Appeal
from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage,
Stephanie E. Joannides, Judge. Trial Court No. 3AN-12-6523 CR
Sharon
Barr, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public
Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
A.
James Klugman, Assistant District Attorney, Anchorage, and
Craig W. Richards, Attorney General, Juneau, for the
Appellee.
Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Suddock,
Superior Court Judge. [*]
OPINION
ALLARD, JUDGE
James
Kevin Coleman[1] was convicted, following a jury trial, of
second-degree burglary, second-degree theft, and fifth-degree
criminal mischief based on allegations that he broke into a
storage shed used by a commercial bike shop and stole two
bicycles.[2] Coleman was also convicted of making a
false report.[3]
On
appeal, Coleman challenges his conviction for burglary,
arguing that the bicycle storage shed was too small to
qualify as a "building" for purposes of the
burglary statutes. Coleman further contends that there was
insufficient evidence that he was the person who broke into
the shed and stole the bicycles, and that the trial court
erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on the
weight of the evidence. Coleman also challenges his
conviction for making a false report, arguing that his false
statement to the police did not qualify as a false
"report" of a crime under AS 11.56.800(a)(2).
For the
reasons explained in this opinion, we conclude that the
bicycle storage shed qualified as a "building" as
that term is defined in the burglary statutes. We also
conclude that the evidence supporting Coleman's burglary,
theft, and criminal mischief convictions was legally
sufficient, and that the trial court did not err in denying
Coleman's motion for a new trial. However, we conclude
that there was insufficient evidence to convict Coleman of
making a false report, given the nature of his false
statement to the police and the circumstances under which
that statement was made.
Accordingly,
we affirm Coleman's convictions for second-degree
burglary, second-degree theft, and fifth-degree criminal
mischief, and we reverse his conviction for making a false
report.
Why
we conclude that the bicycle storage shed was large enough to
qualify as a "building" for purposes of
Alaska's burglary statute
Under
AS 11.46.310(a), a person commits burglary if the person
"enters or remains unlawfully in a building with the
intent to commit a crime in the building." Alaska
Statute 11.81.900(b)(5) defines "building, " in
pertinent part, as follows:
"building, " in addition to its usual meaning,
includes any propelled vehicle or structure adapted for
overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on
business[.]
In the
current case, Coleman was convicted of second-degree burglary
for breaking into a shed that was used to store bicycles for
a business. The shed was a permanent wooden structure with
four walls, a floor, and a roof; it contained multiple
enclosed storage lockers, secured by individual padlocks.
Although the record does not reveal the exact dimensions of
the shed, the evidence presented at trial indicated that the
shed was approximately chest- to shoulder-high, and the shed
could contain 20 to 25 bicycles. To enter the shed to
retrieve the bicycles, an average-sized person would need to
stoop.
At
trial, the general manager of the bicycle shop testified that
the shed was used to store bicycles that were brought in for
repairs. On an average summer work day, 5 to 6 employees
would access the shed to retrieve or store bicycles. The
manager testified that employees would typically not need to
fully enter the shed to retrieve the bicycles, but that they
would sometimes have to crawl all the way into the shed if
they were having difficulty getting a bicycle out. The
entrance to each storage locker in the shed was kept secured
with a padlock and equipped with a break-in alarm.
On
appeal, Coleman argues that the shed did not qualify as a
"building" for purposes of the burglary statute.
Coleman contends that, because the crime of burglary was
originally intended to protect dwellings, a structure can
only qualify as a "building" for purposes of the
burglary statute if it is either designed for human
habitation or large enough to "comfortably accommodate
people moving around" in it. According to Coleman,
because the shed was made to accommodate bicycles and not
people, and because an average-sized person would need to
stoop to enter the shed, the shed did not qualify as a
"building, " and his conviction for second-degree
burglary must be reversed.
In
response, the State argues that the bicycle storage shed was
a building both in the "usual meaning" of the word
and because the shed was a structure that had been
"adapted" for carrying on the bicycle shop's
business - specifically, the storing and repairing of
bicycles. The State concedes, however, that "at some
point, a storage unit [may be] so small that it could not
reasonably be considered 'a structure, '" and as
such, would not be "a building."
