Estate of JAMES V. SEWARD, Deceased.
Appeal
from the Superior Court No. 3AN-13-02105 PR of the State of
Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Erin B. Marston,
Judge.
Vincent E. Mock and Gaylene L. Mock, pro se, Lexington,
Kentucky, Appellants.
Donna
C. Willard, Personal Representative of the Estate of James V.
Seward, Anchorage, Appellee.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Winfree, Stowers, Maassen, and
Bolger, Justices.
OPINION
WINFREE, Justice.
I.
INTRODUCTION
A
decedent left a will stating he had no children. But during
probate proceedings a man in his early 30s claimed to be the
decedent's son, requested genetic testing on the
decedent's cremated remains, and filed numerous motions
in an attempt to share in the decedent's estate. The
man's mother also filed numerous motions in the
proceedings, claiming to be a creditor of the decedent's
estate and seeking recovery of child support from the
man's birth to his 18th birthday. After previously
signing orders denying the motions based on the probate
master's reasoning that paternity determinations may not
be made in estate proceedings, the superior court ultimately
ruled that: (1) laches barred the man's and his
mother's efforts to establish paternity; and (2) because
paternity had not been established, neither the man nor his
mother had standing to pursue a claim in the estate
proceedings.
We
disagree with the probate master and superior court's
underlying conclusion that a paternity determination may not
be made in estate proceedings. We also disagree with their
conclusion that a laches defense could apply in this context.
We nonetheless affirm the superior court's decision with
respect to the man's mother on the alternative ground
that her putative creditor claim - the only basis by which
she could be an interested person in the estate proceedings -
unquestionably is barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. But if the man proves to be the decedent's
son he has, at a minimum, certain statutory rights that: (1)
may be established through declaratory judgment in the
probate proceedings; and (2) might not be barred by a statute
of limitations. Because the statute of limitations defense to
the man's claim was briefed only in limited fashion in
the superior court and was not ruled on by that court, and
because the issue has not been adequately briefed to us, we:
(1) explain in detail how the man may be entitled to a
statutory allowance from the estate; and (2) order that
supplemental briefing be filed to assist us in resolving
whether a statute of limitations may bar the man's
recovery from the estate.
II.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
James
V. Seward executed a will on September 11, 2008. In it Seward
stated: "I hereby declare that I am a single man and
that I have no children, nor do I have any deceased child or
children with lineal descendants now living." The will
also provided: "If any relative, or person claiming to
be an heir or relative, or any other person whomsoever,
should attempt by legal action or otherwise, to contest this
Will, I hereby give [such person] the sum of $ 1.00"
Seward appointed Donna Willard, the attorney who prepared the
will, as his estate's personal representative; he
instructed that his body be cremated and the ashes scattered
on the mountains overlooking Anchorage; and he expressed how
he wanted his estate distributed. Seward died in Anchorage in
May 2013 at age 90.
In
August 2013 Willard applied for informal probate of
Seward's will and appointment as the estate's
personal representative.[1] Willard stated that she believed the
will was "validly executed, " and that she was
"unaware of any instrument revoking [the] will."
But she also stated that the will was executed "the 11th
day of September 2011" when in fact the will was
executed on September 11, 2008. In September Willard's
application for informal probate of the will "dated
September 11, 2011" and appointment as personal
representative was approved by the probate master.
In
October Vincent Mock - self-represented-filed a motion
requesting genetic testing on Seward's ashes to prove he
is Seward's son. The following month he asked that
Seward's estate not be distributed until he could
establish Seward's paternity. Willard opposed both
motions, contending that Seward's ashes already had been
scattered according to his will and that even if Vincent
could prove Seward's paternity, Vincent would not be
entitled to estate assets because he was not mentioned in
Seward's will, was not a minor child entitled to
statutory protection, [2] and was not a pretermitted
heir.[3] In reply Vincent insisted the urn and
airplane used to transport Seward's ashes still could
contain ash remnants. Vincent stated that Seward knew Gaylene
Mock, Vincent's mother, bore Seward a child and that the
assertion in Seward's will that he had no children was
the result of memory loss or coercion. Vincent argued that
the will was invalid, requiring intestate distribution to him
as the sole heir, or alternatively that he was a pretermitted
heir because he was "unintentionally ... omitted from
the will" and was not "specifically
disinherited."
