In the Matter of the Adoption of HANNAH L., a Minor.
Appeal
from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third
Judicial District, No. 3PA-13-00149 PR Palmer, Vanessa White,
Judge.
No.
7157-March 10, 2017
Kristen C. Stohler, Stohler Law, P.C., Palmer, for Appellant
Daniel W. Notice of nonparticipation filed by Appellee
Brandon L.
No
appearance by Appellee Tarrah W.
Before: Stowers, Chief Justice, Fabe, Winfree, Maassen, and
Bolger, Justices.
OPINION
WINFREE, Justice.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Alleging
that parenting failures waived the biological father's
otherwise legally required consent, a stepfather petitioned
to adopt his wife's daughter over the biological
father's objection. The superior court determined that
the proposed adoption was not in the child's best
interests and denied the petition. On reconsideration the
court noted that the child's best interests determination
was sufficient to deny the petition and concluded that a
determination whether the biological father had waived
consent was unnecessary, but nonetheless determined that the
biological father's actions did not constitute a waiver
of consent. The stepfather appeals. Because the record
supports the court's best interests determination - and
that determination by itself is sufficient to block the
adoption - we affirm the court's decision denying the
adoption petition.
II.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Tarrah
W. and Brandon L. are the biological parents of Hannah,
[1]
born in 2007. Tarrah and Brandon never married; they ended
their relationship when Hannah was an infant. Tarrah and
Daniel W. married in 2008.
Tarrah
and Brandon initially had no formal custody and visitation
agreement. Brandon exercised frequent visits with Hannah by
requesting time from Tarrah, who generally was accommodating.
Brandon's time with Hannah included overnight visits
approximately every other weekend and other extended visits.
According
to Tarrah, Hannah began resisting visitation with Brandon
around June 2011. Hannah would scream and cry and refuse to
see Brandon. Tarrah would on occasion physically force Hannah
to participate by, for example, removing Hannah from
Tarrah's car, putting Hannah in Brandon's car, and
leaving. Alternatively she might "bribe" Hannah by
telling her she could get ice cream or go to the toy store on
the way to Brandon's house. Tarrah discussed Hannah's
resistence with Brandon, but he was generally dismissive,
asserting that children frequently and inexplicably behave
defiantly.
Tarrah
said she stopped "forcing" Hannah to participate in
visitation with Brandon starting in spring 2012; from then
until June 2013, despite frequent requests, Brandon saw
Hannah only once or twice. Brandon and Tarrah typically
communicated through text messaging, and his persistent
requests generally were ignored.
In
April 2013 Tarrah proposed counseling to heal Hannah and
Brandon's relationship. Brandon disagreed with
counseling, believing there was "nothing wrong with my
daughter" and it "could do [her] more damage."
He accused Tarrah of being "dramatic" and using
counseling as an obstacle to his time with Hannah. Over
Brandon's objection Tarrah initiated counseling for
Hannah in late April. In June Tarrah told Brandon that the
counselor recommended Hannah have no contact with him and
that Tarrah was taking that recommendation. Tarrah invited
Brandon to call the counselor.
Daniel
petitioned in early June to adopt Hannah, asserting that
Brandon's consent to the adoption was not required under
AS 25.23.050(a).[2] Brandon was not served with the
petition. Unaware of the adoption action, a short time later
Brandon sued Tarrah for legal and physical custody of Hannah.
The
superior court consolidated the matters and held an
evidentiary hearing on interim custody in August. The court
awarded Tarrah interim primary physical custody and awarded
Brandon supervised visitation twice weekly. Four supervised
visits between Brandon and Hannah were attempted, but
visitation continued to be unsuccessful because Hannah
verbally and physically resisted meeting with Brandon.
Brandon
was allowed to select a new counselor for Hannah to alleviate
bias concerns, and Hannah began therapy with the new
counselor in September. In November the superior court
mediated a settlement agreement addressing the custody
dispute and placing the adoption petition on hold for six
months. The parties agreed Brandon would not have legal or
physical custody, but he gained certain visitation rights.
Daniel agreed he would not later argue that Brandon had
waived parental consent to adoption by failing to
significantly support Hannah if: (1) Brandon paid his base
monthly child support for six months; (2) Brandon complied
with Hannah's counselor's recommendations; and (3)
the counselor believed Brandon and Hannah made sufficient
progress during reunification therapy.[3]
After
the six months had elapsed a bench trial on the contested
adoption took place in May and June of 2014; the superior
court made its decision on the record at the end of June and
rendered written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in
March 2015. The court denied Daniel's adoption petition
because it was not in Hannah's best
interests[4] and determined that Brandon's
conduct did "not justify the termination of his parental
rights." The court instead determined that it was in
Hannah's best interests to maintain a relationship with
Brandon; the court observed that Brandon had neither
"taken a meaningful role" nor "demonstrated
consistent involvement" in Hannah's life, and it
ordered mandatory reunification therapy with the expectation
of transitioning into a regular visitation schedule.