The
issue presented here is, therefore, how large a structure
must be in order to be considered a "building" for
purposes of the burglary statute. Because the statute is
ambiguous on this point, we look to the purpose of the
legislation and the legislative history for indications of
legislative intent.[4]
The
definition of "building" codified in AS
11.81.900(b)(5) is derived from Oregon law.[5] Both Alaska and
Oregon define "building" broadly, and the two
statutory definitions of "building" are essentially
the same. As already set out, the Alaska statute defines
"building" to include "its usual meaning"
as well as "any propelled vehicle or structure adapted
for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on
business."[6]Likewise, under the Oregon statute,
"building" is defined "in addition to its
ordinary meaning" as also including "any booth,
vehicle, boat, aircraft or other structure adapted for
overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on
business therein."[7]
The
legislative history of these statutory definitions indicates
that the Alaska and the Oregon legislatures intended these
definitions to be expansive. The commentary to the tentative
draft of Alaska's 1978 criminal code revision states that
the definition is intended to be "broad enough to
include house trailers, mobile field offices, house boats,
vessels and even tents used as dwellings."[8] The commentary to
the Oregon Criminal Code likewise explains that the
definition of "building" was expanded from the
"ordinary meaning of the word" so as to also
include "those structures and vehicles which typically
contain human beings for extended periods of time, in
accordance with the original and basic rationale of the crime
[of burglary]: protection against invasion of premises likely
to terrorize occupants."[9]
Coleman
relies heavily on the Oregon commentary for his claim that
the Oregon and Alaska legislatures intended to limit the
definition of "building" to only those
vehicles or structures that "typically contain human
beings for extended periods of time." But neither the
plain language of the statute nor the legislative history
support this claim.
At
common law, the crime of burglary required proof that the
defendant unlawfully entered a human habitation. Burglary was
defined as the breaking and entering of a dwelling at night
with the intent to commit a crime therein.[10] The
common-law offense of burglary was therefore strictly an
offense aimed at protecting the security of habitation rather
than property.[11]
But
statutory enactments over the past 60 years have changed and
expanded the common-law definition of the offense. For most
jurisdictions, the requirement that the crime take place at
night or that it be directed at a dwelling have
disappeared.[12]Instead, most states (including Alaska
and Oregon) now define burglary simply as unlawfully entering
or remaining in a "building" with the intent to
commit a crime therein.[13] The offense is elevated to a higher
degree of burglary with increased punishment if the
"building" is a "dwelling" or if the
defendant's conduct poses a particular danger to people
found within the building.[14]
This
transformation is evident in the relevant Oregon caselaw,
which has upheld burglary convictions involving storage sheds
and storage containers, even though they were designed to
accommodate property, not people.[15] For example, in State
v. Essig, the Oregon Court of Appeals held that a large
potato storage shed qualified as a building under the
burglary statute, describing it as a substantial structure
and thus a building within the ordinary meaning of the
term.[16] Similarly, in State v. Handley,
the Oregon Court of Appeals held that a storage locker in an
apartment complex's carport qualified as a
building.[17] In State v. Barker, the court
held that "self-contained storage units" within a
commercial storage facility qualified as "buildings,
"[18] and in State v. Webb, the court
held that a tractor trailer adapted by a business to store
goods likewise qualified as a
"building."[19]
Coleman
points out that these Oregon cases all involve storage
containers or sheds that are considerably larger than the
bicycle storage shed involved in his case. For example, the
potato shed in Essig was large enough to
"contain several trucks."[20]Likewise, the tractor
trailer in Webb was twenty-five feet long and eight
to nine feet wide (although no height was
listed).[21] But not all of the Oregon cases involve
such large storage structures. The storage lockers in
Handley were only four feet wide, nine feet long,
and seven feet high.[22] And the dimensions of the storage unit
in Barker were essentially unknown, although the
court noted that it was "large enough for a human being
to enter and move about."[23]
Coleman
also relies on State v. Scott, [24] a 1979 Oregon Court
of Appeals case in which the court reversed a conviction for
burglary of a railway boxcar because it concluded that the
boxcar did not qualify as a "building" for purposes
of Oregon's burglary statute. In Scott, the
court quoted the legislative commentary to Oregon's
burglary statute, noting that the expanded definition of
"building" under the statute was still intended to
comport with "the original and basic rationale for the
protection against invasion of premises likely to terrorize
occupants."[25] The court therefore concluded that the
railway boxcar did not fit the expanded definition because
there was no evidence presented at trial that the boxcar had
been adapted "for carrying on business therein" or
"for accommodating people overnight" and there was
nothing to indicate that the boxcar was anything other than
"a structure on wheels designed for the storage of goods
during their transportation."[26]
We
conclude that Coleman's reliance on Scott is
misplaced. Subsequent Oregon Court of Appeals cases have
narrowed Scott to its facts, explaining that
Scott involved a movable structure on wheels akin to
a vehicle, rather than a stationary structure that could fit
into the ordinary meaning of the term
"building."[27] The reasoning of Scott has
also been criticized. In Barker, for example, the
Oregon Court of Appeals rejected the premise that a court
must examine the primary uses of the storage units at issue
"to determine whether an unauthorized entry would be
likely to terrorize any human occupants."[28] Instead, the
court looked to the "ordinary meaning" of the term
"building, " as evidenced by various dictionary
definitions of the term - ultimately concluding that the
storage units at issue qualified as "buildings" in
the "ordinary sense of the word" because they were
part of a "roofed and walled structure constructed for
permanent use."[29]
Like
the storage units in Barker, the storage shed at
issue in Coleman's case appears to fit within the
dictionary meaning of the term "building."