The
probate master recommended denying Vincent's motion for
ashes testing, [4] stating: "Probate of [a] last will is
not [the] proper venue for [a] paternity contest. Vincent
Mock is not an interested party in [the] estate." The
probate master also recommended denying without prejudice
Vincent's motion regarding disbursal of Seward's
estate, stating again that an "[e]state case is not
[the] proper venue for [a] paternity contest[, ] and Mr. Mock
lacks standing because he is not an interested party in [the]
estate case." Finally, on a third recommended order
denying both motions, the probate master reiterated that a
paternity determination is not appropriate in estate
proceedings, adding that even if Vincent were Seward's
son, "he is not an heir according to [the] last
will." In December the superior court signed all three
recommended orders without comment.
Meanwhile
in November Gaylene-also self-represented-filed a motion
requesting that the court acknowledge Seward as Vincent's
father. Gaylene stated that she lived with Seward "off
and on for thirteen years" and that Seward knew she was
pregnant with his child because she "told him so."
In opposition Willard argued that Gaylene should have filed a
separate superior court action and not a motion in the estate
proceedings. Willard also contended that Gaylene had "no
standing ... to establish paternity on behalf of her adult
son"; Gaylene was not the real party in interest for
seeking a paternity determination or the child support
alleged now to be due Vincent; and Gaylene's motion was
time-barred under even the most liberal ten-year statute of
limitations. The probate master recommended denying
Gaylene's motion without prejudice because "[a]
probate proceeding is not [the] correct venue for [a]
petition to establish paternity, " Gaylene
"lack[ed] standing as [an] interested party, " and
Vincent "is not an heir" under the will. In
December the superior court signed the recommended order
without comment.
Also in
December Vincent filed a motion to conduct genetic testing on
Seward's sister in California, contending that the
testing would establish Seward as his father. Willard opposed
the motion, arguing that the estate proceedings were not
appropriate for a paternity determination, the applicable
statute of limitations had passed, and Alaska's long-arm
statute was not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction
over the sister. Vincent replied that because the sister was
a beneficiary under Seward's will, the court could
establish personal jurisdiction. In January 2014 the probate
master noted that in December 2013 the court had denied
Vincent's motion for genetic testing, referring to the
order denying genetic testing on Seward's ashes. The
master made no specific recommendation regarding
Vincent's motion for genetic testing of Seward's
sister, and it does not appear the superior court took
further action on the motion.
Gaylene
filed a creditor claim[5] against the estate in March, claiming
Seward's estate owed her "20% of.. . Seward['s]
yearly [i]ncome from the year 1982 to the year 2000" for
child support. Willard disallowed the claim[6] based on lack of
standing, the applicable statute of limitations, and failure
to present the claim against the estate within the required
time period.[7] Gaylene then filed a petition to allow her
claim.[8]Willard opposed Gaylene's petition,
arguing: "paternity has never been established, this is
the wrong forum in which to establish it, [and] it is too
late to establish it both factually and because of the
prejudicial delay in waiting so long to try to do so."
In her reply Gaylene contended that Willard had no actual
authority to deny her claim because the 2008 will was not
valid, as it had not been accepted for probate; rather a
"September 11, 2011" will had been accepted, but it
had been lost. The superior court apparently did not rule on
Gaylene's petition, although her proposed order was
stamped "not used" in the probate master's
signature block.
Vincent
and Gaylene filed a number of other motions not relevant to
this appeal, and Willard eventually sought to preclude
Vincent and Gaylene from filing further motions. Willard
argued that Vincent and Gaylene "persist in filing
ill-considered motions, wasting the time and resources of
both the Court and the Estate" even though they
"are [not] interested parties and hence they have no
standing to inject themselves into this proceeding."
Gaylene responded that Vincent was an interested person as
Seward's son and she was an interested person as a
creditor.[9] Willard replied that Gaylene had no proof
of paternity and that Gaylene had not filed her child support
claim within the four-month window provided by AS
13.16.460(a)(1). Willard again reminded the court it already
had ruled that Vincent and Gaylene were not interested
persons in the probate proceedings.
In a
three-page report issued in late March the probate master
recommended precluding Vincent and Gaylene from filing
further motions because neither was an interested person in
the estate proceedings. The master noted there had been no
paternity determination despite the lengthy opportunity to
obtain one before Seward's death. The master also
reasoned that waiting until after Seward's death to bring
their claims "work[ed] substantial prejudice on his
estate, " justifying the application of laches to bar
the claims.
