Appeal
from the District Court, Third Judicial District, Trial Court
No. 3KN-12-904 CR Kenai, Matthew Christian, Magistrate Judge.
Lars
Johnson, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner,
Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Samuel
D. Scott, Assistant District Attorney, Kenai (briefing), John
Skidmore, Division Director, Criminal Division Central
Office, Anchorage (oral argument), and Craig W. Richards,
Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Suddock,
Superior Court Judge. [*].
OPINION
ALLARD, JUDGE
A jury
convicted David Henry Trumbly Jr. of driving under the
influence and refusal to submit to a chemical test. At
sentencing, the court initially imposed the mandatory minimum
fine of $1, 500 for each offense concurrent to one another. A
few days later, the court amended the judgment to impose the
fines consecutively (for a total fine of $3, 000) after the
State argued that the court had no authority to impose the
fines concurrently.
Trumbly
now appeals, arguing that the original judgment was a valid
final judgment and the court's actions therefore violated
the prohibition against double jeopardy. For the reasons
explained here, we agree with Trumbly and conclude that
sentencing courts have the discretion to impose these fines
consecutively or concurrently. We accordingly remand this
case to the district court and direct the court to correct
the judgment to reflect the court's initial imposition of
concurrent fines.
Trumbly
also argues that the police did not have probable cause to
arrest him for driving under the influence. Having reviewed
the record, we find no merit to this claim. We therefore
affirm Trumbly's convictions.
Why
we conclude that the original judgment was lawful
Under
Alaska law, a person convicted of refusal to submit to a
chemical test is subject to the same mandatory minimum
criminal penalties as a person convicted of the underlying
driving under the influence.[1] A first conviction for either
driving under the influence (DUI) or refusal to submit to a
chemical test (refusal) requires a mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment of 72 hours, a mandatory minimum license
revocation of 90 days, and a mandatory minimum fine of $1,
500.[2]
A second conviction for either offense requires a mandatory
minimum term of imprisonment of 20 days, a mandatory minimum
license revocation of 12 months, and a mandatory minimum fine
of $3, 000.[3]A third conviction for either offense
generally qualifies as a felony.[4]
A
subsection of the refusal statute, AS 28.35.032(g)(5),
additionally requires that the mandatory minimum sentence
imposed for the refusal conviction "shall run
consecutively with any other sentence of
imprisonment imposed on the person."[5]Thus, in cases
where the defendant is convicted of both refusal and DUI
arising out of the same incident, the mandatory term of
imprisonments must be imposed consecutively.
Because
these were Trumbly's first offenses for driving under the
influence and refusal to submit to a chemical test, he faced
the mandatory minimum penalties for a first time offender. At
sentencing, the judge imposed the 72-hour mandatory minimum
term of imprisonment for each offense consecutively, as
required by AS28.35.032(g)(5), but imposed the mandatory
minimum license revocations and fines concurrently.
In
response, the prosecutor filed a motion asserting that Alaska
law required consecutive mandatory minimum fines for driving
under the influence and refusal to submit to a chemical test.
The district court ultimately agreed with the State and
modified Trumbly's judgment to impose the fines
consecutively, resulting in a composite fine of $3, 000 ($1,
500 for each offense).
Trumbly
argues that the court erred in concluding that consecutive
fines were required by law. Because this question hinges on
our construction of the Alaska statutes, we review the
question de novo.[6]
n
appeal, the State acknowledges that AS 28.35.032(g)(5) does
not require the sentencing court to impose consecutive fines.
This subsection only requires the court to impose consecutive
"sentences of imprisonment." And, as our
caselaw demonstrates, "sentences of imprisonment"
refer to terms of imprisonment and do not refer to the other
penalties for driving under the influence and refusal, such
as license revocations and monetary fines.[7]
The
State argues instead that the court was required to impose
consecutive fines under AS 28.35.032(g)(2)(A), a different
statutory subsection within the refusal statute. This
subsection provides that, upon conviction under the refusal
statute, "the court may not ... suspend execution of the
sentence ... or grant probation except on condition ...