United States District Court, D. Alaska
ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERATION AND STAYING MOTION TO
VACATE SENTENCE
Sharon
L. Gleason UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before
the Court is Joshua Beaty's motion for reconsideration at
Docket 64. Mr. Beaty seeks reconsideration of the Court's
order at Docket 61, which denied Mr. Beaty's motion to
vacate his sentence. The Government opposed reconsideration
at Docket 72. Oral argument was held on October 4, 2016.
1.
Background
On
February 1, 2016, at Docket 43, Mr. Beaty filed a motion to
vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Upon
being appointed counsel, he filed his First Amended Motion to
Vacate, in which he argued that in light of the United States
Supreme Court's recent decision in Johnson v. United
States, the use of his two prior burglary convictions to
enhance the applicable Guideline range violates due
process.[1] The Government filed an opposition, in
which it argued that the Court had properly enhanced Mr.
Beaty's Guideline calculation because the burglaries
constituted crimes of violence that were listed in United
States Sentencing Guideline § 4B1.2 as it existed at the
time of sentencing.[2] The Government also argued that by signing
a plea agreement, Mr. Beaty waived his ability to
collaterally attack his sentence on the basis he had asserted
in his motion.[3] And the Government argued that even if the
residual clause were applicable, Johnson's
analysis does not apply retroactively to the residual clause
in the Sentencing Guidelines. At Docket 56, the Government
moved to stay the proceedings until the Ninth Circuit
determined the issue.[4] After that filing was made, the issue came
before the United States Supreme Court in Beckles v.
United States, but the Court has not yet issued its
ruling in that case.[5] Mr. Beaty replied to the Government's
opposition to the motion to vacate at Docket 57 and objected
to staying the proceedings at Docket 58.
Upon
initial consideration of these motions, the Court issued an
order on September 6, 2016 at Docket 61, in which it observed
that Mr. Beaty's original Guideline calculation included
an enhancement based on Mr. Beaty's prior burglary
convictions and held that Mr. Beaty had waived his right to
collaterally attack that calculation. Accordingly, the Court
denied both Mr. Beaty's motion to vacate and the
Government's motion to stay.
On
September 8, 2016, Mr. Beaty filed the current motion for
reconsideration of the Court's September 6, 2016 order.
Upon consideration of the parties' arguments, the Court
will grant that motion and set aside its order denying the
motion to vacate. However, the Court will also on its own
initiative stay its determination of the motion to vacate
pending the Supreme Court's determination in
Beckles.
2.
Relief from the Prior Order
Pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), a “court
may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding . . . [for] any other reason
[not covered by (1)-(5)] that justifies
relief.”[6] While Rule 60(b)(6) is reserved for
“extraordinary circumstances, ”[7] the Ninth Circuit
has held that legal error may provide a basis for
relief.[8]
3.
The Court's Reliance on the Residual Clause at
Sentencing
On June
12, 2013, the Court sentenced Mr. Beaty to a term of
imprisonment of 96 months for the offense of Felon in
Possession of a Firearm.[9] The Court calculated the Guideline
range at the start of the sentencing hearing. The statutory
maximum for the crime was 120 months. In the absence of such
limitation, the Guideline range would have been 130 to 162
months[10]-a range that was based on a total
offense level of 27, [11] which was based in part on a 4-level
enhancement due to Mr. Beaty's two prior burglary
convictions pursuant to § 2K2.1(a)(2).[12] But because
of the statutory maximum, the Court's Guideline
calculation defaulted to 120 months. The Court then
considered all of the applicable factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) and imposed a sentence of 96
months.[13]
At the
time of Mr. Beaty's sentencing, the Ninth Circuit had
recognized that the elements of burglary under Alaska law
were not a categorical match with the generic definition of
burglary under federal law.[14] But the Ninth Circuit had also
held that a district court could rely on the residual clause
to classify prior burglaries as crimes of
violence.[15]Given the posture of the then-current
Ninth Circuit authority, Mr. Beaty had no basis at the time
of his sentencing to object to the enhancement of his
Guideline calculation based on the prior burglary
convictions. Accordingly, Mr. Beaty's Guideline
calculation depended, at least in theory, on the validity of
the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2), and the
Court's September 6, 2016 order erroneously held
otherwise. Therefore, the Court's prior order at Docket
61 will be vacated, and the Court will reconsider Mr.
Beaty's first amended motion to vacate at Docket 51.
4.
Motion to Vacate
Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner “may move
the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or
correct the sentence, ” on the grounds that “the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States.”
Mr.
Beaty argues that the Supreme Court's holding in
Johnson, which nullified the residual clause
contained in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), applies
equally to the identically-worded residual clause contained
in § 4B1.2. In Johnson, the Supreme Court held
that the residual clause of the ACCA was unconstitutional
under the void-for-vagueness doctrine.[16] Then in
Welch, the Court found that Johnson applies
retroactively to cases on collateral review, [17] creating the
potential for relief for prisoners previously sentenced
pursuant to the residual clause of the ACCA. But neither the
Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit have determined whether
Johnson's reasoning applies retroactively to
Guideline cases on collateral review. The issue is currently
before the Supreme Court in Beckles v. United
States;[18] oral argument was heard on November 28,
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