Argued
October 9, 2018
ON
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Petitioner
Stokeling pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm and
ammunition after having been convicted of a felony, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1). Based on
Stokeling's prior criminal history, the probation office
recommended the mandatory minimum 15-year prison term that
the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) provides for
§922(g) violators who have three previous convictions
"for a violent felony," §924(e). As relevant
here, Stokeling objected that his prior Florida robbery
conviction was not a "violent felony," which ACCA
defines, in relevant part, as "any crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" that
"has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another,"
§924(e)(2)(B)(i). The District Court held that
Stokeling's actions during the robbery did not justify an
ACCA sentence enhancement, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed.
Held:
1. ACCAs elements clause encompasses a robbery offense that
requires the defendant to overcome the victim's
resistance. Pp. 3-12.
(a) As originally enacted, ACCA prescribed a sentence
enhancement for certain individuals with three prior
convictions "for robbery or burglary," 18 U.S.C.
App. §1202(a) (1982 ed., Supp. II), and defined robbery
as an unlawful taking "by force or violence,"
§1202(c)(8)-a clear reference to common-law robbery,
which required a level of "force" or
"violence" sufficient to overcome the resistance of
the victim, however slight. When Congress amended ACCA two
years later, it replaced the enumerated crimes with the
elements clause, an expanded enumerated offenses clause, and
the now-defunct residual clause. The new elements clause
extended ACCA to cover any offense that has as an
element "the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force" §924(e)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis
added). By replacing robbery with a clause that has
"force" as its touchstone, Congress retained the
same common-law definition that undergirded the definition of
robbery in the original ACCA. This understanding is
buttressed by the then widely accepted definitions of robbery
among the States, a significant majority of which defined
nonaggravated robbery as requiring a degree of force
sufficient only to overcome a victim's resistance. Under
Stokeling's reading, many of those state robbery statutes
would not qualify as ACCA predicates. But federal criminal
statutes should not be construed in ways that would render
them inapplicable in many States. Pp. 3-8.
(b) This understanding of "physical force" comports
with Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133. The
force necessary for misdemeanor battery addressed in
Johnson does not require resistance or even physical
aversion on the part of the victim. Rather, the
"slightest offensive touching" would qualify.
Id., at 139. It is thus different in kind from the
force necessary to overcome resistance by a victim, which is
inherently "violent" in the sense contemplated by
Johnson and "suggest[s] a degree of power that
would not be satisfied by the merest touching."
Ibid. Johnson did not purport, as Stokeling
suggests, to establish a force threshold so high as to
exclude even robbery from ACCAs scope. Pp. 8-10.
(c) Stokeling's suggested definition of "physical
force"-force "reasonably expected to cause pain or
injury"-is inconsistent with the degree of force
necessary to commit robbery at common law. Moreover, the
Court declined to adopt this standard in Johnson.
Stokeling's proposal would prove exceedingly difficult to
apply, would impose yet another indeterminable line-drawing
exercise on the lower courts, and is not supported by
United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S.157. Pp. 10-12.
2. Robbery under Florida law qualifies as an ACCA-predicate
offense under the elements clause. The term "physical
force" in ACCA encompasses the degree of force necessary
to commit common-law robbery. And the Florida Supreme Court
has made clear that the robbery statute requires
"resistance by the victim that is overcome by the
physical force of the offender." Robinson v.
State, 692 So.2d 883, 886. Pp. 12-13.
684 Fed.Appx. 870, affirmed.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Beeyer, Alito, Gorsuch, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.
SoTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and GlNSBURG and Kagan, JJ., joined.
OPINION
Thomas
Justice
This
case requires us to decide whether a robbery offense that has
as an element the use of force sufficient to overcome a
victim's resistance necessitates the use of
"physical force" within the meaning of the Armed
Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(2)(B)(i).
We conclude that it does.
I
In the
early hours of July 27, 2015, two people burgled the Tongue
& Cheek restaurant in Miami Beach, Florida. Petitioner
Denard Stokeling was an employee of the restaurant, and the
Miami Beach Police identified him as a suspect based on
surveillance video from the burglary and witness statements.
