Petition for Hearing from the Court of Appeals No. A-12542 of
the State of Alaska, on appeal from the Superior Court No.
3KO-14-00688 CRof the State of Alaska, Third Judicial
District, Kodiak, Steve W. Cole, Judge.
Diane
L. Wendlandt, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and
Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney General, Juneau, for Petitioner.
Emily
Jura, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public
Defender, Anchorage, for Respondent.
Before: Bolger, Chief Justice, Winfree, Stowers, Maassen, and
Carney, Justices.
OPINION
MAASSEN, JUSTICE.
I.
INTRODUCTION
A man
accidentally killed his roommate with a large knife while
demonstrating martial arts moves. He pled guilty to
criminally negligent homicide and stipulated to the
applicability of a statutory aggravator that allows
sentencing above the upper range when a crime is
"committed against... a member of the social unit made
up of those living together in the same dwelling as the
defendant."[1] On appeal of the sentence, the defendant
argued that the aggravator was inappropriate in the context
of his case. The court of appeals agreed, concluding that the
aggravator is limited to cases in which the defendant's
conduct was specifically directed at the victim and had some
source in the relationship between the victim and the
defendant.[2]
We
granted the State of Alaska's petition for hearing.
Because we conclude that the aggravator applies to the facts
of this case and the sentencing court was not clearly
mistaken in giving it some weight, we reverse the decision of
the court of appeals.
II.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Teila
Tofelogo lived in a group home that provided a sober living
environment for men in recovery. According to the later
findings by the sentencing court, on an afternoon in November
2016 Tofelogo was "horseplaying" with what he
called a "ninja knife," swinging it around while
his roommate, Dennis Fathke, sat on a bed behind him.
Tofelogo failed to notice when Fathke stood up and came
closer, and, while making a turn with the knife, Tofelogo
accidentally stabbed Fathke through the bicep and into his
chest. Tofelogo summoned help and attempted to administer
first aid, but Fathke died soon afterward.
Tofelogo
pled guilty to criminally negligent homicide and stipulated
to the applicability of AS l2.55.l55(c)(l8)(A), an
aggravating factor that allows sentencing above the
presumptive range if "the offense was a felony . . .
specified in AS 11.41 ['Offenses Against the Person']
and was committed against a spouse, a former spouse, or a
member of the social unit made up of those living together in
the same dwelling as the defendant." Tofelogo argued,
however, that the aggravator should be given "little to
no weight" because his conduct did "not fall into
the pattern of abusive and threatening conduct typified in a
domestic violence case."
The
superior court sentenced Tofelogo to six years imprisonment
with four suspended; the composite sentence, including the
suspended time, was above the presumptive term of one to
three years for first-felony negligent
homicide.[3] The increased sentence was allowed by the
applicability of the aggravator, which raised the upper limit
to ten years.[4] The court said it was giving the
aggravator "some weight" but "not a
tremendous, [not] a lot of weight." The court noted the
prevalence of domestic violence in the community, the state,
and "the whole world," observing that it involves
not just intra-family violence but "also includes people
who are living together such as here." The court said
that it would have given the factor much more weight if the
offense had occurred in a more typical domestic setting -
"if this offense had been committed by the defendant
against his spouse, his girlfriend, his own parents, [or] his
children." But despite the lack of a family
relationship, the court declined to give the factor no weight
at all; the court cited a "right to feel safe and secure
in our own homes without someone who is living amongst us
hurting us or killing us, and it doesn't have to
necessarily be someone that we're related to."
Tofelogo
appealed his sentence to the court of appeals, arguing, as
relevant here, that aggravator (c)(l 8)(A) was inappropriate
in the context of his case.[5] The court of appeals agreed,
reasoning that the aggravator was intended to apply to crimes
of domestic violence in which "the identity of the
victim and the victim's relationship to the defendant
[bear on] the blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct
or the defendant's degree of
dangerousness."[6] Concluding that Tofelogo's crime was
not the kind the aggravator was intended to address, the
court of appeals held that the sentencing court erred in
giving the factor any weight at all.[7]
The
State petitioned for hearing, and we granted review.
