Appeal
from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska No.
4FA-18-00019 DL, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Thomas
I. Temple, Judge.
Diana
Wildridge, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner,
Public Defender, Anchorage, for Appellant.
Aisha
Tinker Bray, Assistant Attorney General, Fairbanks, and Kevin
G. Clarkson, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: Bolger, Chief Justice, Winfree, Stowers, Maassen, and
Carney, Justices.
OPINION
WINFREE, JUSTICE.
I.
INTRODUCTION
The
Interstate Compact for Juveniles (ICJ) governs the return of
juveniles who have left their home states without permission.
With her mother's permission, a juvenile left her home
state to visit family friends in Alaska; she then refused to
return home. The home state sought her return under the ICJ,
and the Alaska superior court complied. The superior court
found that it was not authorized to consider the
juvenile's best interests and that the requisition
paperwork demonstrated proof of entitlement for her return.
We affirm the superior court's order, holding that the
ICJ authorizes only the home state to consider a
juvenile's best interests in this context and that proof
of entitlement was established in this case.
II.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In late
April 2018,15-year-old Jessica J.[1] traveled from Iowa to Alaska
to spend the summer with family friends. Jessica's
divorced parents shared legal custody; her mother, who
retained primary physical custody, gave Jessica permission.
Jessica's mother then changed her mind and told Jessica
to return home. Jessica's mother booked several return
flights for Jessica, the final on May 30.
On May
30 Jessica's mother reported to Iowa police that the
Alaska family friends refused to send Jessica home; the
police treated Jessica as a missing person. Alaska police
located her at the family friends' home and indicated she
was "safe until [her] mother c[ould] pay for plane fare
out of Alaska." But the Iowa police still considered
Jessica a missing person, and a week later Alaska police
located her at a shelter, where she apparently had gone to
avoid getting "the family that she was staying with in
trouble if there were legal repercussions ... for staying in
Alaska." Police transported her to a youth facility
pending further legal proceedings.
The
following day the State petitioned the Alaska superior court
to "commence AS 47.15 Interstate Compact for Juvenile
proceedings." The superior court appointed counsel for
Jessica and held five hearings on the matter. At the first
hearing, the court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) for
Jessica. The court acknowledged, but did not consider, a
petition for a domestic violence protective order that
Jessica's father, who also lived in Alaska, had filed on
her behalf against her mother.
At the
second hearing, the superior court dismissed the father's
petition for a domestic violence protective order, but it
noted that it would consider a new petition if Jessica's
"attorney and/or her GAL now determine that she should
have a [domestic violence] order." The court stated that
"if, in fact, the mother started this on a false basis,
which is that [Jessica] was missing or a runaway, that could
affect whether or not the requisition from Iowa is, in fact,
in order." The court also stated that if Jessica were
returned to Iowa, there were "avenues other than living
at home down there. And, in fact, [her] father could file for
change of custody or whatever else he might think is
appropriate for him to do."
Before
the next hearing, Jessica's mother filed a petition and
supporting documents in the Iowa court seeking Jessica's
forced return under ICJ Rule 6-103(3).[2] The Iowa court
filled out the responsive paperwork, which included a finding
that Jessica "has run away; and that [Jessica's]
continued absence from legal custody and control is
detrimental to the best interest of [Jessica] and the
public." Iowa's ICJ office sent the required
paperwork to Alaska's attorney general, who, in turn,
notified the superior court and requested a
hearing.[3]
At the
third hearing, the superior court formally notified Jessica
of the requisition per ICJ Rule 6-103(6).[4] There was
significant debate whether the ICJ applied, and the court
believed that Jessica should "have the opportunity ...
to present evidence to a court" that she should not be
sent back. Noting mixed authority on whether holding states
may consider a juvenile runaway's best interests before
ordering return, the court stated that "there is good
reason to have the hearing held." At the fourth hearing,
the superior court denied the order to enforce the
requisition, in part due to concerns about it being based on
false information regarding whether Jessica was missing. The
court ordered additional briefing on relevant case law and
how to proceed.
By the
fifth hearing, in September, the superior court judge
assigned to the case had retired; the newly assigned judge
found that Jessica was subject to the ICJ as a runaway. The
court concluded that "there is no authority for this
court to conduct a best-interests hearing" and that it
would conduct a hearing only to determine whether the
requisition paperwork was in order. At the final hearing, the
superior court determined there was proof of entitlement and
ordered Jessica's forced return to Iowa.
Jessica
appeals, arguing that the superior court erred by failing to
consider her best interests as part of the ICJ requisition
proceeding and by finding there was proof of entitlement for
her return to Iowa.
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"We
use our independent judgment to review matters of . . .
statutory interpretation."[5] And we do so "according to
reason, practicality, and common sense, considering the
meaning of the statute's language, its legislative
history, and its purpose."[6]
IV.
DISCUSSION
A.
The ICJ Does Not Authorize The Holding State To Conduct A
Best-Interests Analysis Before Ordering A Juvenile
Runaway's Return.
1.
The ICJ's plain language does not authorize the holding
state to consider a juvenile runaway's best
interests.
