United States District Court, D. Alaska
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
SHARON
L. GLEASON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff
Sergius Alex Sheakley filed a “Civil Rights
Complaint” on November 16, 2018, along with the $400
filing fee.[1] Mr. Sheakley's complaint alleges civil
rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and
1985.[2]
The
complaint names two Alaska Superior Court judges, six court
appointed attorneys, one prosecuting attorney, two John Doe
attorneys, and the Alaska Bar Association as defendants, all
in their individual and official capacities.[3] Mr. Sheakley
purports to identify the race of each defendant in his
complaint. Mr. Sheakley alleges that his civil rights have
been violated by the defendants throughout the course of his
ongoing criminal case in Alaska Superior Court.[4] The complaint
enumerates nine specific claims: (1) his arrest warrant
allegedly violates the Fourth Amendment's unreasonable
search and seizure clause of the U.S. Constitution; (2)
Article I § 8 of the Alaska Constitution allegedly
violates federal equal protection; (3) the defendants
allegedly enforced discriminatory laws resulting in a cause
of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) the defendants
allegedly violated the Thirteenth Amendment giving rise to a
cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), and (5) under
42 U.S.C. §1985(3); and (6) the defendants allegedly
violated his rights to speedy trial[5] and appeal.[6] Mr. Sheakley
further alleges the he is being (7) falsely imprisoned by the
defendants, (8) maliciously prosecuted, and (9) is the victim
of an abuse of process.[7]
For
relief, Mr. Sheakley requests this Court grant a declaratory
judgment stating that several provisions of the Alaska
Constitution are discriminatory and unconstitutional.
Additionally, he requests the Court declare several purported
policies and customs of the Office of Public Advocacy, which
allegedly encourage or result in ex parte Rule 5 hearings,
wrongful incarceration, and deliberate misrepresentation as
unconstitutional.[8] He further requests injunctive relief
against “all Defendants from enforcing the challenged
policies, practices, and customs[.]”[9] Mr. Sheakley
requests damages and punitive damages for his unlawful
seizure and detention, $10, 000, 000.00 in compensatory
damages, as well as attorney fees and costs.[10] Mr. Sheakley
demands a jury trial.
SCREENING
REQUIREMENT
Federal
law requires a court to conduct an initial screening of
“a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner
seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity.”[11] In this
screening, a court shall “dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of the complaint, if the complaint-(1) is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.”[12]
To
determine whether a complaint states a valid claim for
relief, a court considers if it contains sufficient factual
matter that if accepted as true “state[s] a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.”[13] In conducting
its review, the court is mindful that it must liberally
construe a self-represented plaintiff's pleading and give
the plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.[14] Before a
court may dismiss any portion of a complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court
must provide the plaintiff with a statement of the
deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity to amend or
otherwise address the problems, unless to do so would be
futile.[15]
DISCUSSION
Mr.
Sheakley alleges numerous disagreements with his ongoing
state criminal matter. Mr. Sheakley seeks to sue Alaska
Superior Court judges, Public Defender and Office of Public
Advocacy attorneys, Department of Law attorneys, and the
Alaska Bar Association. Under civil rights law, all of these
defendants are either absolutely immune from suit or improper
defendants for a § 1983 action. Additionally, Mr.
Sheakley's § 1985 claims present no plausible legal
or factual basis. As such, Mr. Sheakley presents no viable
defendants, nor plausible claims making amendment futile. Mr.
Sheakley's case must be dismissed with prejudice.
Claims
Against Judge Wolverton and Judge Corey
The
complaint alleges that Judges Wolverton and Corey are
“charged with the duty of providing vested deciding and
determining felony cases arising within its territorial
jurisdiction.”[16] The complaint further alleges that at
all times the judges “acted under the color of state
law.” While Mr. Sheakley does not specifically address
certain decisions or rulings from either judge, he expresses
general dissatisfaction with the process of his ongoing
criminal matter in Alaska Superior Court.[17]
“Judges
and those performing judge-like functions are absolutely
immune from damage liability for acts performed in their
official capacities.”[18] Moreover, judicial immunity
extends to preclude prospective injunctive relief against a
state court judge for acts or omissions made in that
judge's official capacity.[19] This judicial immunity is
immunity from lawsuit, not just from ultimate assessment of
damages, and it cannot be overcome by allegations of bad
faith or malice.[20]Accordingly, all of Mr. Sheakley's
claims against Judge Wolverton and Judge Corey are deficient
to a degree that granting leave to amend would be futile.
