Appeal
from the Superior Court No. 3AN-15-08446 CI of the State of
Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Andrew Guidi,
Judge.
Kenneth P. Jacobus, Kenneth P. Jacobus, P.C., Anchorage, for
Appellant.
Samuel
C. Severin, Assistant Municipal Attorney, and Rebecca A.
Windt Pearson, Municipal Attorney, Anchorage, for Appellee,
Municipality of Anchorage. Notice of nonparticipation filed
by David W. Pease, Burr, Pease & Kurtz, Anchorage, for
Appellees James Williams and Suzie Williams.
Before: Stowers, Chief Justice, Winfree, Maassen, Bolger, and
Carney, Justices.
OPINION
CARNEY, Justice.
I.
INTRODUCTION
A man
sued his neighbors, alleging that an access road on their
property caused flooding on his property. After he reached a
settlement with the neighbors, the man stipulated to a
dismissal of his claims with prejudice. Three years later the
man again sued the neighbors as well as the Municipality of
Anchorage, alleging that the flooding had continued and
asserting new claims of nuisance, trespass, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract. The
superior court granted summary judgment for the Municipality
on the basis of either collateral estoppel or res judicata.
The man appeals; we reverse the grant of summary judgment and
remand for further proceedings.
II.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A.
Facts
John
Strong has owned property in Anchorage since 1974. He alleges
that his house and property have regularly flooded since the
neighboring landowners built an access road to their property
in the 1980s. The Municipality became aware of the flooding
by 1993.[1]
James
and Suzie Williams owned the property by 2010, when Strong
initiated his first lawsuit related to the flooding. Strong
sued them for trespass and nuisance and asked the court to
order them to abate the flooding and award Strong
compensatory and punitive damages.
In
March 2011 Strong signed a Release and Settlement Agreement
releasing the Williamses from any and all claims related to
Strong's property damage or the access road. He released
the claims in exchange for $7, 500 and an agreement that the
Williamses would upgrade the driveway according to
agreed-upon specifications. The agreement stated that the
parties intended to "release all individuals, firms, or
corporations who could at any future date be possible
defendants in any action arising out of the claims."
Strong
filed a stipulation to dismiss all claims with prejudice in
July 2012. The superior court accepted the stipulation and
dismissed the lawsuit.
B.
Proceedings
In July
2015 Strong filed another complaint against the Williamses
and added the Municipality of Anchorage. He again alleged
that his property had frequently flooded since the access
road was built in the 1980s. Strong contended that the
Municipality had declared the road a nuisance but had never
enforced an abatement order. He brought claims of nuisance,
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED),
trespass, and breach of contract against the Williamses and
the Municipality. Strong asked the superior court to order
the defendants to remove the access road and take steps to
restore the flow of groundwater that it had obstructed. He
also asked the court to award him compensatory damages for
repairs, mental anguish, and the costs of addressing the
flooding, as well as punitive damages and attorney's
fees.
The
Municipality answered his complaint less than a month later,
arguing that Strong's claims were barred by a number of
doctrines, including res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Strong admitted in response to discovery requests that he was
seeking only equitable, not monetary, relief from the
Municipality and was not claiming trespass or IIED against
the Municipality.
Nearly
a year later the Municipality filed a motion for summary
judgment arguing that collateral estoppel (or issue
preclusion) barred Strong's claims.[2] The Municipality
also contended that, because it was not a party to the
earlier settlement between Strong and the Williamses, it
could not be liable for any breach of contract claim. Strong
opposed the motion and the superior court heard oral argument
in December.
The
superior court orally ruled that "[c]ollateral estoppel
applies with regard to claims based on everything that was
settled to the same extent that it applies in favor of the
Williams[es]" and that there could be no breach of
contract claim against the Municipality because it was not a
party to the settlement agreement. The court gave Strong 30
days to amend his complaint to state a viable claim against
the Municipality; he did not file an amended complaint.
On
April 12, 2017 the superior court issued a written decision
granting summary judgment to the Municipality. It relied on a
different theory in its written decision than its oral
decision to find that Strong's claims were precluded: it
held that res judicata barred Strong's nuisance and
trespass claims against the Municipality and that collateral
estoppel barred Strong's IIED claim. The court also
granted judgment to the Municipality on Strong's claim
for breach of contract because the ...