United States District Court, D. Alaska
ORDER MOTION TO DISMISS
H.
Russel Holland, United States District Judge
Defendants
move to dismiss plaintiffs' second amended and
consolidated complaint.[1]This motion is opposed.[2] Oral argument was
requested and has been heard.
Background
Plaintiffs
are Marvin Roberts, George Frese, Kevin Pease, and Eugene
Vent. Defendants are the City of Fairbanks, James Geier,
Clifford Aaron Ring, Chris Nolan, and Dave Kendrick.
Plaintiffs
were convicted of the October 11, 1997 murder of John
Hartman[3] and then sentenced to prison sentences
ranging from 30 years to 77 years.[4] Plaintiffs allege that their
convictions were the result of manufactured evidence and
false statements.[5]
In
September 2013, plaintiffs filed petitions for
post-conviction relief (“PCR”) in the Alaska
Superior Court, “arguing that newfound testimonial and
physical evidence could prove their factual
innocence.”[6] A five-week evidentiary hearing on
plaintiffs' PCR petitions was held in the fall of
2015.[7] Plaintiffs allege that “[t]his
evidentiary hearing established that [they] were actually
innocent of Hartman's murder” and that they
“squarely placed their factual innocence at issue
during the PCR hearing.”[8] Plaintiffs allege that the
evidence presented at the hearing included testimony from
William Holmes “that he and his friends were
Hartman's true killers, ” testimony from “at
least eleven witnesses who corroborated his account[,
]” and testimony that “the Alaska State Troopers
had been able to corroborate key aspects of Holmes's
confession and had been unable to locate any evidence placing
[p]laintiffs at the scene of the Hartman homicide. . .
.”[9]
Plaintiffs
allege that “[a]t the conclusion of the PCR hearing in
November 2015, the presiding judge told the parties multiple
times that it would take him six to eight months to reach a
decision.”[10] They also allege that “[m]embers
of the prosecution . . . stated publically that if the trial
court concluded [that] the convictions should be vacated and
ordered a new trial, the State would appeal that decision
through to the Alaska Supreme Court.”[11] Plaintiffs
allege that “[t]his signaled an official willingness to
delay further resolution of the case and release of all the
[p]laintiffs, other than Roberts who had by this time served
his sentence and had been released on
probation.”[12]
Plaintiffs
allege that “[j]ust before Christmas, the prosecutors
offered [them] a devil's bargain: the prosecution would
consent to vacating the convictions and dismissing the
charges but only if [they] would agree not to sue to
vindicate their civil rights.”[13] Plaintiffs allege that
State prosecutors were attempting “to avert probable
judicial findings that [p]laintiffs were innocent and/or that
the convictions were marred by official
misconduct.”[14]Plaintiffs further allege that State
prosecutors were attempting to “forestall
[p]laintiffs' civil action, through the waiver of claims,
that likely would expose FPD [Fairbanks Police Department]
officers and their colleagues in the Fairbank District
Attorney Office to unfavorable litigation and public scrutiny
into police and prosecutorial misconduct. . .
.”[15]
Plaintiffs
took the deal that was offered and entered into settlement
agreements with the State of Alaska and the City of
Fairbanks.[16] The settlement agreements provided that
plaintiffs would stipulate to the withdrawal of their PCR
petitions and that the parties would stipulate to a court
order vacating the judgments of conviction.[17] The State
agreed to file dismissals of the indictments and “not
to seek a retrial” but reserved the right to seek a
retrial if “substantial new evidence of guilt is
discovered[.]”[18] The settlement agreements further
provided that “[t]he parties have not reached agreement
as to [plaintiffs'] actual guilt or
innocence.”[19]
In the
settlement agreements, plaintiffs
release[d] and forever discharge[d] . . . the City of
Fairbanks and its departments, divisions, agencies, agents,
representatives, directors, past and current employees,
attorneys, contractors, retained or non-retained experts,
witnesses, predecessors or successors in interest, and
assigns . . . of and from any and all past, present, or
future actions, causes of action, controversies, suits,
claims, demands, liabilities, complaints or grievances of
every kind and nature, whether mature or to mature in the
future, and whether known or unknown, for or by reason of any
matter, thing, claim, or allegation arising out of or in any
way related to the arrest, investigation, prosecution,
appeal, legal representation, or incarceration associated
with, connected to, or related in any way to any legal
matters or actions referenced above, or any other matters
arising prior to the date of this Settlement Agreement and
Mutual Release of All Claims.[20]
More
specifically, plaintiffs released
any and all claims . . . arising out of the investigation
into the death of Jonathan Hartman and the subsequent
prosecution and incarceration of [plaintiffs], . . .
