Appeal
from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska Third Judicial
District, Anchorage, No. 3AN-14-11007CI, Erin B. Marston,
Judge.
Raymond Leahy, pro se, Wasilla, Appellant.
Mary
B. Pinkel, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Jahna
Lindemuth, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellees.
Before: Bolger, Chief Justice, Stowers, Maassen, and Carney,
Justices.[Winfree, Justice, not participating.]
OPINION
CARNEY, JUSTICE.
I.
INTRODUCTION
An
inmate representing himself sued the prison superintendent
and chaplain for violating his religious rights by providing
an inadequate halal diet, banning scented prayer oils, and
not allowing him to have additional religious texts in his
cell beyond the prison's limit. He claimed these actions
violated the Equal Protection Clause of both the Alaska
Constitution and the federal Constitution, and the federal
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA). The inmate also sought reimbursement for scented
oils that the prison had destroyed. The superior court
granted the prison officials' motion for summary judgment
and dismissed all of the inmate's claims.
We
reverse summary judgment on the inmate's RLUIPA claim
regarding the halal diet because the inmate did not receive
adequate guidance on how to file affidavits in opposition to
the summary judgment motion. We reverse summary judgment on
the RLUIPA claim regarding scented oils because the prison
officials failed to satisfy their burden of proving that
banning such oils was the least restrictive means to address
their substantial interest in maintaining prison security and
health. We affirm the dismissal of the inmate's claims
regarding the religious book limit because the issue is not
yet ripe. And we vacate the award of attorney's fees and
costs.[1]
II.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Raymond
Leahy is a Muslim inmate at Goose Creek Correctional Center
(Goose Creek) in Wasilla. He observes Islam's dietary
restrictions (called "halal") and incorporates
scented prayer oils in his daily prayers. To further his
religious studies he requested additional religious texts
above the number generally allowed per inmate.
Leahy
first requested a diet that included halal or kosher meat in
April 2013.[2] Leahy had been receiving a vegetarian
diet, but asserted that it caused him gastrointestinal
distress. Goose Creek served vegan or vegetarian meals to
both Muslim and Jewish inmates due to the expense and
challenges of providing a halal or kosher diet.[3]
Leahy
claims to have used scented oils in his daily prayers until
April 2014. He asserts that unscented prayer oil does not
serve his religious needs because the scent is an important
component of his prayers. But in April 2014 Goose Creek
banned scented prayer oils following documented health
concerns. Leahy objected to the ban and requested that his
oils be stored until his objections were resolved, but Goose
Creek disposed of them in December. The disposed oils cost
Leahy a total of $65.70.
In
April and May of 2014, respectively, Leahy filed grievances
after his requests for a halal meat diet and an exception to
Goose Creek's ban on scented prayer oils were denied.
After the grievances were denied, he submitted administrative
appeals which were also denied.
A.
The First Complaint
After
he was unable to convince Goose Creek to grant him access to
halal meat or scented oils, Leahy filed a complaint in
superior court in December 2014[4] for declaratory judgment,
injunctive relief, and damages against John Conant, the Goose
Creek superintendent, and James Duncan, the Department of
Corrections' statewide Chaplaincy Coordinator (the
officials). Leahy argued that they violated his rights under
RLUIPA by placing a substantial burden on his religious
exercise by denying his request for a halal meat diet and
banning scented prayer oil, [5] and that the officials'
actions also violated article I, sections 1 and 4 of the
Alaska Constitution.[6]
Goose
Creek began serving halal/kosher meat meals at about the same
time that Leahy filed his complaint. But Leahy objected to
the quality and nutritional value of the meals. Leahy claimed
that around the same time, Goose Creek introduced pork for
the first time into its kitchen. Islamic law considers pork
to be "haram" or unlawful; Leahy was concerned that
his meals were being contaminated by their preparation in the
same kitchen.
B.
The Second Complaint
A month
after filing his first complaint Leahy filed a second one,
asserting that his religious rights were being violated by
Goose Creek's limit on religious books and its ban and
disposal of scented prayer oils he had already received
approval to purchase. He argued that, despite Goose
Creek's limit of 11 publications per inmate, he should be
allowed to possess ten religious books and ten religious
magazines in his cell.
