in 1986.[60] Subsection (a)
provides for appeals of " the assessed value of [oil and
gas] property" :[61] the property owner or the
relevant municipality may file an appeal with Revenue "
as provided in 15 AAC 56.020 or 15 AAC 56.047, as
applicable." [62] Those regulations in turn set
procedures for the appeal and provide that Revenue's
decision on the appeal may be appealed to SARB.[63]
Subsections (b) and (c) set taxability appeals on a separate
procedural route: property owners and municipalities
challenging a taxability determination must appeal under 15
AAC 05.001-.050, not 15 AAC 56.020.[64] Those regulations
contain Revenue's general hearing procedures, and provide
that Revenue's decision on the taxability appeal may be
appealed to a formal hearing before Revenue.[65] They do
not provide for an appeal to SARB.
Valdez
challenges subsections (b) through (d) of this regulation.
Alaska Statutes 43.56.110-.130 provide that SARB shall hear
administrative appeals of all " assessment[s]" of
oil and gas property; [66] through this regulation, Revenue
has therefore interpreted " assessment" in AS 43.56
to include only the valuation of taxable oil and gas
property, and not Revenue's initial determination of
taxability. In contrast Valdez argues that "
assessment" encompasses the determination of whether
property is taxable under AS 43.56, because that
determination is made by Revenue in the initial stages of the
assessment process. Valdez concludes that appeals of
taxability determinations are therefore committed to
SARB's jurisdiction by statute, and that 15 AAC 56.015
impermissibly removes those appeals from SARB's
jurisdiction.
In
order to determine whether Revenue's interpretation is
consistent with AS 43.56, it is first necessary to
independently interpret AS 43.56 using our three metrics for
statutory interpretation: text, legislative history, and
purpose.[67] This is the first time we have been
squarely presented with the question of the scope of the term
" assessment" in AS 43.56. In a pair of prior
decisions on other issues associated with AS 43.56, we
appeared to use the term " assessment" as referring
to value.[68] But this prior usage is not binding
on the question now before us because in both prior cases the
only issues presented were those of valuation,[69] so we had
no need to distinguish between issues of valuation and issues
of taxability for the purposes of assessments. Accordingly,
we will proceed by individually examining each of the three
statutory interpretation metrics: the statute's text,
legislative history, and purpose.
A.
Revenue's Interpretation Of " Assessment"
Through Its Regulation Is Not Consistent With The Text Of AS
43.56.
"
Interpretation of a statute begins with its text."
[70] But AS 43.56 does not define the
term " assessment." [71] And AS 43.56's
plain text does not distinguish between appeals involving
valuation and appeals involving taxability. As the superior
court recognized, " [t]he only explicit appellate path
specified in AS 43.56 is through SARB." [72] Whether
the text of AS 43.56 is flexible enough to accommodate
Revenue's interpretation through its regulation depends
on the scope of the statutory term " assessment."
1.
The text of the overall statutory scheme
Because
the term " assessment" is used throughout AS
43.56's statutory scheme, an outline of the language set
forth in the statutory scheme will prove helpful here:
(1)
Alaska Statute 43.56.060 provides standards for the
assessment and taxation of oil and gas property. Subsections
(a) and (b) mandate that Revenue " shall assess
property." [73] Subsections (c) through (f) then set
out the standards for the valuation of oil and gas property.
But these subsections describe the proper valuation of "
taxable property," [74] rather than simply
" property." This distinction -- Revenue assesses
all property but then only values taxable
property -- indicates that the assessment required by AS
43.56.060(a) necessarily includes a determination that
property is taxable under AS 43.56.[75] The text of this
section thus suggests that the taxability determination is a
component of the assessment process, not a determination that
precedes the process.
(2)
Alaska Statute 43.56.090 requires Revenue to prepare annually
an assessment roll containing three things: " a
description of all taxable property; . . . the assessed value
of all taxable property; [and] . . . the names and addresses
of persons owning property subject to assessment and
taxation." The first component of the assessment roll,
" a description of all taxable property,"
necessarily involves a determination by Revenue that the
property described is taxable under AS 43.56. The statutory
scheme defines what constitutes taxable property under AS
43.56 and specifically enumerates certain types of property
that are and are not included in the definition of taxable
property.[76] Thus in order to prepare the
statutorily mandated assessment roll, Revenue must make an
initial determination that property fits within the statutory
definition of taxable oil and gas property and is not
exempted from taxation. And, as discussed above, that
determination is a part of the assessment process.
(3)
Under AS 43.56.100, Revenue must annually " send to
every owner of taxable property named in the assessment roll
a notice of assessment, showing the assessed value of the
property" and must send " a copy of the notice of
assessment on any taxable property that is assessed under [AS
43.56]" to each affected municipality. This assessment
notice thus serves as both notice of a property's
assessed value and notice that the property has been
determined taxable under AS 43.56, as the statute does not
require that owners of property deemed not taxable under AS
43.56 receive any such assessment notice.
