In the Matter of the Estate of JAMES V. SEWARD.
Appeal
from the Superior Court No. 3 AN-13-02105 PR of the State of
Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Erin B. Marston,
Judge.
Vincent E. Mock and Gaylene L. Mock, pro se, Lexington,
Kentucky, Appellants.
Donna
C. Willard, Law Offices of Donna C. Willard, Personal
Representative of the Estate of James V. Seward, Anchorage,
Appellee.
Dario
Borghesan, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Jahna
Lindemuth, Attorney General, Juneau, for Amicus Curiae State
of Alaska.
Before: Stowers, Chief Justice, Winfree, Maassen, Bolger, and
Carney, Justices.
OPINION
WINFREE, JUSTICE.
I.
INTRODUCTION
A man
asserted in a probate proceeding that he was the
decedent's son and requested a paternity determination.
The personal representative opposed the request, arguing that
a paternity determination could not be made in a probate
proceeding and that this particular paternity determination
was barred by a statute of limitations. The superior court
agreed that probate proceedings were not appropriate for
paternity determinations and rejected the man's request,
but it did not rule on the statute of limitations issue. The
court later determined that the man was not an interested
person to the probate proceeding and barred him from further
participation.
On
appeal, we held that paternity determinations can be made in
probate proceedings; we then requested supplemental briefing
on the statute of limitations issue. We now hold that a
paternity determination request during a probate proceeding
is not barred by any statute of limitations, and we remand
for further proceedings consistent with this and our earlier
decision.
II.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS[1]
James
V. Seward died in Anchorage in May 2013 at the age of
90.[2]
Seward had executed a September 11, 2008 will appointing a
personal representative and declaring that he had no spouse
or children.[3] Seward's will was admitted for
informal probate in September 2013.[4]
In
October 2013 Vincent Mock and his mother, Gaylene Mock, began
efforts in the probate proceeding to establish that Seward
was Vincent's father.[5] Gaylene argued that she was a creditor
of the estate, seeking back child support for raising
Vincent.[6] Vincent argued that the will was invalid
and he was entitled by intestate succession to the entire
estate, or, alternatively, that he was a pretermitted heir
and entitled to a portion of the estate.[7] The superior
court ruled that paternity determinations could not be made
in probate proceedings and rejected Vincent's
requests.[8] The superior court eventually ruled that
Gaylene and Vincent were not interested persons to the
probate proceeding and precluded them from making any further
filings.[9]
Gaylene
and Vincent appealed. We affirmed in part in Estate of
Seward, holding that Gaylene's creditor claim was
barred by the statute of limitations and that Vincent was not
entitled to intestate succession or relief as a pretermitted
heir.[10] But we also held that paternity
determinations can be made in probate proceedings and that,
as Vincent also had suggested, he might be entitled to a
statutory exempt property allowance if he were Seward's
son.[11] We ended our decision by noting we would
order supplemental briefing on whether Vincent's
paternity determination for a statutory allowance might be
barred by a statute of limitations, because the personal
representative had argued in the superior court that all of
Vincent's claims were so barred.[12] We did so, [13] and also
asked the State of Alaska to file an amicus curiae brief. We
thank the State for its participation in this appeal.
III.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
How to
interpret a statute is a legal question.[14] Whether a
statute of limitations applies to a paternity determination
is also a legal question.[15] We answer legal questions
using our independent judgment, "adopting the rule of
law most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and
policy."[16]
IV.
DISCUSSION
A.
A Paternity Determination In A Probate Proceeding Is Not A
Separate Cause Of Action Subject To A Statute Of
Limitations.
The
first step in evaluating a statute of limitations defense is
to examine the claim sought to be barred. We therefore begin
our analysis by examining the exempt property allowance
statute, AS 13.12.403.
This
statute provides that when the decedent has no surviving
spouse, "the decedent's children" are
"entitled from the estate to a value, not exceeding $10,
000 in excess of security interests in the items, in
household furniture, automobiles, furnishings, appliances,
and personal effects."[17] Seward was not survived by a
spouse; Vincent therefore is entitled to the allowance if he
can show that he is one of "the decedent's
children." The exempt property allowance statute does
not define "children," but the probate code
generally defines "child" to include "an
individual entitled to take as a child ... by intestate
succession from the parent whose relationship is
involved."[18] We therefore look to the probate code
mechanism for establishing the parent-child relationship for
purposes of intestate succession, AS 13.12.114, to determine
whether Vincent could be a child under that
provision.[19]
Alaska
Statute 13.12.114(a) provides: "[F]or purposes of
intestate succession by, through, or from a person, an
individual is the child of the individual's natural
parents, regardless of their marital status, and the parent
and child relationship may be established as indicated under
AS 25.20.050." Alaska Statute 25.20.050 in turn
provides: "A child born out of wedlock is legitimated
and considered the heir of the putative parent when ... the
putative parent is determined by a superior court without
jury or by another tribunal, upon sufficient evidence, to be
a parent of the child."[20]Finally, AS 13.12.114(d)
qualifies: "To the extent there is a conflict between
this section and either AS 25.20.050 or AS 25.23.130, this
section controls."
Examining
these various statutes together, Vincent's assertion of a
right to the exempt property allowance turns on whether
Seward is one of Vincent's "natural parents"
under AS 13.12.114. We must therefore decide whether the
language of AS 13.12.114 creates its own cause of action
distinct from Vincent's assertion of right to the exempt
property allowance. If it does, we will treat Vincent's
paternity determination ...