Appeal
from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third
Judicial District, Anchorage, Catherine M. Easter, Judge.
Superior Court No. 3 AN-14-00397 PR
Stuart
C. Rader, Ingaldson Fitzgerald, P.C., Anchorage, for
Appellants.
David
D. Clark, Law Office of David Clark, Anchorage, for Appellee.
Before: Stowers, Chief Justice, Winfree, and Bolger,
Justices. [Fabe and Maassen, Justices, not participating.]
OPINION
STOWERS, Chief Justice.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Alaska
Statute 13.12.502(b) provides that a testamentary instrument
will be "valid as a holographic will, whether or not
witnessed, if the signature and material portions of the
document are in the testator's handwriting." Before
us is a purported holographic will, written totally in the
decedent's handwriting, with instructions to distribute
the decedent's estate at death. The sole question on
appeal is whether the decedent's handwritten name at the
beginning of the document is a "signature" as
contemplated by AS 13.12.502(b). This is an issue of first
impression in our state, and we agree with the superior
court's conclusion that a testator's handwritten name
in the exordium clause[1] of a purported holographic will is
sufficient to satisfy the signature requirement in AS
13.12.502(b) unless the instrument is otherwise incomplete.
II.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In
January 2010 Alva Marie Baker handwrote a purported will. The
instrument, as closely as possible, is reproduced below [sic
throughout]:
Jan 10/2010
Jan 10/2010
My name is Alva Marie Baker -
My "will" when I pass on is to go as
follows!
(1) My home goes to my daughter Connie Marie Sumrall
(2) Any vehicles or vehicle! I own upon
death goes to Connie Sumrall
(3) All "tools" and "furniture" of any
kind goes to Connie Sumrall
(4) All funds held in a checking account goes to Connie
Sumrall at Northrim Bank[2]
(5) All funds in saving accounts goes to Connie
Sumrall
(6) Any Insurance I may have goes to Connie
Sumrall
(7) Any Jewerly I may have upon death goes to my daughter
Connie Sumrall
(8) All pictures I have upon my death given to me by
"Connie ¶ my grandchildren gave me, can go
back to the "giver ! ! "I can not take
them with me ! !
(9) All "old" furniture can go to Connie, if she
wants them if not, let the grand children
"pick" some - please do not fight
over anything !
(10) Money I have M "Key Bank Eagle
River, AK) Equal divided
Will be divided to (Equal) my 7 grand
kids -
The grand kids that have passed away, if they have a child it
will go to (there child or divided between their
kids)
Baker
died in November 2013. In February 2014 Baker's daughter,
Connie Marie Sumrall, filed a petition for adjudication of
testacy and formal probate of the instrument. That petition
was opposed by Seth Whaley and Jessica Milwicz, two of
Baker's grandchildren.
Sumrall
moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the document
was a valid holographic will per AS 13.12.502(b) because it
was written in Baker's hand and signed by Baker. Whaley
and Milwicz opposed that motion arguing that there were
genuine issues of material fact as to, among other things,
whether the handwriting on the will was Baker's, whether
there was testamentary intent, and whether there were issues
of incapacity or undue influence. The superior court denied
Sumrall's motion for partial summary judgment, ruling
that an evidentiary hearing would be necessary "to
determine . . . whether the identification of Ms. Baker
constitutes a signature as contemplated by [the holographic
will statute]."
Prior
to the hearing, Whaley and Milwicz stipulated that the
handwriting on the contested will was entirely Baker's.
And all parties stipulated that whether Baker's
handwritten name in the first sentence of the contested will
"complie[d] with the signature requirement of AS
13.12.502" was "an issue of law for determination
by the court, " and that Sumrall "[was] not
precluded from offering extrinsic evidence in support of her
opposition to [Whaley and Milwicz's] motion for summary
judgment." The superior court issued orders accepting
both stipulations.
Whaley
and Milwicz then filed a motion for partial summary judgment
seeking a determination that Baker's handwritten name at
the top of the document was not a signature as contemplated
by AS 13.12.502(b), and that Baker therefore died intestate.
Sumrall opposed that motion and filed a cross-motion for
partial summary judgment arguing that Baker's handwritten
name was a signature as contemplated by AS 13.12.502(b) and
that the document was a valid holographic will.
In
March 2015 the superior court denied Whaley and Milwicz's
motion for partial summary judgment. The order related
exclusively to the question "whether the purported
execution of the will-a signature contained in the
introductory clause-can satisfy [AS] 13.12.502(b), governing
holographic wills." Alaska Statute 13.12.502(b) provides
that a testamentary instrument may be "valid as a
holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if the signature
and material portions of the document are in the
testator's handwriting." The court concluded that,
although there "is limited Alaska precedent"
interpreting that statute, Alaska law does not require a
terminal signature in order for a holographic will to be
valid.
The
court reasoned that "Alaska follows a holographic will
statute nearly identical to that in California,
"[3] and California courts have determined that
when faced with a purported will in which the signature does
not appear at the end, "the court must determine from an
inspection of the instrument's language, form[, ] and the
relative position of its parts whether or not there is a
positive and satisfactory inference that the decedent's
name was placed in that location with the intention of
executing the instrument."[4] Applying the California rule to
this case, the superior court determined that there was a
"satisfactory inference" that Baker placed her name
in the introductory clause "with the intention of
executing the instrument" and that the instrument
therefore "as a matter of law ... meets the requirements
of AS § 13.12.502(b)."
Whaley
and Milwicz filed a motion for reconsideration and the
superior court denied the motion. Whaley and Milwicz then
notified the court that they wished to dismiss their
"claims concerning decedent's competence, undue
influence[, ] and insane delusion"; the court issued an
order dismissing those claims with prejudice. Whaley and
Milwicz sought our review of the superior court's ruling
that the document was a valid holographic will. We denied
their petition for review without prejudice because it was
not a direct appeal from the superior court's entry of a
formal testacy order.[5]
The
parties then stipulated that there were no more disputed
issues. The superior court entered the stipulation
"[b]ased on contestants' notice of dismissal with
prejudice as to their other objections and their request that
the evidentiary [hearing] to address other objections be
vacated." The will subsequently entered formal probate,
and Sumrall was appointed personal representative of the
estate.
Whaley
and Milwicz now appeal the entry of the final testacy order.
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The
interpretation of a statute is a legal question which we
review de novo.[6]"We interpret... Alaska law according
to reason, practicality, and common sense, taking into
account the plain meaning and purpose of the law as well as
the intent of the drafters."[7] In interpreting statutes, we
take "a 'sliding scale' approach...: 'the
plainer the language of the statute, the more convincing any
contrary legislative history must be.'
"[8]
IV.
...