The ICJ
governs the transportation of juveniles across state
lines.[7] Nearly every state has adopted some
version of the ICJ.[8] The ICJ declares that compacting states
"recognize that each state is responsible for the proper
supervision or return of juveniles... who have absconded,
escaped, or run away."[9] These states "also recognize
that each state is responsible for the safe return of
juveniles who have run away from home and in doing so have
left their state of residence."[10]
ICJ
Rule 6-103 governs the non-voluntary return of runaways. This
rule provides that the runaway juvenile's legal guardian
"shall petition the court of jurisdiction in the
home/demanding state for a requisition."[11] If the home
state judge determines, among other things, "that said
juvenile's continued absence from legal custody and
control is detrimental to the best interest of said
juvenile and the public," the judge completes a
Form I Requisition for Runaway Juvenile.[12] The form and
requisition packet then are forwarded to the holding state,
and the "court in the holding state shall inform the
juvenile of the demand made for his/her return and may elect
to appoint counsel or a [GAL]."[13] The "purpose of said
hearing is to determine proof of entitlement for the return
of the juvenile."[14] Although the ICJ rules do not define
"proof of entitlement," if it "is not
established, the [holding state] judge shall issue written
findings detailing the reason(s) for
denial."[15]
ICJ
Rule 6-105 concerns the return of juveniles when there are
reports of abuse or neglect. Under that section:
When a holding state has reason to suspect abuse or neglect
by a person in the home/demanding state, the holding
state's ICJ Office shall notify the home/demanding
state's ICJ Office of the suspected abuse or neglect. The
home/demanding state's ICJ Office shall work with the
appropriate authority and/or court of competent jurisdiction
in the home/demanding state to affect the return of the
juvenile.... Allegations of abuse or neglect do not alleviate
a state's responsibility to return a juvenile within the
time frames in accordance with the rules.[16]
Jessica
argues that "[a]lthough not explicit, the ICJ's
current language indicates that an inquiry into best
interests is required" by the holding state. She argues
that the ICJ allows the superior court to appoint a GAL whose
"role in any case is to investigate and inform the court
of the child's best interest." She argues that the
GAL's role, read in conjunction with the holding
state's requirement to conduct a hearing on proof of
entitlement, "indicate[s] that a [holding state] court
may take into consideration the juvenile's best
interest."
But as
the State notes, "[a]ppointment of a [GAL] is not
mandatory." ICJ Rule 6-103(6) provides that the holding
state "may elect to appoint counsel or
a [GAL]." (Emphasis added.) Based on this specific
wording, not only is a GAL not required, the GAL's role
in protecting a juvenile's best interests would be the
same as counsel's; representation, by counsel or GAL if
the court elects to appoint either, is limited to contesting
whether proof of entitlement has been
established.[17]
Further,
the ICJ accounts for the holding state's concerns about
the juvenile's best interests, mandating that
"[w]hen a holding state has reason to suspect abuse or
neglect by a person in the home/demanding state, the holding
state's ICJ Office shall notify the home/demanding
state's ICJ Office of the suspected abuse or
neglect."[18] After the holding state reports its
suspicions, the "home/demanding state's ICJ Office
shall work with the appropriate authority and/or court of
competent jurisdiction in the home/demanding state to affect
the return of the juvenile" to the legal
guardian.[19] The ICJ mandates that "[allegations
of abuse or neglect do not alleviate a state's
responsibility to return a juvenile within the time frames in
accordance with the rules."[20]The holding state thus
must alert the home state when there are suspicions of abuse
or neglect, but the home state is the proper forum to address
those concerns.
Finally,
under the expressio unius canon of statutory
construction, the ICJ's requirement that the home state
consider a juvenile's best interests, without also
providing that the holding state consider the same, implies
that the holding state should not also conduct the
inquiry.[21] The juvenile's best interests are
not overlooked; the home state expressly must find, albeit in
a standardized form, that "said juvenile's continued
absence from legal custody and control is detrimental to the
best interest of said juvenile and the
public."[22]
Based
on this plain language, we find unpersuasive Jessica's
argument that "the ICJ's current language indicates
that an inquiry into best interests is required" by the
holding state and that "a trial court must consider a
non-delinquent juvenile's best interests prior to
ordering the juvenile's requisition."
2.
Legislative history also indicates that the holding state is
not authorized to consider a juvenile runaway's best
interests.
Jessica
argues that ICJ changes indicate the holding state must
consider a juvenile runaway's best interests. She
contends that "[b]efore the Alaska legislature
restructured [its version of the ICJ] in 2009, the statute
included language providing for a court to consider a
child's best interest" and that no legislative
history exists indicating "that the Alaska legislature
intended to prohibit Alaska courts from considering a
child's best interest as part of their considerations
under the ICJ."
Although
Jessica is correct that prior ICJ language explicitly
mandated considering a juvenile's best interests, that
mandate has always been directed to the home state in
ordering a requisition, not to the holding state complying
with a requisition. Alaska initially adopted the ICJ in
I960;[23] a revised version was adopted in
2009.[24] According to legislative staff, the new
version "replace[d] the old [ICJ] which was created in
1955The new [ICJ] ensures that all states will have identical
language in their statutes which would help with compliance
issues."[25] To ensure uniformity among ...