Daniel
sought reconsideration, asserting, among other things, that
the superior court had failed to determine whether Brandon
had waived his right to consent to the adoption. Daniel
argued that Brandon's failure to meaningfully
communicate, failure to provide support, and abandonment
constituted waiver of consent. The court issued a
reconsideration order clarifying its findings and conclusions
two days after Daniel's motion would otherwise have been
deemed denied under Alaska Civil Rule 77(k)(4).[5] The order
included findings that Brandon did not waive consent to the
adoption. The court also explained it had not previously
addressed waiver because "on the basis of the entirety
of the testimony heard" it had determined that adoption
was not in Hannah's best interests.
Daniel
appeals the adoption ruling, asserting that: (1) the
court's order on reconsideration should be vacated as a
matter of law because it was untimely; (2) the court erred by
failing to find that Brandon's consent had been waived;
and (3) the court erred by deciding that adoption was not in
Hannah's best interests. Brandon and Tarrah have not
participated in the appeal.
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"When
interpreting the Civil Rules we exercise our independent
judgment, adopting the rule of law that is most persuasive in
light of reason, precedent, and policy."[6]
"Although we review the superior court's factual
findings in adoption proceedings for clear error, we review
de novo as [a] matter[] of law whether ... factual findings
satisfy the requirements for application of a
statute."[7] We have explained:
When reviewing factual findings we ordinarily will not
overturn a trial court's finding based on conflicting
evidence, and we will not re-weigh evidence when the record
provides clear support for the trial court's ruling; it
is the function of the trial court, not of this court, to
judge witnesses' credibility and to weigh conflicting
evidence.[8]
IV.
DISCUSSION
A.
The Superior Court Did Not Err By Issuing Its Reconsideration
Order.
The
superior court issued its written custody and adoption
decision in March 2015. Daniel timely moved for
reconsideration. After 30 days Daniel's motion was deemed
denied under Rule 77(k)(4).[9] Daniel filed a timely
notice of appeal the next day.[10] But the following day,
notwithstanding that the motion to reconsider was already
deemed denied under Rule 77(k)(4), the court issued its
"Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration and Clarifying
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, " directly
addressing Daniel's reconsideration contentions.
Daniel
asserts that the superior court erred by ruling on his motion
for reconsideration two days after the 30-day time period
provided by Rule 77(k)(4) expired. Daniel urges us "to
vacate the trial court's [reconsideration order] as
untimely and to rely on the record as it existed [on the date
given by Rule 77(k)(4)]." Arguing that the
"deadline is not optional, it is mandatory, "
Daniel suggests that the court made "novel factual and
legal findings relative to its original order" that were
inappropriate because the order was late.[11] He also
contends that the delay required him to undertake
unanticipated additional appellate briefing while "not
knowing exactly what findings of fact and conclusions of
law" were subject to appeal.
We
reject Daniel's contentions. To the extent the Civil
Rules are "mandatory" in this context, their
enforcement is against parties, not the
court.[12]Rule 77(k)'s limited purpose is
"to remedy mistakes injudicial decision-making where
grounds exist, while recognizing the need for a fair and
efficient administration of justice."[13] A party
requesting reconsideration invites the court to reassess its
ruling.[14]The court is therefore authorized to
enter new factual and legal findings addressing
reconsideration arguments. Contrary to Daniel's
implication, denying reconsideration by providing additional
analysis or clarification cannot in itself be prejudicial.
The superior court's additional determinations clarified
its prior order's alleged shortcomings, comporting with
Rule 77(k)'s purpose of efficiently remedying potential
mistakes in judicial decision-making.[15] Moreover the
additional findings, conclusions, and analysis better serve
us in undertaking meaningful review.[16] Finally, we note
that Daniel was notified of his appellate briefing due date
over two months after he filed his appeal notice. He then
requested and was granted two 30-day extensions to file his
brief. Daniel had more than adequate time to address the
reconsideration ruling.
We
conclude that the superior court did not violate Rule 77(k)
by issuing the delayed reconsideration order.
B.
The Superior Court Did Not Err By Denying The Adoption
Petition.
1.
Denial of an adoption petition can be based on either prong -
lack of required consent or best interests of the
child.
Under
AS 25.23.120(c) a court is permitted to issue a final decree
of adoption only if it determines both that "the
required consents have been obtained or excused" and
that "the adoption is in the best interest of the person
to be adopted."[17] The superior court initially ruled
that after making its best interests determination it did not
need to examine whether Brandon had waived his right to
consent to the adoption. Daniel argues that "[t]he trial
court erred by failing to make findings whether [Brandon]
waived his right to consent to [the] adoption."
Daniel's argument is based on a technicality - that if
the reconsideration order is vacated there are no consent
...