and Submitted August 10, 2016 San Francisco, California
from the United States District Court for the District of
Nevada Andrew P. Gordon, District Judge, Presiding D.C. No.
T. Rasmussen (argued), Rasmussen & Kang LLC, Las Vegas,
Nevada, for Defendant-Appellant.
William R. Reed (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;
Elizabeth O. White, Appellate Chief; Daniel G. Bogden, United
States Attorney; United States Attorney's Office, Reno,
Nevada; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before: Susan P. Graber and M. Margaret McKeown, Circuit
Judges, and Rosanna Malouf Peterson, [*] District
panel affirmed a criminal judgment in a case in which the
defendant was convicted under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act for continuing crimes that spanned
his 18th birthday.
panel rejected the defendant's contention that the
Juvenile Delinquency Act prohibits consideration of the
defendant's pre-majority conduct as proof of the
substantive crimes, and concluded that the defendant's
conviction must stand where the district court instructed the
jury that it could convict only if it found that the
defendant continued his participation after turning 18, and
the jury's special verdict form makes clear that the
defendant, in fact, continued his participation after turning
GRABER, CIRCUIT JUDGE
David Ray Camez participated in a criminal enterprise, known
as the "carder.su enterprise, " that operated an
online trading post for stolen and counterfeit access devices
and means of identification. The government indicted him
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO") for continuing crimes that, according to
the government, spanned Defendant's eighteenth birthday.
The district court instructed the jury that it could not
convict Defendant solely for his pre-majority conduct. But
the court permitted the jury, over Defendant's objection,
to consider Defendant's pre-majority conduct as proof of
the substantive crimes. Defendant argues that the Juvenile
Delinquency Act ("JDA") prohibits consideration of
his pre-majority conduct as proof of the substantive crimes.
Reviewing de novo the question of statutory interpretation,
United States v. Watson, 792 F.3d 1174, 1177 (9th
Cir. 2015), we hold that the district court's
instruction, which comported with the law of most circuits
that have addressed this issue, was not erroneous.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
carder.su enterprise engaged in unlawful trafficking of means
of identification, real and counterfeit; access devices; and
associated equipment. The enterprise's hierarchy included
an administrator, moderators, reviewers, vendors, and
members. Defendant was a "member" whose criminal
activities in furtherance of the enterprise included
production of, and trafficking in, counterfeit identification
documents, possession of counterfeit and unauthorized access
devices, and conspiracy to possess device-making equipment.
government indicted Defendant on two RICO counts: (1) a
substantive RICO count of participation in a criminal
enterprise, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); and (2)
a RICO conspiracy count of conspiring to participate in a
criminal enterprise, in violation of § 1962(d). Because
the government alleged both pre-majority and post-majority
conduct, the district court instructed the jury on the effect
of Defendant's age:
You may not convict Mr. Camez of RICO or RICO conspiracy
based solely on his juvenile acts. You may convict him only
if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Camez
continued to participate in the Carder.su organization or the