including but not limited to claims for malicious
prosecution, wrongful imprisonment, prosecutorial misconduct,
legal malpractice, [and] violation or deprivation of rights
civil or constitutional[.[21]
Plaintiffs
also “release[d] any right [they] may now or hereafter
have to reform, rescind, modify or set aside th[e] Settlement
Agreement[s] and Mutual Release[s] of All Claims through
mutual or unilateral mistake or
otherwise.”[22]
Plaintiffs
declare[d] that the terms of th[e] Settlement Agreement[s]
and Mutual Release[s] of All Claims have been carefully read
and are fully understood and are voluntarily accepted [f]or
the purpose of making a full and final compromise of any and
all claims, disputed or otherwise, for and on account of the
matters described above.[23]
The
settlement agreements also provided that “[i]t is
mutually understood by the [p]arties that the purpose of
th[ese] Agreement[s] is that there be no further litigation
by [plaintiffs] or others on [their] behalf related to this
matter.”[24] The settlement agreements also noted
that the agreements had “been drafted by the [p]arties
through the efforts of their respective legal counsel”
and that “[t]he [p]arties warrant that the terms of
th[e] Agreement[s] have been carefully reviewed and that each
[p]arty understands [their] contents and has been advised as
to the legal effect of th[e] Agreement[s] by legal counsel
obtained by that [p]arty.”[25] Each of plaintiffs'
lawyers represented that they had “carefully and fully
explained the terms, provisions and effects of” the
agreements and that their clients represented that they
understood the terms of the agreements and the significance
of the terms.[26]
The
terms of the stipulation that was contemplated in the
settlement agreements were presented to the Superior Court on
December 11, 2015. Plaintiffs “stipulate[d] and
agree[d] that the original jury verdicts and judgments of
conviction were properly and validly entered based on proof
beyond a reasonable doubt[, ]” and the parties
“stipulate[d] and agree[d] that th[e Superior c]ourt
need not make findings of innocence under AS
12.72.020.”[27] In paragraph 5 of the stipulation,
“[t]he parties stipulate[d] and agree[d] that [the
Superior c]ourt may immediately enter Orders vacating the
Judgments of Conviction, Restitution Orders, and Rule 39
judgments for attorney fees in each” underlying
criminal case “and award[] each Petitioner the relief
of a new trial for each of the charges for which Petitioners
were convicted.”[28] The stipulation provided that
“[u]pon entry of the Orders in paragraph 5, Petitioners
withdraw their claims of prosecutorial misconduct
asserted” in their PCR petitions.[29] The
stipulation also provided that “[u]pon entry of the
Orders in Paragraph 5, . . . the State will not seek retrial
in any of the underlying criminal cases and will file
dismissals pursuant to Criminal Rule 43(a) of the
indictments. . . .”[30] Finally, “the parties
stipulate[d] and agree[d] that upon the filing of the . . .
dismissals, [the Superior c]ourt shall order the immediate
and unconditional release of Petitioners from custody and
supervision. . . .”[31]
On
December 17, 2015, the Superior Court held a hearing to
address the stipulation. At the hearing, the Superior Court
judge read the stipulation into the record and declared that
“[t]he orders vacating the judgment of conviction and
commitment and probation and restitution will enter”
and that he would “sign them off the
record.”[32]
The
State dismissed the charges against plaintiffs on December
17, 2015.[33] The orders vacating plaintiffs'
convictions and sentences were also signed on December 17,
2015 2015.[34] And, Vent, Pease, and Frese were
released from prison on December 17, 2015.