After conducting a criminal background check, police learned
that Stokeling had previously been convicted of three
felonies-home invasion, kidnaping, and robbery. When
confronted, Stokeling admitted that he had a gun in his
backpack. The detectives opened the backpack and discovered a
9-mm semiautomatic firearm, a magazine, and 12 rounds of
ammunition.
Stokeling
pleaded guilty in federal court to possessing a firearm and
ammunition after having been convicted of a felony, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1). The probation office
recommended that Stokeling be sentenced as an armed career
criminal under ACCA, which provides that a person who
violates §922(g) and who has three previous convictions
for a "violent felony" shall be imprisoned for a
minimum of 15 years. §924(e). ACCA defines "violent
felony" as "any crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year" that
"(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of
another; or
"(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another."
§924(e)(2)(B).
As
relevant here, Stokeling objected that his 1997 Florida
robbery conviction was not a predicate offense under ACCA.
This conviction, he argued, did not qualify under the first
clause-the "elements clause"-because Florida
robbery does not have "as an element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force."
[*]
Under
Florida law, robbery is defined as "the taking of money
or other property... from the person or custody of another, .
. . when in the course of the taking there is the use of
force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." Fla.
Stat. §812.13(1) (1995). The Florida Supreme Court has
explained that the "use of force" necessary to
commit robbery requires "resistance by the victim that
is overcome by the physical force of the offender."
Robinson v. State, 692 So.2d 883, 886 (1997).
Instead
of applying a categorical approach to the elements clause,
the District Court evaluated whether the facts of
Stokeling's robbery conviction were serious enough to
warrant an enhancement. The court concluded that, although
Stokeling" 'grabbed [the victim] by the neck and
tried to remove her necklaces'" as she"
'held onto'" them, his actions did not
"justify an enhancement." Sentencing Hearing in
15-cv-20815 (SD Fla.), Doc. 45, pp. 10-11. The court then
sentenced Stokeling to less than half of the mandatory
minimum 15-year term of imprisonment provided by ACCA.
The
Eleventh Circuit reversed. 684 Fed.Appx. 870 (2017). It held
that the District Court erred in making its own factual
determination about the level of violence involved in
Stokeling's particular robbery offense. Id., at
871. The court also rejected Stokeling's argument that
Florida robbery does not categorically require sufficient
force to constitute a violent felony under ACCA's
elements clause. Id., at 871-872.
We
granted certiorari to address whether the "force"
required to commit robbery under Florida law qualifies as
"physical force" for purposes of the elements
clause. 584 U.S. __ (2018). We now affirm.
II
Construing
the language of the elements clause in light of the history
of ACCA and our opinion in Johnson v. United States,
559 U.S. 133 (2010), we conclude that the elements clause
encompasses robbery offenses that require the criminal to
overcome the victim's resistance.
A
As
originally enacted, ACCA prescribed a 15-year minimum
sentence for any person who received, possessed, or
transported a firearm following three prior convictions
"for robbery or burglary." 18 U.S.C. App. §
1202(a) (1982 ed., Supp. II). Robbery was defined in relevant
part as "any felony consisting of the taking of the
property of another from the person or presence of another
by force or violence." § 1202(c)(8) (1982
ed., Supp. II) (emphasis added).
The
statute's definition mirrored the elements of the
common-law crime of robbery, which has long required force or
violence. At common law, an unlawful taking was merely
larceny unless the crime involved "violence." 2 J.
Bishop, Criminal Law §1156, p. 860 (J. Zane & C.
Zollman eds., 9th ed. 1923). And "violence" was
"committed if sufficient force [was] exerted to overcome
the resistance encountered." Id., at 861.
A few
examples illustrate the point. Under the common law, it was
robbery "to seize another's watch or purse, and use
sufficient force to break a chain or guard by which it is
attached to his person, or to run against another, or rudely
push him about, for the purpose of diverting his attention
and robbing him." W. Clark & W. Marshall, Law of
Crimes 554 (H. Lazell ed., 2d ed. 1905) (Clark &
Marshall) (footnotes omitted). Similarly, it was robbery to
pull a diamond pin out of a woman's hair when doing so
tore away hair attached to the pin. See 2 W. Russell, Crimes
and Indictable Misdemeanors 68 (2d ed. 1828). But the crime
was larceny, not robbery, if the thief did not have to
overcome such resistance.
