United States District Court, D. Alaska
ORDER
H.
Russel Holland United States District Judge
Motion
to Dismiss
Defendant
moves to dismiss plaintiff's complaint.[1] This motion is
opposed.[2] Oral argument was not requested and is not
deemed necessary.
Background
Plaintiff
is Jason Matyascik. Defendant is Arctic Slope Native
Association, Ltd., d/b/a Samuel Simmonds Memorial Hospital.
Defendant is “the P.L. 93-638 regional health
organization for the Arctic Slope Region of
Alaska.”[3]
Plaintiff
alleges that “[o]n or about May 14, 2018, ” he
“contracted with” defendant “to renew his
employment contract” at defendant's “hospital
as a physician.”[4] Plaintiff alleges that defendant
“refused to honor the contract, terminating [his]
employment without providing him” the three-month
notice called for in the contract for early
termination.[5] Plaintiff also alleges that
“[d]uring the 2017-2018 term of [his] employment,
[defendant] promised to reimburse several unpaid sums to him,
yet failed to fulfill those promises.”[6] Plaintiff also
alleges that he rented housing from defendant and that
defendant overcharged him rent, “ousted [him] from the
property without providing him notice to quit[, ]” and
“failed to return [his] security deposit within the
statutory timeframe set forth under AS
34.03.070.”[7] Plaintiff further alleges that
“[f]ollowing the termination of [his] tenancy, ”
defendant “converted his personal property in violation
of AS 34.03.260.”[8] Finally, plaintiff alleges that after
defendant terminated his contract, defendant “failed to
provide notice of an election for COBRA . . . insurance and
failed to assist [him] in obtaining COBRA
insurance.”[9]
Plaintiff
commenced this action on April 1, 2019. In his complaint,
plaintiff asserts the following causes of action: 1) breach
of contract, 2) violation of Alaska's Uniform Residential
Landlord Tenant Act, 3) conversion, 4) intentional violation
of COBRA, and 5) breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.
Pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant
now moves to dismiss plaintiff's claims, arguing that the
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because it is
entitled to tribal sovereign immunity and because plaintiff
has not exhausted his administrative remedies.
Discussion
“‘[T]he issue of tribal sovereign immunity is
[quasi-]jurisdictional.'” Pistor v.
Garcia, 791 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Pan Am. Co. v. Sycuan Band of Mission Indians, 884
F.2d 416, 418 (9th Cir. 1989)). “Although sovereign
immunity is only quasi-jurisdictional in nature, Rule
12(b)(1) is still a proper vehicle for invoking sovereign
immunity from suit.” Id. at 1111. “In
the context of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss on the basis
of tribal sovereign immunity, ‘the party asserting
subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving its
existence,' i.e. that immunity does not bar the
suit.” Id. (quoting Miller v. Wright,
705 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2013)). “When a district
court is presented with a challenge to its subject matter
jurisdiction, ‘[n]o presumptive truthfulness attaches
to [a] plaintiff's allegations.'” Id.
(quoting Robinson v. United States, 586 F.3d 683,
685 (9th Cir. 2009)). “In resolving such a motion,
‘[a] district court may hear evidence regarding
jurisdiction and resolv[e] factual disputes where
necessary.'” Id. (quoting
Robinson, 586 F.3d at 685).
“Tribal
sovereign immunity not only protects tribes themselves, but
also extends to arms of the tribe acting on behalf of the
tribe.” White v. Univ. of Calif., 765 F.3d
1010, 1025 (9th Cir. 2014). Defendant argues that it is an
arm of its member tribes.
In determining whether an entity is entitled to sovereign
immunity as an “arm of the tribe, ” [the court]
examine[s] several factors including: “(1) the method
of creation of the economic entities; (2) their purpose; (3)
their structure, ownership, and management, including the
amount of control the tribe has over the entities; (4) the
tribe's intent with respect to the sharing of its
sovereign immunity; and (5) the financial relationship
between the tribe and the entities.”
Id. (quoting Breakthrough Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v.
Chukchansi Gold Casino and Resort, 629 F.3d 1173, 1187
(10th Cir. 2010)).
As
plaintiff concedes, [10] the first four factors weigh in favor of
defendant being considered an arm of its member tribes.
Defendant “is comprised of the eight
federally-recognized Indian tribes in the” Arctic Slope
Region and these “member tribes' governing bodies
have each passed tribal government resolutions authorizing
[defendant] to receive certain federal funds to provide
services to their tribal members.”[11] Defendant was
established to provide health care and other services
pursuant to the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act (ISDEAA), the Indian Health Care Improvement
Act, and the Alaska Tribal Health Compact.[12]
“Providing health care is a core governmental function
of Alaska tribes[.]”[13] Thus, defendant “is not
simply a business entity that happens to be run by a tribe or
its members, but, rather, occupies a role quintessentially
related to self-governance.” E.E.O.C. v. Karuk
Tribe Housing Authority, 260 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir.
2001). Defendant is controlled by its Board of Directors,
which consists of elected or appointed members from each of
the eight tribal members. And in its by-laws, defendant
states that it “is an arm of its member Tribes, is
organized to carry out its member Tribes' essential
governmental programs and goals, and is entitled to and shall
in all matters assert and be protected by the sovereign
immunity of its member Tribes from suit, judgment or
execution in any forum or jurisdiction.”[14] In addition,
...