United States District Court, D. Alaska
ORDER
H.
Russel Holland United States District Judge.
This is
an action for judicial review of the denial of disability
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 401-434. Plaintiff Rance Lentz has timely filed
his opening brief, [1] to which defendant, the Commissioner of
the Social Security Administration, has timely
responded.[2] Oral argument was requested but is not
deemed necessary.
Procedural
Background
On
August 2, 2015, plaintiff filed an application for disability
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging
that he became disabled on February 27, 2015. Plaintiff
alleged that he was disabled due to ulcerative colitis, IgA
pemphigus, migraines, rheumatoid arthritis, depression,
kidney stones, and uveitis. Plaintiff's application was
denied initially. Plaintiff requested a hearing. After an
administrative hearing on January 31, 2018, an administrative
law judge (ALJ) denied plaintiff's application. On May 2,
2018, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for
review, thereby making the ALJ's March 5, 2018, decision
the final decision of the Commissioner. On July 2, 2018,
plaintiff commenced this action in which he asks the court to
find that he is entitled to disability benefits.
General
Background
Plaintiff
was born on February 6, 1979. He was 38 years old at the time
of the administrative hearing. Plaintiff has a high school
education. Plaintiff's past relevant work includes work
as an auto mechanic, heavy equipment mechanic, and heavy
equipment operator.
The
ALJ's Decision
The ALJ
first determined that plaintiff met “the insured status
requirements of the Social Security Act through September 30,
2020.”[3]
The ALJ
then applied the five-step sequential analysis used to
determine whether an individual is disabled.[4]
At step
one, the ALJ found that plaintiff had “engaged in
substantial gainful activity during the following periods:
February 27, 2015 through March 31, 2015” but that
“there has been a continuous 12-month period[] during
which the claimant did not engage in substantial gainful
activity.”[5] The ALJ noted that his “remaining
findings address the period[] the claimant did not engage in
substantial gainful activity.”[6]
At step
two, the ALJ found that plaintiff had “the following
severe impairments: longstanding history of ulcerative
colitis status post bowel resection surgery; hemiplegic
headaches and associated mild hemiparesis on the right side;
migraine headaches; hypertension; major depressive disorder;
generalized anxiety disorder; possible malingering; [and]
possible conversion disorder. . . .”[7] The ALJ found
plaintiff's septum secundum and IgA pemphigus non-severe
and that rheumatoid arthritis, fibromyalgia, and a
seizure-like condition were “nonmedically determinable
impairments.”[8]
At step
three, the ALJ found that plaintiff did “not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the listed
impairments. . . .”[9] The ALJ considered Listings 4.00
(cardiovascular system), 5.00 (digestive system), 12.04
(depressive, bipolar and related disorders), and 12.06
(anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders). The ALJ
considered the “paragraph B” criteria and found
that plaintiff had moderate limitations as to understanding,
remembering, and applying information; mild limitations as to
interacting with others; moderate limitations with regard to
concentration, persistence, or pace; and moderate limitations
as to adapting or managing oneself.[10] The ALJ found that the
“paragraph C” criteria were not
met.[11]
“Between
steps three and four, the ALJ must, as an intermediate step,
assess the claimant's RFC.” Bray v. Comm'r
of Social Security Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222-23 (9th
Cir. 2009). The ALJ found that plaintiff had the
residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined
in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except the claimant is additionally
limited to: sitting for six hours, and standing/walking for a
combined total of five hours during an eight-hour workday;
occupations that would permit a sit/stand option allowing the
claimant to alternate between sitting and standing positions
throughout the day without going off task; frequent
pushing/pulling with the right upper extremity; occasional
overhead reaching with the right upper extremity; occasional
stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling[, ] and climbing of
ramps or stairs; no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds;
no exposure to unprotected heights; occasional exposure to
moving and hazardous machinery; occupations that would allow
reasonable use of the restroom; simple, routine and
repetitive tasks; [and] no high-paced production quotas or
changes in the workplace setting.[12]
The ALJ
gave Dr. Lebeau's opinion[13] great weight.[14] The ALJ gave
little weight to Dr. Hanley's December 2017
opinion.[15] The ALJ gave Dr. Lace's
opinion[16] great weight.[17]The ALJ gave little weight
to the opinion of Josie Barry, M.A.[18] The ALJ gave some
weight[19] to the opinions of Dr.
Fraser[20] and Dr. Kiehl.[21] And, the ALJ gave little
weight[22] to the lay testimony of Lou Ann
Fett[23] and Kim Wood.[24]
The ALJ
found plaintiff's pain and symptom statements less than
credible because they were inconsistent with the medical
evidence.[25]
At step
four, the ALJ found that plaintiff was “unable to
perform any past relevant work. . . .”[26]
At step
five, the ALJ found that “there are jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant
can perform, ” including working as an assembler,
basket filler, or garment sorter.[27]
Thus,
the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had “not been under a
disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from
February 27, 2015, through the date of this decision. . .
.”[28]
Standard
of Review
Pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court has the “power to
enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a
judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of
the Commissioner. . . .” The court “properly
affirms the Commissioner's decision denying benefits if
it is supported by substantial evidence and based on the
application of correct legal standards.” Sandgathe
v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997).
“Substantial evidence is ‘more than a mere
scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.'” Id. (quoting
Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.
1995)). “‘To determine whether substantial
evidence supports the ALJ's decision, [the court]
review[s] the administrative record as a whole, weighing both
the evidence that supports and that which detracts from the
ALJ's conclusion.'” Id. (quoting
Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039). If the evidence is
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the
court must uphold the Commissioner's decision.
