United States District Court, D. Alaska
Maurice K. Mason, Plaintiff,
v.
Federal Express Corporation., et al, Defendants.
ORDER AND OPINION [RE: MOTIONS AT DOCKETS 81 AND
84]
JOHN
W. SEDWICK SENIOR JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
I.
MOTIONS PRESENTED
At
docket 81 plaintiff Maurice K. Mason (“Mason”)
moves for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 29
U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), supported by affidavits from his
two lawyers at dockets 82 and 83. At docket 84 Mason moves
for an award of prejudgment interest pursuant to D.Ak. L.R.
58.1(d), supported by his own affidavit at docket 85.
Defendants Federal Express Corporation; FedEx Trade Networks
Transport & Brokerage, Inc.; Aetna Life Insurance
Company; Federal Express Corporation Short Term Disability
Plan; and Federal Express Corporation Long Term Disability
Plan (collectively, “Defendants”) respond to both
motions at docket 89. Mason replies at docket 90.
At
docket 93 Michael Flanigan (“Flanigan”), one of
Mason’s lawyers, filed a supplemental affidavit to
update his attorney’s fees. At docket 102 Mason filed a
notice of a reduction in his claim for attorney’s fees
to remove time that Flanigan spent on Mason’s claim
that arose under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c). And, at docket 96
Mason filed a supplemental brief regarding his claim for
prejudgment interest on his award of LTD benefits.
Oral
argument was not requested and would not assist the court.
II.
BACKGROUND
The
court has described the background giving rise to this
litigation in detail in the order at docket 74. It need not
be repeated here. Suf fice it to say for present purposes
that Mason’s complaint asserts the following four
claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, as amended (“ERISA”):[1] (1) wrongful
denial of Mason’s STD benefits claim; (2) wrongful
refusal to consider his LTD benefits claim; (3) breach of
fiduciary duty; and (4) failure to provide requested plan
documents (under § 1132(c)). After the parties filed
cross-motions for partial summary judgment, the court granted
Mason partial summary judgment on his STD cause of action as
to all defendants, except his employer, FedEx Trade Networks
Transport & Brokerage, Inc. (“FedEx Trade”).
The court granted summary judgment to FedEx Trade, holding
that it is not a proper party to this action. As Mason
concedes, this decision eliminated FedEx Trade from the
case.[2]
The
court partially remanded the case to the STD claims
administrator to determine the amount of STD payments to be
made to Mason and to the LTD claims administrator to
determine the amount to be paid to Mason for past LTD
benefits under the LTD Plan. Mason filed a motion at docket
79 requesting an evidentiary hearing on his § 1132(c)
claim against Federal Express Corporation (“FedEx
Corp.”), but this motion became moot when the parties
settled the § 1132(c) claim. Pursuant to the settlement
agreement, Mason reduced his request for attorney’s
fees by five hours.[3]
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Courts
have discretion to allow reasonable attorney’s fees and
prejudgment interest in ERISA cases.[4] Defendants do not dispute
that Mason is entitled to recover prejudgment interest or his
attorney’s fees. Instead, they argue that Mason has not
sufficiently established the validity of the sums he seeks.
IV.
DISCUSSION
A.
Mason’s Attorney’s Fee Request
The
Ninth Circuit recognizes a two-step approach to determining
the amount of attorney’s fees in ERISA
actions.[5] Under this approach, the court first
determines the loadstar by multiplying the hours reasonably
expended on the case by a reasonable hourly
rate.[6] “The party seeking fees bears the
burden of documenting the hours expended in the litigation
and must submit evidence supporting those hours and the rates
claimed.”[7] Next, “in rare and exceptional
cases, ” the court may adjust the lodestar upward or
downward based on eleven factors[8] set out by the Supreme Court
in Hensley v. Eckerhart.[9]
1.
The lodestar
a.
Hours reasonably expended
Mason’s
two lawyers initially submitted affidavits stating that they
spent a combined 171.8 hours litigating this case (67.7 hours
from Flanigan plus 104.1 hours from Paula M. Jacobson
(“Jacobson”)) and paralegal Lisa Gallager
(“Gallager”) spent 52.9 hours.[10] In a
supplemental affidavit, Flanigan added 17 more hours to his
total.[11]Flanigan then reduced his hours by
five[12] in accord with the parties’
stipulation at docket 100. All told, Mason is seeking to
recover 183.8 hours of total attorney time (79.7 from
Flanigan and 104.1 from Jacobson) and 52.9 hours of paralegal
time.
Defendants
challenge many of the time entries as excessive. “[T]he
burden of producing a sufficiently cogent explanation”
for why a specific time entry is excessive is placed mostly
“on the shoulders of the losing parties, who not only
have the incentive, but also the knowledge of the case to
point out such things as excessive or duplicative billing
practices.”[13] Defendants argue that Jacobson’s
and Gallager’s hours are excessive because their firm
merely drafted the initial complaint and worked on the case
through the filing of the administrative record. They also
challenge several of Flanigan’s time entries because,
according to Defendants, this case “did not raise any
unique issues that required lengthy analysis or
briefing.”[14]
Defendants
challenge 23 specific time entries. With regard to 22 of
these 23 entries, Defendants state baldly that the entries
are excessive. Because Defendants fail to provide specific
explanations for why any of these entries are excessive, and
the court does not find any of them to be objectively
unreasonable, Defendants have failed to meet their burden
with regard to these objections. The lone exception is
Defendants’ objection to the 2.5 hours that Gallager
spent on November 10, 2014, conducting legal research into
“estoppel theory, Plan’s failure to delegate
fiduciary duties (as relevant to standard of
review.).”[15] Defendants note that this was not a
theory that Mason pursued in this case, and Mason effectively
concedes that this time was not reasonably spent by not
responding to Defendants’ specific objection. The court
will reduce Gallager’s hours by 2.5. Mason will be
awarded 183.8 hours of total attorney’s time, (79.7
from Flanigan and 104.1 from Jacobson) and 50.4 hours of
paralegal time.
b.
Reasonable hourly rate
Mason
submits that $300 is a reasonable hourly rate for his
attorneys’ work, and $100 per hour is a reasonable rate
for paralegal work. Defendants do not challenge the paralegal
rate, but do argue that Mason has not met his burden of
showing that $300 per hour is the prevailing market rate for
the services of lawyers in this community with
Flanigan’s and Jacobson’s experience.
Jacobson’s
affidavit states that she has 26 years of experience handling
civil matters, including ERISA cases, but does not cite any
examples where a court has awarded her $300 per hour for her
work. Similarly, Flanigan’s affidavit states that he
has 36 years of experience, but cites no cases in which he
was awarded the rate he seeks.
In
reply, Mason submits Horton v. Tesoro[16] and Avila
v. Pediatrix, [17] cases where courts awarded Flanigan fees
at a rate of $300 per hour. In neither case did the defendant
challenge the reasonableness of Flanigan’s requested
$300 hourly rate.[18]Although Jacobson was not involved in
these cases, her experience is roughly comparable to
Flanigan’s. The court finds that these cases are
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