Petition
for Review from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District
No. 3AN-14-8238 CR, Anchorage, Kevin M. Saxby, Judge.
Appearances: Michael T. Schwaiger, Assistant Public Defender,
and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the
Petitioner.
Tamara
E. De Lucia, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal
Appeals, Anchorage, and Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney General,
Juneau, for the Respondent.
Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, and Allard and Wollenberg,
Judges.
OPINION
ALLARD
Judge.
This
petition for review involves a superior court's rejection
of a plea agreement in a murder case. For the reasons
explained in this opinion, we grant the petition and vacate
the superior court's decision. On remand, we direct the
superior court to reconsider the plea agreement with the
guidance provided here.
Underlying
facts and procedural history
In
2014, David Joseph Thomas was indicted for first- and
second-degree murder for the death of his girlfriend, Linda
Bower. Thomas confessed that he had killed Bower-first to his
brother and then separately to the police, after turning
himself in to custody.
According
to the parties' briefing and the presentence report,
Thomas was heavily intoxicated at the time of the murder.
Thomas reported having ingested a large amount of vodka and
over-the-counter medication prior to taking Bower to his
house to watch movies. He remembered little of what happened
thereafter, although he recalled waking to find himself
strangling Bower and then losing consciousness again. The
next thing he remembered was waking up on the floor of his
bedroom, with Bower lying unmoving on the bed. Thomas
attempted mouth-to-mouth resuscitation; then he vomited and
again lost consciousness. After Thomas turned himself in, the
police searched the residence; they found an empty bottle of
vodka and vomit in Thomas's bedroom.
Thomas
accepted responsibility for killing Bower and reached a plea
agreement with the State. Under the terms of this agreement,
Thomas would plead guilty to second-degree murder and he
would receive a sentence of 75 years' imprisonment with
25 years suspended (50 years to serve).
At the
time of Thomas's offense, the crime of second-degree
murder carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years and a
maximum sentence of 99 years.[1] The crime of first-degree murder
carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years and a
maximum sentence of 99 years.[2] In Page v. State, this
Court announced a benchmark sentencing range of 20-30 years
to serve for first felony offenders convicted of
second-degree murder.[3] This benchmark range can be exceeded for
good cause, [4] and the parties agreed that good cause
existed here to exceed the Page benchmark.
At the
change of plea hearing, the victim's parents told the
superior court that they thought Thomas's sentence under
the plea agreement was improperly lenient. The parents were
particularly opposed to the fact that the plea agreement did
not contain a restriction on Thomas's eligibility to be
considered by the Parole Board for release on discretionary
parole. Under AS 33.16.090(b)(1), a defendant convicted of
murder is eligible to be considered for discretionary parole
after serving one-third of their active term of imprisonment.
After
hearing from the parents and the parties, the judge
conditionally accepted Thomas's guilty plea. But the
judge declared that he would defer his final decision on
whether to accept the negotiated sentence until a presentence
report was prepared.
In a
sentencing memorandum submitted to the court, the prosecutor
explained the State's reasons for entering into the
negotiated agreement. With regard to the level of the charge,
the prosecutor explained that, given the evidence of
Thomas's substantial intoxication, the State would have
significant difficulty proving the specific intent necessary
to convict Thomas of first-degree murder.[5] The prosecutor
also noted that Thomas had accepted responsibility for the
killing, and that he had turned himself in and confessed to
the crime.
With
regard to the negotiated sentence, the prosecutor
characterized the agreed-upon sentence - 75 years'
imprisonment with 25 years suspended - as the equivalent of a
first-degree murder sentence imposed for a second-degree
murder conviction. The prosecutor also noted that
Thomas's sentence of 50 years to serve far exceeded the
Page benchmark range of 20-30 years.[6]
The
author of the presentence report agreed with the State that
Thomas's substantial intoxication played a role in the
crime and the author was critical of Thomas's failure to
address his problems with substance abuse. The presentence
investigator also noted, however, that Thomas's
"grief, guilt, and remorse for his crime appear to be
real, " and that Thomas "does not present as a
criminally minded individual, but as a man who has committed
a horrendous criminal act."
At the
sentencing hearing, Thomas and the State again explained why
they believed that the court should accept the negotiated
plea and sentence, and why they believed that the
Chaney criteria were met by a sentence of 75 years
with 25 years suspended in this case. The victim's
parents reiterated their opposition to the negotiated
sentence and their particular opposition to the fact that
Thomas would be eligible for discretionary parole
consideration after serving one-third of his sentence.
The
victim's parents also presented a memorial photo montage
of the victim's life. This photo montage was set to music
played and sung by the victim herself (the Beatles song,
"Blackbird").
At the
conclusion of this hearing, the superior court judge rejected
the negotiated sentence as too lenient. The judge's
primary reason for rejecting the plea agreement appears to
have been the absence of any restriction on Thomas's
eligibility for discretionary parole consideration. The judge
stated that, in his view, Thomas had intentionally killed his
girlfriend, notwithstanding the evidence of his severe
intoxication, and that Thomas was therefore guilty of the
more serious crime of first-degree murder. The judge further
declared that it would "cheapen the crime" if
Thomas were eligible to apply for discretionary parole after
serving only one-third of the 50-year active term of
imprisonment provided for in the plea agreement. The judge
also indicated his belief that Thomas should remain in prison
until he "aged out" of criminal behavior. According
to the judge, this "aging out" generally happened
around 50 years of age.
This
petition followed.
The
various issues raised by the proceedings in this case
The
parties raise several significant legal issues in their
pleadings to this Court. Chief among these issues is the
scope of a trial court's authority to reject a plea
agreement, as well as the standard that a trial court should
employ when reviewing a negotiated plea agreement.
The
State asserts that the trial court's role in approving or
disapproving a plea agreement is a limited one, circumscribed
by considerations of separation of powers and the court's
more limited knowledge of the case in comparison to the
parties. The State further asserts that a trial court's
assessment of whether an agreed-upon sentence is too lenient
is akin to an appellate court's assessment of whether a
sentence is "clearly mistaken."[7] That is, the
trial court should limit its role to evaluating whether the
agreed-upon sentence is within the permissible range of
sentences that a reasonable judge could impose under the
circumstances, rather than determining what the judge would
impose in the first instance.[8] The State contends that, in this
case, the sentence was well within that range of permissible
sentences that a reasonable judge would impose, and the
superior court therefore should have accepted the plea
agreement.
Thomas
separately argues that the court failed to provide adequate
reasons for its rejection of the negotiated sentence, and
Thomas asserts that the court's analysis of the
negotiated sentence reflects a flawed understanding of the
Chaney criteria and the governing law on
discretionary parole. Thomas also points to the court's
failure to compare Thomas's case to the full range of
conduct encompassed by the second-degree murder statute, ...