(4)
Under AS 43.56.110, a property owner or municipality who
receives such an assessment notice may appeal it " by
advising [Revenue] in writing of the objections to the
assessment within 20 days of the effective date of the
notice." [77] Upon a property owner's
objection, Revenue is authorized to " adjust the
assessment and the assessment roll." [78] This
subsection does not limit what an owner or municipality can
appeal to Revenue -- any objection to the assessment may be
appealed. By the plain language of the statute, this includes
the mere fact of the property's inclusion on the
assessment roll, not only the dollar amount at which Revenue
has valued the property. Revenue's remedial power is
similarly broad, encompassing the power to adjust both the
assessment and the assessment roll.[79] Thus, if a
property owner or municipality can appeal the inclusion of
property on the assessment roll, Revenue may remove the
property from the roll altogether if it agrees that the
property is not taxable; its power is not limited to
adjusting the valuation of the property.
(5)
Alaska Statute 43.56.120 provides that " [a]fter a
ruling by [Revenue] on an appeal made under AS 43.56.110, the
owner or a municipality may further appeal to [SARB]."
This section is simple and unequivocal: whatever was appealed
to Revenue under AS 43.56.110 can be further appealed to
SARB. And, as previously noted, under AS 43.56.110 the
property owner can object to any aspect of the assessment
notice and Revenue must rule on this objection.
(6)
Alaska Statute 43.56.130 further underscores the broad scope
of SARB's jurisdiction established by AS 43.56.120. This
section establishes procedures for hearings before SARB and
mandates that SARB " shall hear appeals filed
under AS 43.56.120(a)." [80] The use of the
mandatory " shall" indicates that the legislature
did not intend to grant SARB or Revenue the discretion to
categorically remove a class of appeals from SARB's
jurisdiction.
(7)
Alaska Statute 43.56.130(f) provides that SARB may adjust a
property's assessed value only upon " proof of
unequal, excessive, or improper valuation or valuation not
determined in accordance with the standards set out in [AS
43.56]." But simply because the legislature limited the
grounds upon which SARB could adjust a property's
assessed value does not indicate that it intended to limit
SARB's role solely to adjustments of value. Such an
interpretation of AS 43.56.130(f) would contradict AS
43.56.130(a)'s simple and explicit command that SARB
" shall hear appeals filed under AS 43.56.120(a)."
[81] Moreover a property that Revenue has
incorrectly determined is taxable has certainly been "
improper[ly] valu[ed]," so AS 43.56.130(f) expressly
permits SARB to address issues of taxability. Indeed this is
how SARB interpreted the grant of jurisdiction for many years
before Revenue promulgated 15 AAC 56.015.[82]
(8)
Finally, AS 43.56.135 mandates that Revenue " shall
certify the final assessment roll and mail . . . a statement
of the amount of tax due" to each owner of taxable
property by June 1 of each year. This requirement implies
that all issues relating to the assessment roll must be
resolved at the administrative level by June 1 of each year.
This requirement must encompass taxability appeals, because
an assessment roll is not final if it still contains property
whose owners are disputing its taxability in appeal
proceedings before Revenue. Allowing taxability appeals at
the administrative level to extend beyond June 1, as
taxability appeals before Revenue currently do, contravenes
this clear statutory requirement because if an administrative
taxability appeal were later successful, the assessment roll
would then have to be altered after June 1, in direct tension
with this statutory prescription.
2.
Common usage of the term " assessment"
When
interpreting a statute, we construe its language "
'in accordance with [its] common usage,' unless the
word or phrase in question has 'acquired a peculiar
meaning, by virtue of statutory definition or judicial
construction.'" [83] As mentioned earlier,
the term " assessment" is not defined in AS 43.56,
and we have not ruled on its meaning. Nor is "
assessment" defined in AS 29.45, which governs municipal
taxation.[84] A diligent search of the Alaska
Statutes reveals there is no definition for the term "
assessment" in the context of property taxation in the
entirety of the code.
But we
can also rely on both dictionaries and texts in the field of
property assessment in order to ascertain the meaning of
" assessment." [85] The edition of
Black's Law Dictionary in existence at the time
of the drafting and enactment of AS 43.56 defines "
assessment" generally as " the process of
ascertaining and adjusting the shares respectively
to be contributed by several persons towards a common
beneficial object according to the benefit received."
[86] And it defines "
assessment" specifically for the purposes of property
taxation as " [t]he listing and valuation of
property for the purpose of apportioning a tax upon it."
[87] Both definitions contemplate the
scope of the term " assessment" as including not
just the assigning of value to a piece of property but also
the initial identification of that property as eligible for
taxation.
