JAMES E. BARBER, Appellant,
v.
STATE OF ALASKA, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellee. BILLY JACK WIGLESWORTH, Appellant,
v.
STATE OF ALASKA, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellee. MATTHEW M. MOORE, Appellant,
v.
STATE OF ALASKA, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellee
Appeal
from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, No.
3AN-81-05274 CI Third Judicial District, Anchorage, John
Suddock, Judge.
Appearances:
James
E. Barber, pro se, Anchorage, Billy Jack Wiglesworth, pro se,
Wasilla, and Matthew M. Moore, pro se, Palmer, Appellants.
John
K. Bodick, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Craig
W. Richards, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellees.
Before: Stowers, Chief Justice, Maassen and Bolger, Justices.
[Fabe and Winfree, Justices, not participating.]
OPINION
STOWERS, Chief Justice.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Beginning
in 2013 a number of pro se prisoners moved for the superior
court to enforce the terms of the 1990 Final Settlement
Agreement and Order[2] in the Cleary case,
[3] a
class action by inmates regarding prison conditions. In 2014
Superior Court Judge John Suddock dismissed the
prisoners' motions, concluding that the Final Settlement
Agreement was unenforceable because it had been terminated in
2001 when Superior Court Judge Elaine M. Andrews found that
the requirements for termination had been met. But Judge
Andrews did not terminate the Final Settlement Agreement
because she determined that the Alaska Prison Litigation
Reform Act was only constitutional if it did not terminate
the Final Settlement Agreement. Judge Andrews's 2001
Order became the law of the case when it was issued. Because
Judge Suddock failed to make required findings when reversing
the law of the case, we reverse Judge Suddock's Order and
remand for further proceedings.
II.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. The
Cleary Case
Smith
v. Cleary describes the Cleary Final Settlement
Agreement:
This case began in 1981 as a class action brought against the
state by Alaska prisoners challenging prison conditions. The
plaintiffs formed three subclasses: pretrial detainees
(subclass A), sentenced prisoners in state owned or operated
correctional centers (subclass B), and prisoners held by the
state in federal facilities (subclass C). Although the state
and subclass C settled in 1983, litigation continued with the
remaining subclasses until the parties entered a
comprehensive settlement, which the superior court
incorporated in a consent decree in 1990.
The settlement agreement applied to "all inmates, with
some exceptions, who are or will in the future be
incarcerated in correctional facilities owned or operated by
the state" and bound the Department of Corrections and
"any successor department, division, or agency of the
state of Alaska which is statutorily responsible for the
administration of the state's adult correctional
facilities." It included elaborate provisions for future
operation of Alaska prisons, enumerated rights of inmates,
guaranteed the availability of specific rehabilitative
programs and services, required the state to implement an
inmate classification system, created population guidelines,
and established caps to eliminate overcrowding. The agreement
also established mechanisms to monitor ongoing compliance,
including a provision calling for a designated superior court
judge to have continuing jurisdiction over alleged
violations.[4]
The
Final Settlement Agreement "ordinarily allows compliance
challenges to be prosecuted individually by prisoners who
have exhausted all available administrative
remedies."[5]
B.
Alaska Prison Litigation Reform Act And 2001 Superior Court
Order
In 1999
the Alaska Legislature enacted the Alaska Prison Litigation
Reform Act (APLRA), AS 09.19.200, which established standards
for terminating prospective relief under the Final Settlement
Agreement and any other litigation challenging prisoner
conditions in Alaska. Alaska Statute 09.19.200(c) provides:
Prospective relief ordered in a civil action with respect to
correctional facility conditions, including prospective
relief ordered under a consent decree, regardless of whether
that civil action was filed or the relief ordered before or
after August 30, 1999, shall be terminated upon the motion of
the defendant unless the court finds that there exists a
current violation of a state or federal right....
In 2000
the Department moved to terminate the Final Settlement
Agreement pursuant to AS 09.19.200(c).[6] The plaintiffs
opposed that motion and argued that the APLRA was
unconstitutional.[7] Judge Andrews ruled that the APLRA was
constitutional provided that it only terminated the
prospective effect of the Final Settlement Agreement and not
the Agreement itself.[8] She concluded that prospective relief
under the APLRA is limited to remedy violations of state or
federal law.[9]
In 2001
Judge Andrews held another hearing on the status of the Final
Settlement Agreement.[10] The court-appointed compliance
monitor reported that all matters referred to him were
resolved in conformity with the Agreement and that judicial
oversight was no longer necessary; the court then terminated
active judicial supervision in the case.[11]
Judge
Andrews also explained that the majority of federal courts
had terminated previously issued prisoner-rights consent
decrees under the federal equivalent of the
APLRA.[12] But she instead adopted the approach in
Gilmore v. California[13] and decided that the APLRA
should be construed to leave the Final Settlement Agreement
intact while restricting the court's authority to order
continuing prospective relief under the
Agreement.[14] Judge Andrews noted that the
Gilmore court "described the consideration of
whether the termination of consent decrees violates the
separation of powers doctrine as a 'grave constitutional
question whether Congress can command the courts
retroactively to terminate a final judgment.'