Vincent
objected to the master's report, arguing that
Seward's 2008 will was invalidly admitted to probate
because the order accepting Seward's will for probate
expressly referred to a "September 11, 2011" will,
and not a 2008 will. Vincent therefore suggested that Seward
had a 2011 will that had been lost and argued that the
referenced 2011 will may have mentioned him or his mother.
Vincent further argued that he always had intended "to
establish paternity with [his] father . . . [but] just did
not expect him to die." Gaylene also objected to the
master's report, arguing that it was wrong to rely on the
2008 will when the order accepting a will for probate
referred to a 2011 will. Gaylene stated that she and Seward
had planned on marrying but their plans fell through, and
that she had omitted Seward's name from Vincent's
birth certificate and not sought child support because Seward
"had a violent temper" and would often hit her.
Also in
March Vincent and Gaylene filed motions to remove Willard as
the personal representative of Seward's estate. Their
arguments again centered around the possible existence of a
2011 will; Vincent questioned whether in a September 11, 2011
will Seward disposed of his assets differently than in the
September 11, 2008 will that had been admitted for probate.
Willard responded: "Unfortunately, in my application, I
made a typographical error utilizing the number 11 for both
the day and the year [of Seward's will]. In fact, as the
Will evidences, its date of execution was September 11,
2008." In reply Vincent again argued that Willard
apparently had probated the wrong will and that a September
11, 2011 will actually existed or had been destroyed by
Willard. In May the superior court denied without explanation
the motions to remove Willard as personal representative.
In
March Vincent also had asked the court to recognize him as
Seward's pretermitted heir. Vincent argued he had been
"accidentally overlooked" when Seward created his
will but had not been specifically disinherited. Vincent also
argued he was a "rightful" and "only"
heir entitled to Seward's entire estate. Willard
responded by pointing out that a pretermitted heir must be
born after the will's execution, [10] but Vincent
was born more than 25 years before Seward executed his will.
She also argued that if Seward had been aware of Vincent,
Seward declined to acknowledge Vincent was his son by
declaring in his will that he had no children deceased or
living. Citing the provision of the will providing one dollar
to any person who contests it, Willard also contended Seward
"made it plain" that the will's provisions
"were not to be attacked by any relative or person
claiming to be an heir or relative." In early May the
superior court denied without explanation Vincent's
motion seeking recognition as a pretermitted heir. The
superior court in early May also adopted the probate
master's March report as its order, precluding Vincent
and Gaylene from filing further motions because they were
"not interested parties in the estate proceeding."
Vincent petitioned for our review of this order, emphasizing
both that he was Seward's son and the significance of the
alleged will date discrepancy, contending that (1) there
existed somewhere a valid 2011 will and (2) the 2008 will had
not been effectively registered for probate. Vincent also
argued that his mother was a creditor and qualified as an
interested person in the estate proceedings. Willard opposed
the petition, largely reiterating her arguments made to the
superior court. Because the superior court's order was a
final judgment as to Vincent (and Gaylene), we converted
Vincent's petition for review into an appeal and ordered
full briefing. Gaylene filed a notice of participation and
joined Vincent in the appeal.
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
The Probate Statutes Contemplate That A Paternity
Adjudication May Be Made During Estate
Proceedings.[11]
The
superior court repeatedly adopted the probate master's
recommendations to deny Vincent's and Gaylene's
paternity-related motions on the ground that paternity cannot
be adjudicated during probate estate proceedings. But when
the superior court acts as the probate court[12] it "has
'jurisdiction over all subject matter relating to'
decedents' estates... 'to the full extent permitted
by the constitution, ' "[13] and "when exercising
probate jurisdiction a superior court 'should continue to
exercise its jurisdiction' to resolve 'questions
ancillary' to the probate
proceedings."[14] By statute that subject matter
jurisdiction expressly extends to the "determination of
heirs and successors of decedents."[15]
Alaska
Statute 13.12.114(a) also provides that "for purposes of
intestate succession by, through, or from a person, an
individual is the child of the individual's natural
parents, regardless of their marital status, and the parent
and child relationship may be established as indicated under
AS 25.20.050." In relevant part AS 25.20.050(a)
provides: "A child born out of wedlock is legitimated
and considered the heir of the putative parent when ... the
putative parent is determined by a superior court without
jury or by another tribunal, upon sufficient evidence, to be
a parent of the child." Alaska Statute 13.12.114(d)
further provides that "[t]o the extent there is a
conflict between this section and... AS 25.20.050 ..., [AS
13.12.114] controls."[16] It is clear AS 13.12.114
contemplates that the probate court may enter a judgment
regarding the parent and child relationship.