Claims
Against Assistant District Attorney Soldwedel
Mr.
Sheakley seeks to bring suit against Assistant District
Attorney Arne Soldwedel. The complaint alleges that Mr.
Soldwedel is “charged with the duty of prosecuting
criminal cases for the State of Alaska” and
“acted under the color of state
law.”[21] While Mr. Sheakley does not articulate
any specific allegations against Mr. Soldwedel, he appears to
challenge Mr. Soldwedel's role as a prosecutor and any
purported decisions that may have impacted his speedy trial
rights.[22] He also alleges malicious prosecution
and abuse of process, broadly and without
detail.[23]
Similar
to judicial immunity, prosecutorial immunity protects
government attorneys when they are acting pursuant to their
judicial role as an advocate for the state performing
functions “intimately associated with the judicial
phase of the criminal process.”[24] Mr.
Sheakley's claims are deficient primarily because they
are rooted in Mr. Soldwedel's prosecutorial duties and
activities.
A
prosecutor can be held accountable for malicious prosecution.
But for any such claim to go forward, a claimant must provide
plausible factual details and more than just conclusory
allegations.[25] Most importantly, a claim for malicious
prosecution cannot proceed until the termination of the prior
criminal proceeding has occurred in favor of the
accused.[26] This “avoids parallel litigation
over the issue of probable cause and guilt . . . and it
precludes the possibility of the claimant [sic]
succeeding in the tort action after having been convicted in
the underlying criminal prosecution, in contravention of a
strong judicial policy against the creation of two
conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical
transaction.”[27]
Mr.
Sheakley's criminal matter in Alaska Superior Court
remains ongoing. The general claims against Mr. Soldwedel are
broad and stem from his duties as a prosecuting attorney, for
which he is immune from suit. In regard to the claim of
malicious prosecution, Mr. Sheakley must conclude his
criminal case and it must be resolved in his favor, before he
can bring such a claim. In sum, all of the claims against Mr.
Soldwedel are deficient to a degree that they must be
dismissed without leave to amend, since amendment would be
futile.
Claims
Against Public Defender Agency Attorney Moudy and Office of
Public Advocacy Attorneys Van de Mark, Mahlen, Corrigan,
Hold, and Parvin.
The
complaint names, Joseph Van de Mark, Jeffrey Mahlen, Jim
Corrigan, Chad Hold, and Gregory Parvin, attorneys with the
Office of Public Advocacy, as defendants, in addition to
Julia Moudy, an attorney with the State Public Defender. The
complaint seeks damages from the attorneys due to their
alleged actions as Assistant Public Advocates and supervisors
for the Office of Public Advocacy and as an Assistant Public
Defender for the State Public Defender.
42
U.S.C. § 1983 is a federal statute that “is not
itself a source of substantive rights, ” but provides
“a method for vindicating rights [found]
elsewhere.”[28] For relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
a plaintiff must “plead that (1) defendants acting
under color of state law (2) deprived plaintiff[s] of rights
secured by the Constitution or federal
statutes.”[29] To act under the color of state law, a
complaint must allege that the defendants acted with state
authority as state actors.[30]
A
lawyer appointed to represent a criminal defendant in a state
court proceeding is "as a matter of law, ... not a state
actor."[31] Such a lawyer, whether from the Office
of Public Advocacy or the Public Defender's Office is
“no doubt, paid by government funds and hired by a
government agency. Nevertheless, his function was to
represent his client, not the interests of the state or
county.”[32] It does not matter that a state criminal
defense lawyer is paid from public funds. “Except for
the source of payment, ... the duties and obligations are the
same whether [the client was] privately retained, appointed,
or serving in a legal aid or defender
program.”[33] This means that because a criminal
defense lawyer's duty and loyalty are to his client, not
the state, a court appointed attorney is not a state actor
for purposes of Section 1983.
42
U.S.C. § 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor.
None of the named defendants, as court appointed counsel to
the indigent, are state actors as a matter of law. Mr.
Sheakley has not named a state actor; therefore, he has
failed to meet an essential element of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
No. other defendants could be substituted under the alleged
facts; therefore, amendment is futile and the claims against
Defendants Moudy, Van de Mark, Mahlen, Corrigan, Hold, and
Parvin must be dismissed with prejudice.
Claims
Against ...