Appeal
from the Superior Court No. 3PA-15-01336 CI of the State of
Alaska, Third Judicial District, Palmer, Gregory Heath,
Judge.
Jon
Buchholdt, Buchholdt Law Office, and Christopher V. Hoke,
Hoke Law, Anchorage, for Appellant.
John
K. Bodick and Matthias R. Cicotte, Assistant Attorneys
General, Anchorage, and Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney General,
Juneau, for Appellee.
Susan
Orlansky, Reeves Amodio, LLC, Anchorage, for Amicus Curiae
ACLU of Alaska Foundation.
Cynthia Strout, Anchorage, for Amicus Curiae Alaska
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
Before: Stowers, Chief Justice, Maassen, Bolger, and Carney,
Justices. [Winfree, Justice, not participating.]
OPINION
BOLGER, Justice.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Federal
law requires that a prison disciplinary decision must include
a written statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons
for the decision. In this case, the superior court affirmed a
decision finding a prisoner "guilty" without any
further explanation. The court reasoned that the prisoner was
not prejudiced because the disciplinary hearing was recorded,
and the prisoner was able to adequately explain his version
of the evidence in his appeal. But we conclude that the
written disciplinary decision or the audio recording must
ordinarily include a specific statement satisfying federal
law: a mere finding of "guilty" is generally
insufficient. We therefore reverse the superior court's
decision affirming the decision of the Department of
Corrections.
II.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Bob
Huber, a former prisoner at Goose Creek Correctional Center,
was involved in an incident in the prison dining hall on
October 11, 2014. The incident report states that Huber
stared at a correctional officer in an intimidating manner,
dropped food on the floor, yelled profanity at the officer,
and refused to provide his inmate number when asked. The
officer cited him under 22 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC)
05.400(c)(15), which prohibits prisoners from
"[e]ngaging in a group or individual demonstration or
activity that involves throwing of objects, loud yelling,
loud verbal confrontation, or pushing, shoving, or other
physical contact that disrupts or interferes with the orderly
administration of the facility."[1]
A
disciplinary hearing was held on October 21. At the hearing,
the hearing officer read the correctional officer's
description of the incident aloud and asked Huber how he
would like to plead. Huber pleaded not guilty. He testified
that the incident report misrepresented what had occurred and
that he had been attempting to defend an inmate who was being
treated unfairly. After Huber finished testifying, the
hearing officer stated that she was "going to find
[Huber] guilty." She then imposed a penalty of 15 days
of punitive segregation. Following the hearing, the hearing
officer issued a written disciplinary decision on the
standard decision form. The decision form includes a section
for enumerating the "reasons, evidence considered and
specific facts" upon which a guilty finding is based.
The hearing officer left this portion of the form blank.
Huber
appealed the decision to the superintendent of Goose Creek
Correctional Center, explaining his version of events and
arguing that the cited offense in the correctional
officer's original incident report had not been properly
filled out. The superintendent affirmed the guilty finding
and the penalty.
Huber
appealed to the superior court, raising the issue of a due
process violation for the first time. Huber noted that
Department of Corrections (DOC) regulations require a written
disciplinary decision to include "a statement of the
evidence relied upon and the specific facts found to support
the disciplinary tribunal's decision."[2]He further argued
that a hearing officer's failure to include this
information in the report made it impossible for the
superintendent to conduct meaningful review of the
officer's findings. Accordingly, he concluded that the
hearing officer's decision violated his right to due
process.[3] The State countered that Huber had waived
his due process argument by failing to assert it in his
appeal to the superintendent. It further argued that even if
Huber's due process claim was preserved, he had failed to
demonstrate that the lack of written findings had prejudiced
his ability to defend himself during the prison disciplinary
process.[4]
The
superior court affirmed the disciplinary decision. The court
first concluded that Huber had forfeited his due process
argument by failing to raise the issue during the
disciplinary appeal process. The court further held that even
if Huber had not forfeited the issue, he had failed to show
that he had been prejudiced as a result of the lack of
written findings. Huber appeals.
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Huber Did Not Forfeit His Due Process Claim By Failing To
Raise It During The Administrative Appeal.
