Appeal
from the Superior Court, First Judicial District, Juneau,
Trial Court No. 1JU-12-384 CR Philip M. Pallenberg, Judge.
Doug
Miller, Law Office of Douglas S. Miller, Anchorage, for the
Appellant.
Eric
A. Ringsmuth, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal
Appeals, Anchorage, and Craig W. Richards, Attorney General,
Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Suddock,
Superior Court Judge. [*]
OPINION
MANNHEIMER, Judge
While
Steven Warren Stiner was on bail release pending the appeal
of his conviction for a felony assault, the police stopped
his truck for a traffic infraction. One of the officers who
conducted the stop observed a pistol barrel resting against
Stiner's right leg. The police seized this pistol and
they arrested Stiner.
Following
a bench trial, Stiner was found guilty of three crimes
relating to his possession of this firearm: felon in
possession of a concealable firearm, and two counts of
violating the conditions of his release (the condition that
he obey all laws, and the condition that he not possess
firearms).[1]
At
Stiner's sentencing, his attorney asked the superior
court to enter a single merged conviction for all three
crimes. The superior court granted this motion in part. The
court ruled that Stiner should receive only one merged
conviction for violating the two conditions of his release,
but the court ruled that this conviction should not
merge with the felon-in-possession verdict. The court
reasoned that the societal harms presented by the two
offenses (violating bail conditions versus possessing a
concealable firearm as a felon) were sufficiently distinct
that Stiner's conduct would support two separate
convictions. Stiner now appeals that decision.
Why
we conclude that Stiner's conduct supports two
convictions
Stiner
argues that, under Alaska's double jeopardy clause as
construed by our supreme court in Whitton v. State,
[2] it
is improper for him to receive two convictions for his single
act of possessing a firearm.
Whitton
and the later cases construing Whitton address the
situation where a defendant's single act violates
separate criminal statutes. These cases provide the framework
for deciding whether a sentencing court should enter separate
convictions for the separate statutory violations, or whether
separate convictions would constitute a prohibited double
punishment under the double jeopardy clause.
Under
Whitton, a court must focus on the societal
interests advanced or protected by the statutes that were
violated, and decide whether those statutory interests are
sufficiently distinct to support separate
convictions.[3]
In
Stiner's case, we agree with the superior court that
Stiner's violation of his bail conditions implicated a
societal interest that is substantially different from
society's interest in prohibiting felons from possessing
concealable firearms. Aside from the fact that Stiner was a
convicted felon who was prohibited from possessing handguns,
Stiner had secured his release pending appeal by promising to
abide by various bail conditions. The court (and the public)
had an independent interest in having those bail conditions
enforced, not only to punish Stiner personally for his
knowing disregard of those conditions, but also to deter
future defendants from violating their ...