United States District Court, D. Alaska
ORDER AND OPINION [RE: MOTIONS AT DOCKETS 40,
44]
JOHN
W. SEDWICK SENIOR JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.
I.
MOTION PRESENTED
At
docket 40 Defendant Maniilaq Association
(“Maniilaq”) moves pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56 for summary judgment on all claims brought
by Plaintiff Thomas Myers (“Myers”). Maniilaq
supports the motion with a memorandum of points and
authorities at docket 41 and affidavits at dockets 42 and 43.
Maniilaq additionally moves at docket 44 for summary judgment
on Myers' claim that Maniilaq breached the implied
covenant of good fath and fair dealing. Maniilaq supports
that summary judgment motion with a memorandum at docket 45
and affidavits at dockets 46 and 47.[1] Myers did not file an
opposition to either motion. Oral argument was not requested
and would not assist the court.
II.
BACKGROUND
On
December 10, 2013, Maniilaq's then-President/Chief
Executive Officer Patrick Anderson hired Myers as a
“Senior Lean Sensei, ” tasked with implementing
Anderson's preferred “Lean Management
System.”[2] Five days after Maniilaq terminated
Anderson, Maniilaq also terminated Myers by memorandum
hand-delivered to Myers on January 29, 2014.[3] Myers left
Maniilaq that day and did not return to work after that
date.[4] Myers filed the instant suit in this Court
on January 31, 2017.[5] Maniilaq now moves for summary judgment on
all claims in Myers' wrongful discharge complaint as
time-barred by the applicable statute of
limitations.[6] Maniilaq additionally moves for summary
judgment on the merits of Myer's claim that Maniilaq
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.[7]
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary
judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”[8] The materiality requirement
ensures that “only disputes over facts that might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment.”[9] Ultimately, “summary judgment will
not lie if the . . . evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.”[10] However, summary judgment is mandated
“against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient
to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial.”[11]
The
moving party has the burden of showing that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact.[12] Where the
nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a
dispositive issue, the moving party need not present evidence
to show that summary judgment is warranted; it need only
point out the lack of any genuine dispute as to material
fact.[13] Once the moving party has met this
burden, the nonmoving party must set forth evidence of
specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for
trial.[14] All evidence presented by the non-movant
must be believed for purposes of summary judgment and all
justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the
non-movant.[15] However, the non-moving party may not
rest upon mere allegations or denials but must show that
there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual
dispute to require a fact-finder to resolve the parties'
differing versions of the truth at trial.[16]
The
Court cannot grant summary judgment based solely on the fact
that no opposition was filed in this case. The Local Civil
Rules for the United States District Court for the District
of Alaska state that “[n]o unopposed motion for summary
judgment will be granted unless the court is satisfied that
there are no disputed issues of material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to the decision as a matter of
law.”[17] In other words, summary judgment motions
are not governed by the usual default judgment principles;
rather, a court must determine whether the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law even if the motion is
unopposed.[18] A court must consider the merits of the
motion and ensure that the motion is supported by sufficient
evidentiary materials.[19]
IV.
DISCUSSION
A.
Motion at Docket 40
Maniilaq
first moves for summary judgment on the ground that Myers
failed to commence this action in the time allowed by law. In
a federal diversity action brought under state law,
“the state statute of limitations
controls.”[20] Under Alaska law, tort actions not
arising from a contract are governed by AS 09.10.070(a),
which provides a two-year statute of
limitations.[21] Breach of contract claims must be
brought within three years pursuant to AS
09.10.053.[22]
Myers'
amended complaint raises wrongful discharge and breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims. In
his complaint, Myers avers that, “[i]n early February
2014, [he] was given notice that he was . . . being
discharged from his job with Maniilaq
Association.”[23] In support of its summary judgment
motions, however, Maniilaq has provided uncontroverted
evidence that Myers was terminated on January 29,
2014.[24] Myers' initial complaint was not
filed until January 31, 2017, [25] three years and two days after
Myers was terminated. Myers asserts no basis for tolling, and
none is apparent from the record. Thus, Myers' claims are
untimely under either the two-year or three-year statute of
limitations, and summary judgment is granted as to all
claims.
B.
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