The
superior court concluded that "[b]ecause Huber's due
process argument was not raised during the administrative
proceedings below, it is waived on appeal." Huber
responds that he did not need to explicitly raise this issue
during the administrative appeal process in order to preserve
it. "We review de novo whether a party has waived a
claim on appeal."[5]
We
recently addressed the effect of a prisoner's failure to
raise constitutional claims during the DOC disciplinary
appeals process in Walker v. State, Department of
Corrections.[6] The appellant in Walker argued
that DOC violated his right to due process by refusing to
allow him to call witnesses during a disciplinary
hearing.[7]The superior court concluded that the
appellant had waived this argument by failing to raise it in
his administrative appeal.[8] We reversed this decision and concluded
that the appellant had not forfeited this
argument.[9] We first noted that no statute or
regulation mandates issue exhaustion in Alaska.[10] Then we
concluded that several characteristics of the prison
disciplinary process counseled against imposing a judicially
created issue exhaustion requirement for disciplinary
appeals.[11] Accordingly, we held that
"prisoners who fail to raise their constitutional claims
during the administrative appeal process do not necessarily
forfeit those claims."[12]
The
forfeiture issue in Huber's appeal is not meaningfully
distinct from that in Walker. Like the appellant in
Walker, there is no evidence that Huber received
notice that failure to raise an issue during the
administrative appeal process would result in
forfeiture.[13] And Huber was similarly required to file
his administrative appeal "within three working days of
receipt of the written disciplinary decision," and
prepared his appeal without legal assistance.[14] Finally,
prison superintendents possess no "special expertise to
address [the] constitutional claim[]" that Huber raises
on appeal.[15] Accordingly, we conclude that Huber did
not forfeit his due process claim by failing to raise it
during the disciplinary appeals process.[16]
B.
The Hearing Officer's Failure To Provide A Statement Of
The Reasons For The Decision Or The Evidence
Supporting It Was A Violation Of Huber's Right To Due
Process.
In
Wolff v. McDonnell, the United States Supreme Court
held that due process requires factfinders in a prison
disciplinary proceeding to produce "a 'written
statement... as to the evidence relied on and reasons'
for the disciplinary action."[17] A year after
Wolff, we accordingly stated in McGinnis v.
Stevens that the Alaska Constitution entitles prisoners
"to all due process rights enunciated in
Wolff," including the written statement
requirement.[18] And we went further and held that the
Alaska Constitution provides greater due process protections
than the U.S. Constitution. It entitles a prisoner not simply
to a written summary statement, but "to have the
entire hearing recorded for purposes of
administrative appeal and potential further appeal to the
superior court."[19]
Huber
first contends that simply providing a verbatim record of his
disciplinary proceeding misconstrues our holding in
McGinnis and cannot satisfy the Wolff
written statement requirement. However, we recently rejected
this same argument in Pease-Madore v. State, Department
of Corrections.[20] In that case, a prisoner appealed from
three disciplinary decisions in which the hearing officer did
not produce a Wolff written statement.[21] We concluded
that the McGinnis verbatim record requirement
"serve[s] the same purposes as the [Wolff]
written statement," and in fact "may furnish a more
inclusive record of the proceedings" than a written
statement.[22] Accordingly, we held that an audio
recording of a disciplinary hearing can satisfy
Wolff s requirement for a written
statement.[23]
But we
also noted that, although an audio recording of a
disciplinary proceeding may satisfy the
Wolff requirement, it will not necessarily
do so.[24] We reasoned that a verbatim record
"fulfills th[e] purpose" of the Wolff
requirement "if the recording includes information about
the evidence relied on and the reasons for the
decision."[25] However, we also stated that, "[i]f
the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary
action are not identified in the recording, then there is
indeed a qualitative difference between the information made
available through a written statement as opposed to a
recording."[26] We concluded that the audio recordings
of the proceedings at issue provided sufficient information
to satisfy the Wolff requirement only when
considered in conjunction with the hearing officers'
written reports.[27] Pease-Madore thus establishes
that it is the substance of the explanation that matters,
rather than the manner in which it is preserved. In other
words, a prisoner's right to due process is satisfied
when the written disciplinary decision, audio recording, or
both in conjunction satisfy the Wolff requirement -
that is, when they provide "information about the
evidence relied on and the reasons for the
decision."[28]
Huber
next contends that the hearing officer's decision in his
disciplinary hearing did not satisfy the Wolff
requirement, and thereby violated his right to due process.
"Whether an inmate has received procedural due process
is an issue of constitutional law that we review de
novo."[29]
"One
question left open by the Wolff decision is how
specific a Wolff statement should
be."[30] In Pease-Madore, we concluded
that verbatim records of a proceeding coupled with
disciplinary decisions that incorporated detailed incident
reports satisfied the Wolff
requirement.[31] Thus, in at least some instances, it is
...