III.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
"The
existence or non-existence of an aggravating or mitigating
factor is a mixed question of law and
fact."[8] Determining whether the factor applies
"involves a two-step process: the court must (1) assess
the nature of the defendant's conduct, a factual finding,
and then (2) make the legal determination of whether that
conduct falls within the statutory
standard."[9] "Any factual findings made by the
court regarding the nature of the defendant's conduct are
reviewed for clear error, but whether those facts establish
that the conduct" falls within the factor's ambit
"is a legal question."[10] In interpreting the scope
of an aggravating factor, we apply our independent judgment,
interpreting the statute "according to reason,
practicality, and common sense, considering the meaning of
the statute's language, its legislative history, and its
purpose."[11]
If a
factor is found to apply, the amount of weight to give it is
committed to the sentencing court's
discretion.[12] "[W]hen the issue is one of
sentencing discretion - whether and how much a
defendant's sentence should be adjusted on account of an
aggravating or mitigating factor-we will employ the
'clearly mistaken' standard of
review."[13] Under this standard "the sentence
will be modified only in those instances where the reviewing
court is convinced that the sentencing court was clearly
mistaken in imposing a particular
sentence."[14] In making such a determination, we
independently review the record.[15]
IV.
DISCUSSION
A.
Aggravator (c)(18)(A) By Its Plain Language Applies To
Tofelogo's Crime.
Alaska
Statute 12.55.155(c) lists factors that "shall be
considered by the sentencing court if proven in accordance
with this section"[16] and that "may allow imposition
of a sentence above the presumptive range set out in AS
12.55.125." These so-called aggravators include the one
central to this appeal: "the offense was a felony . . .
specified in AS 11.41 ['Offenses Against the Person']
and was committed against a spouse, a former spouse, or a
member of the social unit made up of those living together in
the same dwelling as the defendant."[17] Tofelogo
stipulated to the applicability of this factor in his plea
agreement, and by its terms it appears to apply. Tofelogo
agreed to plead guilty to criminally negligent homicide, a
felony "specified in AS 11.4l";[18] moreover, the
crime "was committed against" his roommate,
ostensibly "a member of the social unit made up of those
living together in the same dwelling as the
defendant."[19] The superior court gave this stipulated
factor "some weight" in sentencing.
For the
reasons that follow, we conclude that the superior court
correctly applied the aggravator to the facts of this case,
and that the weight the court gave the aggravator did not
result in a sentence that is clearly mistaken.
B.
The Court Of Appeals Rejected A Literal Reading Of Aggravator
(c)(18)(A).
The
court of appeals agreed that "Tofelogo's case falls
within the literal wording of aggravator
(c)(18)(A)."[20] It nevertheless concluded that "the
rationale of this aggravator does not apply to the facts of
Tofelogo's case, and the sentencing judge should not have
given the aggravator any weight."[21] The court
began its analysis by stating that "[t]he crimes covered
by aggravator (c)(l8)(A) are a subset of the larger category
of'crimes involving domestic violence' -the category
of offenses defined by AS 18.66.990(3) and
(5)."[22] The court determined that the aggravator
was therefore "based on the same rationale that prompted
the legislature to enact the definition of 'crime
involving domestic violence': the policy of altering
various provisions of law to facilitate the prosecution and
punishment of crimes that occur between people who are
involved with or related to each other in specified
ways."[23]
The
court of appeals then discussed past decisions in which,
analyzing the definition of "crime involving domestic
violence," it had "pointed out that the literal
wording of this definition encompasses more situations than
the legislature intended-situations where it does not make
any sense to treat a crime differently based on the
relationship between the defendant and the
victim."[24] The court cited both Carpentino v.