"[15] Judge Andrews agreed with
Gilmore that "it would pose a grave
constitutional question if the Alaska Legislature was
attempting to require the court to terminate a final order
and judgment rather than merely terminate the relief
available under the consent decree."[16] She therefore
avoided "the more difficult question of
constitutionality ... by construing the APLRA narrowly to
terminate only prospective relief due parties under the
consent decree but not the consent decree
itself."[17] No party appealed Judge Andrews's
decision, and that decision became law of the case.
C.
Current Challenges
1.
James Barber
In
October 2013 James Barber and four other inmates housed at
Spring Creek Correctional Center in Seward each filed 30
identical motions under the Cleary heading alleging
violations of the Final Settlement Agreement. In February
2014 the Goose Creek Correctional Center in Wasilla began
restricting prisoners from sending mail to one another
"except as allowed by the superintendent." In April
2014 after Barber had been transferred to Goose Creek, he and
nine other inmates filed motions under the Cleary
heading regarding the Department of Corrections' decision
to prohibit prisoner-to-prisoner mail communication. The
inmates contended that the Department's policy violated
the Final Settlement Agreement.
2.
Billy Jack Wiglesworth
Billy
Jack Wiglesworth was already a prisoner at the Goose Creek
Correctional Center when it began prohibiting
prisoner-to-prisoner mail. In March 2014 after exhausting his
administrative remedies through the prison grievance system
Wiglesworth, along with three other inmates, filed a motion
in the superior court. Wiglesworth's motion alleged
violations of the Final Settlement Agreement, the Alaska
Administrative Code, the Alaska Constitution, and the
Department's procedures. Although Wiglesworth contended
that the Department's action violated his constitutional
right to free speech, he requested that the court in its
discretion order prospective relief for 18 months to give the
parties an opportunity to separately litigate the free speech
issue.[18]
The
Department opposed Wiglesworth's motion and argued that
the prisoners had failed to show that the restriction was a
violation of his state or federal rights. The Department
asserted that 22 AAC 05.520(a) provided it with the authority
to restrict prisoner mail where "the security of the
facility requires limitation"; it claimed that the
restriction was required to combat an increase in gang
activity in Alaska prisons.
In his
reply Wiglesworth again suggested that the court could
provide relief for up to two years while the parties
litigated the issue of prisoner free speech. Wiglesworth
noted the Department did not support its claim that gang
activity had increased or suggest that its previous practice
of restricting mail on a case by case basis was no longer
sufficient. He argued that if the Department was correct in
asserting that new concerns about increasing gang violence
prompted the change in policy, the Department should have
sought modification of the Final Settlement Agreement
pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 60(b).
In
April 2014 Goose Creek instituted a new rule that inmates
would be able to receive black and white photocopies of all
incoming letters and would not receive the
originals.[19] Wiglesworth moved for a preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order pending the
outcome of the administrative process. The Department opposed
the motion and argued that Wiglesworth failed to show that
its practice violated state or federal law, that security
concerns justified the new procedure, and that the new
procedure did not violate the Final Settlement Agreement.
3.
2014 Superior Court Order
In July
2014 Judge Suddock concluded that the superior court was no
longer authorized to enforce the Final Settlement Agreement.
Judge Suddock explained that Judge Andrews's 2001 Order
misinterpreted Gilmore v. California.[20] Judge Suddock
noted that under the APLRA the State as a moving party was
entitled to termination of remedies as to the Final
Settlement Agreement's provisions absent allegations of
current and ongoing violations of state or federal rights.
Because Judge Andrews did not find any constitutional rights
when she issued her order in 2001, Judge Suddock concluded
the Department had met the APLRA's requirements for
termination of the Final Settlement Agreement.
Based
on the fact that the Department had satisfied the
requirements for termination of the Final Settlement
Agreement in 2001, Judge Suddock determined that the
Agreement was in fact terminated by Judge Andrews's 2001
Order, although the superior court failed to recognize that
at the time.
Judge
Suddock then turned to the prisoners' argument that the
court is authorized to enforce the Agreement's provisions
under a lesser standard for a period of two years. He
declined to invoke the court's authority, saying that
"the court would invoke its special two-year injunctive
power only under the clearest of circumstances, which it
[found] [were] not present" and that "changed
conditions readily supported] [the Department's]
safety-based policy decision to abandon inmates'
Cleary rights to receive any publications from
personal sources."
Finally,
Judge Suddock described the status of prisoners' rights
to challenge prison conditions after termination:
If any inmate desires to file a future claim alleging a state
or federal rights violation not grounded in the terms of the
consent decree, which extends to the entire class and seeking
a narrowly-tailored, least-intrusive remedy that does not
unduly interfere with the appropriate operation of the
criminal justice system, that course of action remains open,
...