KEVIN M. EASLEY, Appellant and Cross-Appellee,
v.
TAMMY M. EASLEY, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
Appeal
from the Superior Court No. 3AN-07-06831 CI of the State of
Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Catherine M.
Easter, Judge.
Appearances: Daniel I. Pace, Pace Law Offices, Anchorage, for
Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Jeffrey J. Jarvi, Anchorage, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Before: Stowers, Chief Justice, Winfree, Maassen, Bolger, and
Carney, Justices.
OPINION
BOLGER, Justice.
I.
INTRODUCTION
In a
2008 divorce decree based on a settlement agreement, an
ex-husband was ordered to sell the marital home and
thereafter pay his ex-wife her share of the estate. But by
2015 he had not yet done so. The superior court ordered the
ex-husband to sell the home in 90 days and entered judgment
against him after the deadline passed. The ex-husband now
appeals on due process and equity grounds, and the ex-wife
appeals seeking prejudgment interest, attorney's fees,
and costs. Because both parties' arguments lack merit, we
affirm the superior court's order.
II.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Tammy
Easley filed for divorce from Kevin Easley in 2007 after more
than a decade of marriage. Paragraph 21(b) of their 2008
divorce decree, which was based on a settlement agreement,
required Kevin to pay Tammy $325, 000 after selling the
marital home. The settlement structure made the sale of the
home a condition precedent to the disbursement of most of
Tammy's share of the estate.[1] Paragraph 22 of the decree
required Kevin to pay Tammy $3, 500 in spousal support each
month until the sale.
As
early as 2009, however, Kevin realized that the marital home
had substantially declined in value. That year he filed an
Alaska Civil Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment
asserting a mutual mistake of fact regarding the valuation of
the home. The motion was denied, but Kevin still delayed
selling the home. Accordingly, in the summer of 2014 the
court requested briefs and oral argument regarding whether to
read into the decree a term setting a date certain for sale
of the home. Following the hearing the court decided not to
set a date at that time. But later that year the case was
transferred to a new judge, and at a December hearing the
parties again discussed the issue. Ultimately, at a
"motion hearing" in June 2015, the court revisited
the issue sua sponte, decided that "seven years is
reasonable, " and ordered Kevin to sell the home within
90 days, at which point Tammy would be entitled to the $325,
000 owed to her regardless of whether the sale was made.
Kevin
moved for reconsideration, objecting to the order on due
process and equity grounds. The court denied the motion,
noting that it could "think of no circumstances under
which it would be reasonable to require a financially
disadvantaged divorcee to wait seven years (or more) before
receiving financial recompense for her fair share of an
estate that her former spouse has, in near entirety,
continued to possess." The court further emphasized that
Kevin "was given ample notice and opportunity to be
heard." After 90 days passed and the home was not sold,
Tammy moved for entry of judgment without opposition from
Kevin. In October 2015 the court entered judgment against
Kevin in the amount of $325, 000 but denied Tammy's
motion for prejudgment interest, attorney's fees, and
costs.
Kevin
now appeals, arguing that he was not given notice or an
opportunity to be heard regarding the sale of the marital
home and the interpretation of the decree, and that he was
prejudiced by this lack of due process. In the alternative
Kevin argues that equity requires offsetting the amount he
owes Tammy by the amount of spousal support he has paid over
the years. Tammy also appeals, arguing that she is entitled
to prejudgment interest, attorney's fees, and costs.
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Kevin's Due Process And Equity Arguments Are
Meritless.
1.
Due process
Kevin
argues that the superior court violated his due process
rights "when it failed to give him notice and an
opportunity to be heard pertaining to the sale of the marital
home and the intent of the parties regarding the equitable
distribution of marital property." Kevin's due
process rights would be violated if the superior court did
not provide him with adequate notice and an opportunity to be
heard and if Kevin suffered actual prejudice as a
result.[2] "Whether the superior court violated
a party's due process rights is a question of law, which
we review de novo."[3]
We
conclude that Kevin received adequate notice and an
opportunity to be heard and thus do not reach the prejudice
argument. Kevin's version of events - in which he was
"ambushed" by a sudden order to sell the marital
home-omits important aspects of the procedural history. The
record reveals that Kevin had notice of and was given
numerous opportunities to be heard regarding the issue of
enforcing the settlement agreement. As early as 2009, Kevin
had argued that the marital home could not be sold for its
appraised value when he unsuccessfully asserted that a mutual
mistake of fact underlay the settlement
agreement.[4] Then after a summer 2014 hearing regarding
whether the divorce decree required Kevin to sell the home by
a certain date, the court issued an order stating that it
"finds there is no basis for the court to take any
action at this time regarding the sale of the marital
home." But at two hearings in December 2014 and June
2015, a new judge considered whether circumstances regarding
continued litigation and the long delay in selling the home
made necessary a date certain for the sale, and the court
ultimately decided to order Kevin to sell the home and pay
Tammy her share of the estate. At the 2015 hearing,
Kevin's attorney protested that the previous judge
"ruled that there is no definitive date certain on the
divorce decree, " and the court responded that it was
"making a decision right now."[5] The attorney made
no further objection to the resolution of this issue during
the proceeding. Kevin also had an opportunity to make his
offset argument in response to Tammy's motion for
judgment, but he did not file any opposition.[6] After so many
opportunities to be heard, Kevin's argument that his due
process rights were violated must fail.
Furthermore,
we have held that adequate notice gives "an aggrieved
party opportunity to present a case and have its merits
fairly judged."[7] We have previously found due process
satisfied when an ex-husband alleged that he believed a
hearing would only be about visitation but instead resulted
in a modification of physical custody.[8] We stated that
the ex-husband in that case "had notice" that the
ex-wife "sought equal time with the children"
because she had made such a statement in filings and
testimony, and he had shown he was aware of her intentions in
his filings in opposition.[9] The facts are similar here: Because of
the previous back-and-forth between the parties on the issue
of enforcement of the divorce decree, Kevin lacked neither
notice of Tammy's desire to be paid her share of the
estate nor an opportunity to oppose her
arguments.[10] We therefore conclude that Kevin was
afforded adequate due process.
2.
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