Black's Law Dictionary defines the word
"building" as:
[A] structure designed for habitation, shelter, storage,
trade, manufacture, religion, business, education, and the
like. A structure or edifice inclosing a space within its
walls, and usually, but not necessarily, covered with a
roof.[30]
Here,
the storage shed was a permanent structure with four walls, a
roof, a floor, and a fixed entry place through which a person
could enter the structure in order to store or retrieve the
bicycles placed there by the business.
Coleman
contends that, despite these attributes, the storage shed
does not qualify as a "building" because the
entrance was not high enough for an average-sized person to
enter without stooping and it was not big enough for an
average-sized person to move around "comfortably."
We
agree with Coleman that, as a general matter, a structure
that is too small for a human being to physically enter and
occupy with their whole body cannot be considered a
"building" that can be burglarized. We note that
courts in other jurisdictions have reached a similar
conclusion with regard to their burglary
statutes.[31]
For
example, in Paugh v. State, the Wyoming Supreme
Court held that a three-foot display case in a department
store was not a "separately secured or occupied
portion" of a building for purposes of Wyoming's
burglary statute because the display case was "too small
to accommodate a human being."[32] The Washington Court of
Appeals similarly held that a police evidence locker that was
10 inches high, 10 inches wide, and 2 feet deep was too small
to qualify as a "building" under Washington's
burglary statute.[33] Coin boxes at a car wash have likewise
been found to be too small to qualify as a "building,
"[34] as have soft drink vending machines,
[35]
and a large tool box on wheels.[36]
But
these cases all involve containers that are significantly
smaller than the storage shed at issue in Coleman's case.
Here, the trial testimony indicated that the bicycle
shop's storage shed was designed to be wide enough, long
enough, and tall enough - approximately chest- to
shoulder-high - to allow an average-sized person to enter the
shed and move about, albeit not necessarily for an extended
period of time and not necessarily entirely comfortably.
Indeed, the testimony at trial established that human beings
did, at times, fully enter the shed to retrieve the bicycles
stored inside.
Given
these circumstances, and given that the shed otherwise
exhibited all of the attributes associated with the term
"building" in the usual meaning of the term, we
conclude that the storage shed at issue here qualified as a
"building" for purposes of Alaska's
second-degree burglary statute. We therefore reject
Coleman's claim that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction for second-degree burglary on this
ground.
Why
we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support
Coleman's conviction for making a false report
Alaska
Statute 11.56.800(a)(2) provides, in relevant part, that
"[a] person commits the crime of false ... report if the
person knowingly ... makes a false report to a peace officer
that a crime has occurred or is about to occur." In the
present case, Coleman was charged with making a false report
based on the fact that, when Coleman was stopped by the
police and questioned about why he was in the area, Coleman
falsely claimed that he was in the area because he was
chasing his van, which he falsely said had been stolen.
The
evidence at trial established that the police responded to
the burglary alarm at the bicycle shop around 4:00 a.m. After
arriving at the scene, the police found two bicycles from the
bicycle shop on the ground nearby. In the vicinity, the
police also discovered Coleman's van, which was
"high-centered" on a cement pillar in the parking
lot.
The
police also saw a man (later determined to be Coleman) trying
to leave the scene in a taxi cab. One of the officers stopped
the taxi and questioned Coleman, who was in the back seat of
the cab, sweating profusely. When the officer asked Coleman
why he was in the area, Coleman told a confusing story about
his van being stolen and chasing the stolen van on his
bicycle. Coleman could not explain why he was in a taxi cab
or why he was leaving his van behind. Coleman also could not
explain where the bicycle he had used to chase the van was.
When the officer asked Coleman why he had not called to
report the stolen van to the police, Coleman said that the
police "handle things differently" and that he
would "take care of it himself."
At
trial, the officer testified that Coleman was clearly nervous
during the police questioning and that his explanation for
his presence at the scene made no sense and was not
believable. Based on their suspicions that Coleman was
responsible for the burglary, the police arrested Coleman.
Following his ...