Texts
written by those who work in the field of property assessment
also consider a determination of taxability to be an integral
component of " assessment." As the superior court
noted in its order, " [d]eterminations that property is
taxable [are] a necessary step routinely undertaken by
municipal boards of tax equalization nationwide as reflected
in standard texts on assessment processes." One such
text defines " assessment" with respect to property
taxation as " the official act of discovering,
listing, and appraising property, whether performed by an
assessor, a board of review, or a court." [88] Another
text describing the assessment process and the tasks of
assessors includes the initial step in the process of "
[l]ocating and identifying all taxable property in the
jurisdiction." [89] These definitions indicate that
" assessment," as the term is commonly used,
includes the step of an initial determination that a property
is taxable.
3.
The significant consequences of Revenue's
interpretation
By
bifurcating the review process for valuation appeals from
that for taxability appeals, Revenue's interpretation of
the statute changes the standard of review that the superior
court affords to the administrative decision below on the
issue of taxability. The statute explicitly affords a
property owner or municipality appealing a decision by SARB a
right to a trial de novo in the superior court.[90] We have
rejected attempts by the superior court to limit the scope of
discovery in such appeals, and we have interpreted the right
to a trial de novo on appeal from SARB decisions to include
the standard discovery rights under the Alaska Civil
Rules.[91] The trial de novo thus affords the
appealing property owner or municipality an opportunity for
full discovery, motions practice, and time to resolve any
objections it has to SARB's determinations. And if the
superior court's decision is further appealed to this
court after a trial de novo, we review only the superior
court's decision, not SARB's decision.[92]
In
contrast, under Revenue's interpretation, a property
owner or municipality appealing a taxability decision by
Revenue to the superior court has no such statutory right to
a trial de novo. Rather they are limited to an administrative
appeal in which the decision to grant a trial de novo is left
to the discretion of the superior court judge.[93] We have
stated that such discretionary de novo review " is
rarely warranted" [94] and is generally limited to
review of due process violations at the agency
level.[95] If the property owner or
municipality is not granted a discretionary trial de novo on
a taxability claim, the superior court's review of
Revenue's decision will be limited to the record on file
with Revenue and will be deferential to Revenue's
findings.[96] It is unlikely the legislature would
have intended for these serious consequences to arise from a
distinction not provided for in the text of the statute, and
we are accordingly wary of adopting Revenue's
interpretation.
While
AS 43.56's plain text is silent on the scope of the term
" assessment," the text of the overall statutory
scheme, the common usage of the term " assessment"
in the property taxation context, and the significant
consequences of Revenue's interpretation of the statute
lead us to conclude that the statute's text indicates
that " assessment" encompasses the initial
taxability determination.
B.
Revenue's Interpretation Of " Assessment"
Through Its Regulation Is Not Consistent With The Legislative
History Of AS 43.56.
"
When interpreting a statute, we do not stop with the plain
meaning of the text" ; rather, " we apply a sliding
scale approach, where '[t]he plainer the statutory
language is, the more convincing the evidence of contrary
legislative purpose or intent must be.'"
[97]
The
legislative history of AS 43.56 lends some support to the
indication found in the plain text that Revenue's
determination of the taxability of oil and gas property is
part and parcel of the assessment process. The entirety of AS
43.56 was adopted during the first special legislative
session held in the fall of 1973.[98] In a letter to the
speaker of the house introducing the bill that would become
codified at AS 43.56, then-Governor Egan explained that
" [SARB] is created to serve the function of the local
board of equalization" and that " [t]he manner of
assessment and collection of the tax is similar to that
provided for municipalities." [99] Under AS 29.45,
which establishes the manner in which municipalities assess
and collect tax, the municipality's governing body sits
as a board of equalization when hearing appeals from
municipal tax assessments.[100] These municipal
boards of equalization routinely hear both valuation and
taxability appeals.[101]
The
State notes that, while municipal boards of equalization do
often hear taxability appeals, such appeals may also be
brought directly to the superior court.[102] The State
argues that because municipal boards of equalization do not
have exclusive jurisdiction over taxability appeals, neither
should SARB be understood to have such exclusive
jurisdiction. But municipal boards of equalization
do have exclusive jurisdiction over taxability
appeals at the administrative level; the statute does grant
property owners the right to appeal taxability determinations
directly to the superior court, but grants the board of
equalization exclusive jurisdiction over such appeals at the
administrative level. This is consistent with SARB having
exclusive jurisdiction over taxability appeals at the
administrative level, after Revenue issues an informal
conference decision, and the statutory grant to property
owners and municipalities of a right to appeal SARB's
determination to the superior court for trial de
novo.[103]
Finally,
the legislature, rather than contemplating a bifurcated
process for AS 43.56 appeals when drafting the bill that
would become AS 43.56, emphasized the virtue of condensing
power to hear such appeals in a single entity. The committee
drafting the bill heard extensive testimony on the need for a
uniform standard for assessment of oil and gas
property,[104] and ultimately created only a
single entity to hear appeals: SARB. It is exceedingly
unlikely that the legislature intended to create ...