State[25] and Bingaman v. State,
[26]
in which it had explained that the legislature's broad
definition of "domestic violence," if read
"literally, ... would cover many instances where the
specified relationship between the defendant and the victim
is irrelevant to assessing whether the defendant is
atypically dangerous or whether the defendant's conduct
is atypically blameworthy."[27] The court posed
hypotheticals showing the definition's potential
overbreadth: for example, an automobile accident that is
categorized as a crime of domestic violence only because the
victim, by chance, happens to fall under the broad definition
of "household members" (the victim in the example
is "the child of a former high school
sweetheart").[28] The court concluded that such a result
would contravene the "social policy underlying" the
(c)(18)(A) aggravator: "to authorize courts to impose
more severe sentences on defendants whose relationship to
their victim makes the crime more blameworthy"
e.g., spouses and former spouses.[29]Referring to the
aggravator's additional inclusion of "a member of
the social unit made of those living together in the same
dwelling as the defendant," the court cautioned that if
it were "[interpreted literally," it "would
apply to a defendant who was convicted of felony assault for
causing a traffic accident that resulted in injuries to other
people" who included, "by chance, ... the
defendant's former spouse, or... another resident of the
defendant's dormitory or barracks."[30] In such a
case, the court reasoned, "the rationale behind
aggravator (c)(l8)(A) does not apply - because the identity
of the victim and the victim's relationship to the
defendant have essentially no bearing on the blameworthiness
of the defendant's conduct or the defendant's degree
of dangerousness."[31]
Summarizing,
the court of appeals cited its earlier observation that
"the 'hallmark' of domestic violence is conduct
whose purpose is 'to coerce, control, punish, intimidate,
or exact revenge within the context of an intimate
relationship.' "[32] Crimes of domestic violence
"are all implicitly premised on the assumptions that the
defendant's conduct was directed at the victim, and that
[their relationship] provided a motivation for the crime, or
. . . made the victim more vulnerable, or . . . was otherwise
a significant contributing factor in the
crime."[33] Concluding that these "assumptions
do not apply to Tofelogo's case," the court held
that "the sentencing judge should not have given the
aggravator any weight."[34]
C.
The Plain Language Of Aggravator (c)(18)(A) Shows A
Reasonable Purpose Not Contradicted By Legislative
History.
Our
disagreement with the court of appeals centers on its
conclusion that aggravator (c)(l8)(A) cannot be interpreted
literally consistent with its purpose. We begin with the
statutory language itself; we agree with the court of appeals
that read literally it applies to Tofelogo's
case.[35] As for the statute's purpose, the
language reasonably implies a legislative intent to make more
blameworthy crimes committed against not only spouses and
former spouses but also persons in their own living spaces -
where they may legitimately have a heightened expectation of
safety and security, [36] especially with regard to danger from
members of their own "social unit."[37]Such a purpose
- grounded in the language the legislature chose to use-is
reasonable in and of itself. Finding a reasonable purpose
does not require us to add implicit requirements such as
those the court of appeals read into the aggravator: that the
defendant and the victim also share a special, intimate,
spouse-like relationship, and that the crime arose out of
that relationship.[38] In fact, as the State points out, the
court of appeals has in the past affirmed sentencing
courts' application of aggravator (c)(l 8)(A) to living
situations that did not have those
characteristics.[39]
We
follow a "sliding scale approach to statutory
interpretation, in which 'the plainer the statutory
language is, the more convincing the evidence of contrary
legislative purpose or intent must be.'
"[40] To support the court of appeals'
interpretation of (c)(18)(A), Tofelogo cites the legislative
commentary that accompanied the aggravator's passage. The
legislature noted that the factor
is applicable to crimes involving domestic violence. Its
scope is restricted to crimes against the person (AS 11.41)
directed against a spouse, a former spouse or a member of the
social unit comprised of those living together in the same
dwelling as the defendant. Its addition reflects a
legislative determination that crimes against the person
involving ...