Alaska
Statute 13.12.114 is based on a Uniform Probate Code
provision intended to provide that an illegitimate child be
treated as a child of the father when parentage is
sufficiently established under the Uniform Parentage
Act:[17]
If, for purposes of intestate succession, a relationship of
parent and child must be established to determine succession
by, through, or from a person,
... a person is the child of its parents regardless of the
marital status of its parents and the parent and child
relationship maybe established under the [Uniform Parentage
Act].[18]
It is
evident that both the current and former probate statutes
addressing paternity were adopted from Uniform Probate Code
provisions contemplating that paternity determinations could
be made after the putative father's death. But
Alaska did not adopt the Uniform Parentage Act[19] - which
provides that "[a] proceeding to adjudicate the
parentage of a child having no presumed, acknowledged, or
adjudicated father may be commenced at any
time"[20] - and when AS 13.12.114 was created from
the Uniform Probate Code language it instead contained the
reference to AS 25.20.050. Although Willard argues that there
can be no paternity determination because Seward is deceased
and AS 25.20.050 requires a living defendant to establish
paternity, nothing in AS 25.20.050 compels the conclusion
that paternity determinations may be made only against living
persons. The statute simply states that "[a] child born
out of wedlock is legitimated and considered the heir of the
putative parent when ... the putative parent is determined by
a superior court without jury... upon sufficient evidence, to
be a parent of the child."[21]
Given
that: (1) when acting as a probate court the superior court
has broad subject matter jurisdiction relating to
decedents' estates, including matters ancillary to the
estate proceedings; (2) probate courts are expressly
empowered to determine the "heirs and successors of
decedents"; and (3) AS 13.12.114 invites paternity
determinations during estate proceedings in the manner set
forth in AS 25.20.050(a), it was error to adopt the probate
master's recommendations to deny Vincent's and
Gaylene's paternity-related motions to the extent those
denials were based on the specific ground that a paternity
determination cannot be made during estate proceedings.
B.
Because The Request For An AS 13.12.114 Paternity
Determination Was For Declaratory Judgment With Underlying
Legal Claims, Laches Was Not An Available
Defense.[22]
As
stated above AS 13.12.114 contemplates that the probate court
may enter judgment regarding the parent and child
relationship. This is a form of declaratory
judgment.[23] Although courts have the authority to
declare rights without granting separate legal or equitable
remedies, when deciding whether a request for declaratory
judgment and any associated relief is time-barred, courts
must look to the nature of the relief to determine whether
laches or a statute of limitations applies.[24] If the relief
is equitable, laches applies; if the relief is legal, a
statute of limitations applies.[25] Here the request for
declaratory judgment was associated with Gaylene's
creditor claim and with Vincent's assertion of statutory
property rights, both legal in nature. Nothing about the
request for declaratory judgment and associated relief was
equitable in nature.
Courts
have no inherent power to decide whether it would be
equitable to adjudge someone a father.[26] And we have
long held that actions to collect child support are not
equitable, but rather are legal in nature.[27] Although the
superior court may apply equitable principles when acting
under its probate jurisdiction, [28] that does not include the
power to employ laches to bar a legal claim.[29] Laches is
inapplicable in this context, and it was error to apply it to
preclude Vincent and Gaylene from pursuing their requests for
declaratory and related legal relief in the probate
proceedings.
C.
Gaylene's Creditor Claim Is Unquestionably Barred By The
Statute Of Limitations, [30] And The Superior Court's Ruling
That Gaylene Is Not An Interested Person In The Estate
Proceedings Is Affirmed On This Alternative
Ground.[31]
Gaylene
asserts she is an interested person in the estate proceedings
because she is a creditor;[32] she seeks to establish that
Vincent is Seward's son in connection with her legal
claim for child support allegedly due her from 1982 through
2000; and she seeks recovery from the estate based on this
alleged pre-death obligation. The ten-year statute of
limitations of AS 09.10.100, [33] subject to tolling during the
child's minority under AS 09.10.140, [34] applies to
claims for past child support.[35] Assuming Vincent is
Seward's son and Gaylene has standing to assert her claim
for long-past-due child support, [36] and given Gaylene's
assertion that she knew Seward was Vincent's father when
Vincent was born, the statute of limitations on Gaylene's
claim expired years before Seward died. For this reason
Willard's disallowance of Gaylene's creditor claim on
the statute of limitations ground should have been sustained
by the superior court, and we so hold. And because
Gaylene's only basis for asserting that she is an
interested person in the estate proceedings is her creditor
claim, the superior court's conclusion that she is not an
interested person in the proceedings is affirmed on this
ground.