Id. But, the Commissioner's decision cannot be
affirmed “‘simply by isolating a specific quantum
of supporting evidence.'” Holohan v.
Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir.
1999)).
Discussion
Plaintiff
first argues that the ALJ erred as to Dr. Hanley's
January 15, 2017 opinion. On January 15, 2017, Dr. Hanley,
who was plaintiff's primary care physician, opined that
plaintiff could continuously lift/carry 10 pounds; could
frequently lift/carry 20 pounds; could occasionally
lift/carry up to 100 pounds; could sit for 4 hours; could
stand/walk for 2 hours; could occasionally climb
stairs/ramps; could never climb ladders/scaffolds; could
frequently balance and stoop; could occasionally kneel,
crouch, and crawl; could never be around unprotected heights,
dust, fumes, odors, or pulmonary irritants; could
occasionally be around moving mechanical parts; could
occasionally operate a motor vehicle; could frequently be
around humidity and wetness; and could occasionally be around
extreme cold, extreme heat, and vibrations.[29] Dr. Hanley
also opined that plaintiff would be unable to work when
having a headache and that he would be absent from work more
than four times a month because of his
headaches.[30] On December 26, 2017, Dr. Hanley wrote
that plaintiff
has a significant inherited disease that has limited his
ability to seek employment or remain in a position of
employment on a regular basis. He has had numerous
hospitalizations over the past years, which have included
surgical as well as medical interventions. He has both
physical and mental health components to his condition. He is
often physically capable, but has unpredictable and frequent
exacerbations of his disease process that require urgent
medical attention and would indeed prevent him from working.
These include transient changes to his eyesight, increased
pain, recurrent infections, heart arrhythmias, to name a few
of his impairments. He has had these limitations, most of his
adult life, but worsened in February 2015 based on my review
of the medical record. I would foresee his limitations as
outlined above persisting into the foreseeable
future.[31]
The ALJ
rejected Dr. Hanley's December 2017 opinion because it
was not supported by his treatment notes.[32] Plaintiff
does not challenge this finding. Rather, plaintiff argues
that the ALJ erred as to Dr. Hanley's January 2017
opinion because the ALJ did not even mention this opinion.
Defendant concedes that it was error for the ALJ to not
consider Dr. Hanley's January 2017 opinion and that this
error was not harmless.[33]
Plaintiff
next argues that the ALJ erred as to Dr. Curns' report.
Dr. Curns evaluated plaintiff on November 21, 2017 and wrote
that plaintiff had
clinical depression, anxiety, severe somatic symptoms, social
withdrawal, and extreme psychological turmoil. He is isolated
from others and has unusual beliefs and eccentric behaviors.
Mr. Lentz has a strong potential for having a conversion
disorder that worsens in times of stress. He has difficulty
making decisions and he has low self-esteem. Mr. Lentz is
socially awkward and is likely to have problems with work and
in relationships. He has limited psychological resources for
handling stress and he may have symptoms of
PTSD.[34]
The ALJ
did not address Dr. Curns' report, which was based on a
battery of tests, other than to note that Dr. Curns had
stated that plaintiff's clinical presentation should be
viewed with caution due to an “‘over-reporting of
symptoms.'”[35] Defendant concedes that the ALJ erred
in not considering Dr. Curns' evaluation and that this
error was not harmless.[36]
Plaintiff
next argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting Dr. Martino's
opinion. Dr. Martino treated plaintiff's headaches and
depression.[37] But, as defendant aptly points out, Dr.
Martino did not offer any opinions. What plaintiff takes
issue with is the fact that the ALJ did not mention a June
15, 2015 treatment note, in which Dr. Martino noted that
plaintiff reported that “diesel fumes can be a
trigger” for his headaches.[38] Plaintiff argues that the
ALJ should have considered this notation because it is
consistent with Dr. Hanley's opinion that plaintiff
should avoid all exposure to fumes.
There
was no error as to Dr. Martino's treatment notes. The
reference to diesel fumes being a trigger was a self-report,
not a determination that was made by Dr. Martino.
Finally,
plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinion
of Josie Barry. On January 9, 2018, Barry opined that
plaintiff had no limitations in his ability to interact
appropriately with the general public, ask simple questions
or request assistance, maintain socially appropriate
behavior, and adhere to basic standards of neatness and
cleanliness; moderate limitations in his ability to
understand/remember/carry out very short and simple
instructions, sustain an ordinary routine without special
supervision, make simple work-related decisions, accept
instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from
others, get along with coworkers and peers without
distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes, be aware
of normal hazards and take appropriate precautions, and
travel in unfamiliar places or use public transportation; and
extreme limitations in his ability to remember locations and
work-like procedures, understand/remember/carry out detailed
instructions, maintain attention and concentration for
extended periods of time, perform activities within a
schedule, maintain regular attendance, be punctual within
customary tolerances, work in coordination with others or
proximity to others without being distracted by them,
complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions
from psychologically based symptoms, perform at a consistent
pace without an unreasonable number of and length of rest
periods, respond appropriately to changes in the work
setting, set realistic goals or make plans independently of
others, and tolerate normal levels of stress.[39] Barry also
opined that plaintiff would miss 28 days of work per month
because of his mental impairments and that she did not
“believe that he could work on a regular basis”
because “[h]is mental impairment is tied to his
physical impairments making it very difficult for him to have
a lot of ‘good days.'”[40]
The ALJ
rejected Barry's opinion because Barry opined that
plaintiff had extreme ...