In
September 2015 Conant granted Leahy an exception to the
scented oil ban, allowing him to store scented prayer oils in
the chaplain's closet and check them out for prayers in
his cell. But in July 2016, after reports of allergic
reactions to the oils by inmates and staff, Conant reinstated
the total ban against scented oils. Goose Creek continues to
allow the use of unscented prayer oils; the oils are stored
and used only in the chapel.
C.
Summary Judgment
The
officials moved for summary judgment, arguing that neither
the Goose Creek halal diet nor the prayer oil policy violated
RLUIPA, that the diet did not violate Leahy's equal
protection rights, and that the book limitation policy did
not violate either RLUIPA or Leahy's equal protection
rights.
Leahy
filed an opposition to summary judgment the same month. He
asserted that he had never previously been informed of Goose
Creek's policy allowing inmates only five books, five
magazines, and one religious text in their cells or that he
needed to fill out a Religious Accommodation Request Form if
he wanted an exception from the policy. Leahy also asserted
that he would not fill out the required form because he
wanted a "fluid" book list that was not determined
by the officials' judgment of what was religiously
appropriate. In response to the officials' argument that
they were entitled to summary judgment with regard to the ban
on scented prayer oils, Leahy proposed less restrictive
alternatives. He suggested permitting only "milder"
scents less likely to irritate others, allowing only one
ounce to be stored in an inmate's cell, or having all
scented oils stored in the chaplain's office and checked
out for use in the chapel. Regarding the halal diet, Leahy
disagreed with the facts as the officials presented them and
argued that the halal diet rarely had meat, that fruit was
unnecessarily exposed to potential contamination, and that
the actual menu differed from that on which Goose Creek based
its nutritional claims. Leahy did not submit any affidavits
with his opposition.
The
officials replied to Leahy's opposition. Leahy filed a
response to their reply. The officials moved to strike the
response because it was not permitted by the rules of civil
procedure; the court granted the motion. The court also
granted the officials' motion for summary judgment and
dismissed the case with prejudice.
Leahy
then filed a motion to reconsider the grant of summary
judgment. In his motion he included new facts concerning
another religious group's use of scented prayer oils at
Goose Creek. The officials moved for entry of final judgment.
The court denied Leahy's motion to reconsider and entered
final judgment in favor of the officials. The court's
order stated that "the claims have either been agreed to
be moot or [Leahy] did not raise genuine disputes of material
facts and [the officials were] entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." The court also noted that Leahy's
attempt to present new evidence in his motion to reconsider
was not appropriate. Following the superior court's final
judgment Goose Creek paid Leahy $65.70 for the prayer oils
which it had destroyed.
Leahy
appeals.
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"We
review for abuse of discretion 'decisions about guidance
to a pro se litigant.' "[7] Abuse of discretion is
found" 'when a party has been deprived of a
substantial right or seriously prejudiced by the [trial]
court's ruling.' We consider 'the particular
facts and circumstances of each individual case to determine
whether the denial was so unreasonable or so prejudicial as
to amount to an abuse of discretion.'
"[8]We hold self-represented litigants to a
"less stringent" standard than lawyers; so long as
the essence of the self-represented litigant's argument
can be easily discerned from the briefing, and the opposing
party would not be prejudiced by its consideration, it should
be considered.[9]
"We
review a grant of summary judgment de
novo"[10] and "view the facts in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party."[11]
"Questions of ripeness are reviewed de
novo."[12]
IV.
DISCUSSION
Leahy
argues that the superior court abused its discretion by
granting summary judgment to the officials without first
providing him necessary guidance about how to present facts
in support of his claims. He argues that it also abused its
discretion by not adequately considering the facts that he
did present. We agree he received insufficient guidance on
how to file affidavits in support of his opposition to
summary judgment and we therefore reverse summary judgment on
his RLUIPA claim regarding an inadequate halal diet. We also
reverse summary judgment on his RLUIPA claim regarding the
ban on scented prayer oils because the officials did not
demonstrate that a complete ban on such oils was the least
...