D. If
Vincent Is Seward's Son, He Is An Interested Person In
The Estate Proceedings.
Alaska
Statute 13.06.050(24) expressly includes a decedent's
children as persons interested in the decedent's
estate.[37] This makes abundant sense, as there are
several ways in which a decedent's child may be entitled
to a portion of the decedent's estate. For example a
child is an intestate heir absent a valid will or to the
extent a valid will does not dispose of the entirety of the
decedent's estate.[38] A child born after the execution of a
will may be a pretermitted heir entitled to a share of the
decedent's estate passing under the will.[39] And a child
may have the right to certain statutory allowances from the
decedent's estate notwithstanding the existence of a
valid will otherwise fully disposing of the decedent's
estate.[40] For these reasons notice of estate
proceedings must be given to a decedent's
child[41] - notice allows a decedent's child
the opportunity to protect statutory rights and contest the
validity of a will.
With
this in mind we first address the merits of the parties'
substantive arguments whether, if Vincent is Seward's
son, Vincent might have a claim against the estate. Vincent
argues on appeal that the 2008 will is invalid and he may be
entitled to inherit under an alleged 2011 will; that even if
the 2008 will is valid he is entitled to recover under the
will as a pretermitted heir; and that he has the legal right
to statutory allowances notwithstanding the existence of a
will. Willard asserts that the 2008 will is valid and
properly being probated; that Vincent cannot be a
pretermitted heir under the will; and that Vincent is barred
from seeking recovery under other language of the will.
Willard does not address Vincent's claim to statutory
allowances.
1. The
errors on the application and order for admission of
Seward's 2008 will to informal probate are immaterial -
the will accepted for probate is the 2008 will.
There
can be no dispute that Seward executed a will in 2008 and
that this will was presented for probate. Willard later
stated that she made a date mistake in her paperwork opening
the estate, and Vincent offers no evidence to refute
Willard's explanation. Vincent cannot seize solely on a
scrivener's error in accompanying paperwork to invalidate
an otherwise valid will facially complying with the requisite
statutory formalities.[42]
We have
recognized that honest mistakes are sometimes made in court
documents and that courts should be free to correct them.
Alaska Civil Rule 60(a), for example, provides:
"Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts
of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or
omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own
initiative or on the motion of any party and after such
notice, if any, as the court orders."[43] Although
Willard should have requested that the superior court correct
the date mistake in the order accepting the 2008 will for
probate, implicit in its denials of Vincent's various
motions regarding the mistake is the court's
acknowledgment that the mistake was simply a mistake. Other
than the noted date discrepancy, no evidence was presented
suggesting the actual existence of a 2011 will - the
paperwork error alone does not affect the acceptance of
Seward's 2008 will for probate. We therefore affirm the
superior court's acceptance of the 2008 will for probate,
its appointment of Willard as the personal representative,
and its rejection of Vincent's arguments about an alleged
2011 will.[44]
2.
Vincent is not a pretermitted heir under the 2008 will and
has no claim under the will.
The
superior court ruled that Vincent is not a pretermitted heir
under the 2008 will. Vincent argues that he is a pretermitted
heir because Seward did not intentionally disinherit him but
rather "inadvertently forgot[]" to include Vincent
in his will.
To
qualify as a pretermitted heir eligible to "a share in
the [testator's] estate, " the testator's
omitted child must be "born or adopted after
the execution of the will."[45] Analyzing a former
version of the pretermitted heir statute, we explained that
"[t]he plain language of the statute indicates that [it]
applies only to the testator's children . . . born or
adopted after the execution of the will."[46] We explained
that this statute's purpose was "not to compel
parents to make testamentary provision for children, but to
prevent the consequences of forgetfulness or
oversight."[47] It was meant to protect a testator's
children "against an unintentional omission in a
will."[48] Vincent was born in 1982, but Seward
executed his will in 2008. Because Vincent was not born or
adopted after the execution of Seward's will, he cannot
benefit from the presumption that he was omitted
...