In
fact, common-law authorities frequently used the terms
"violence" and "force" interchangeably.
See ibid. (concluding that "if any injury be
done to the person, or there be any struggle by the party to
keep possession of the property before it be taken from him,
there will be a sufficient actual 'violence'" to
establish robbery); Clark & Marshall 553
("Sufficient force must be used to overcome
resistance. . . . If there is any injury to the person of the
owner, or if he resists the attempt to rob him, and his
resistance is overcome, there is sufficient violence
to make the taking robbery, however slight the
resistance" (emphasis added)). The common law also did
not distinguish between gradations of "violence."
If an act physically overcame a victim's resistance,
"however slight" that resistance might be, it
necessarily constituted violence. Ibid.; 4 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 242 (1769)
(distinguishing "taking ... by force" from
"privately stealing," and stating that the use of
this "violence" differentiates robbery from other
larcenies); see also 3 id., at 120 (explaining, in
the battery context, that "the law cannot draw the line
between different degrees of violence, and therefore totally
prohibits the first and lowest stage of it").
The
overlap between "force" and "violence" at
common law is reflected in modern legal and colloquial usage
of these terms. "Force" means "[p]ower,
violence, or pressure directed against a person or
thing," Black's Law Dictionary 656 (7th ed. 1999),
or "unlawful violence threatened or committed against
persons or property," Random House Dictionary of the
English Language 748 (2d ed. 1987). Likewise,
"violence" implies force, including an "unjust
or unwarranted use of force." Black's Law
Dictionary, at 1564; accord, Random House Dictionary, at 2124
("rough or injurious physical force, action, or
treatment," or "an unjust or unwarranted exertion
of force or power, as against rights or laws").
Against
this background, Congress, in the original ACCA, defined
robbery as requiring the use of "force or
violence"-a clear reference to the common law of
robbery. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 320,
n. 13 (2010) ("Congress 'is understood to legislate
against a background of common-law . . .
principles'"). And the level of "force" or
"violence" needed at common law was by this time
well established: "Sufficient force must be used to
overcome resistance . . . however slight the
resistance." Clark & Marshall 553.
In
1986, Congress amended the relevant provisions of ACCA to
their current form. The amendment was titled Expansion of
Predicate Offenses for Armed Career Criminal Penalties. See
Career Criminals Amendment Act of 1986, §1402, 100 Stat.
3207-39. This amendment replaced the two enumerated crimes of
"robbery or burglar/ with the current elements clause, a
new enumerated-offenses list, and a (now-defunct) residual
clause. See Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. __
(2015). In the new statute, robbery was no longer enumerated
as a predicate offense. But the newly created elements clause
extended ACCA to cover any offense that has as an
element "the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force." 18 U.S.C.
§924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2012 ed.) (emphasis added).
"'[I]f
a word is obviously transplanted from another legal source,
whether the common law or other legislation, it brings the
old soil with it.'" Hall v. Hall, 584 U.S.
__, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 13) (quoting Frankfurter, Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev.
527, 537 (1947)). That principle supports our interpretation
of the term "force" here. By retaining the term
"force" in the 1986 version of ACCA and
otherwise" [e]xpan[ding]" the predicate offenses
under ACCA, Congress made clear that the "force"
required for common-law robbery would be sufficient to
justify an enhanced sentence under the new elements clause.
We can think of no reason to read "force" in the
revised statute to require anything more than the degree of
"force" required in the 1984 statute. And it would
be anomalous to read "force" as excluding
the quintessential ACCA-predicate crime of robbery, despite
the amendment's retention of the term "force"
and its stated intent to expand the number of qualifying
offenses.
The
symmetry between the 1984 definition of robbery (requiring
the use of "force or violence") and the 1986
elements clause (requiring the use of "physical
force") is striking. By replacing robbery as an
enumerated offense with a clause that has "force"
as its touchstone, Congress made clear that "force"
retained the same common-law definition that undergirded the
original definition of robbery adopted a mere two years
earlier. That conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the
...