On May
14, 2018, plaintiffs filed their second amended and
consolidated complaint in this matter. In this complaint,
they assert twelve causes of action. In the first cause of
action, plaintiffs assert § 1983 deprivation of liberty
claims. In the second cause of action, plaintiffs assert
§ 1983 claims for malicious prosecution. In the third
cause of action, plaintiffs assert § 1983 Brady
claims. In the fourth cause of action, plaintiffs assert
§ 1983 supervisor liability claims. In the fifth cause
of action, plaintiffs assert § 1983 civil rights
conspiracy claims. In the sixth cause of action, plaintiffs
assert § 1985(3) conspiracy claims. In the seventh cause
of action, plaintiffs assert Monell claims under
§ 1983 against the City of Fairbanks. In the eighth
cause of action, plaintiffs assert § 1983 First
Amendment right of access claims. In the ninth cause of
action, Vent and Frese assert Fifth Amendment violation
claims.[35] In the tenth cause of action, plaintiffs
assert spoliation of evidence claims. In the eleventh cause
of action, plaintiffs assert negligence claims. In the
twelfth cause of action, plaintiffs assert intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims.
Pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
defendants now move to dismiss plaintiffs' claims for
failure to state plausible claims. In the alternative,
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7), defendants move to dismiss
plaintiffs' claims for failure to join the State of
Alaska as an indispensable party.
Discussion
“‘To
survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Zixiang Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir.
2013) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009)). “A claim is facially plausible ‘when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.'” Id. (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “The plausibility
standard requires more than the sheer possibility or
conceivability that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Id. “‘Where a complaint pleads facts
that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability,
it stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.'”
Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
“[T]he complaint must provide ‘more than labels
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.'” In re Rigel
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Securities Litig., 697 F.3d 869,
875 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “In evaluating
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts the complaint's
well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” Adams v. U.S. Forest Srvc., 671
F.3d 1138, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 2012). “However, the trial
court does not have to accept as true conclusory allegations
in a complaint or legal claims asserted in the form of
factual allegations.” In re Tracht Gut, LLC,
836 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2016).
As an
initial matter, plaintiffs “do not oppose” the
dismissal of their negligence and negligent infliction of
emotional distress claims.[36] Defendants' motion to
dismiss these two claims is granted. Plaintiffs'
negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress
claims are dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiffs
do oppose the dismissal of their other ten claims. Defendants
first argue that these claims are subject to dismissal
because they are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477 (1994).
The
question before the Court in Heck was “whether
a state prisoner may challenge the constitutionality of his
conviction in a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.” Id. at 478. Heck had been convicted of
voluntary manslaughter in state court and was serving a
fifteen-year sentence. Id. He filed a § 1983
action in federal court, alleging that the state prosecutor
and police investigator had conducted an unlawful
investigation, destroyed evidence, and used illegal and
unlawful evidence at his trial. Id. at 479. Heck
sought damages; he did not seek to be released from custody.
Id.
The
Seventh Circuit had held that if a prisoner is challenging
the legality of his conviction, “the suit is classified
as an application for habeas corpus and the plaintiff must
exhaust his state remedies.” Id. at 480
(citation omitted). But, the Court found that “[t]he
issue with respect to monetary damages challenging conviction
is not . . . exhaustion; but rather . . . whether the claim
is cognizable under § 1983 at all.” Id.
at 483.
The
Court then compared Heck's § 1983 claims to
“[t]he common-law cause of action for malicious
prosecution” and observed that for such a claim
“[o]ne element that must be alleged and proved . . . is
termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the
accused.” Id. at 484. The Court found that
“the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not
appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of
outstanding criminal judgment applies to § 1983 damages
actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the
unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement[.]”
Id. at 486. Thus, the Court held
that, in order to recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other
harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must
prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid
by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or
called into question by a federal court's issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Id. at 486-87. “A claim for damages bearing
that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has
not been so invalidated is not cognizable under
§ 1983.” Id. at 487. The Court explained
that
when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit,
the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of
his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must
be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if
the district court determines that the plaintiff's
action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the
invalidity of any outstanding ...