United States District Court, D. Alaska
PROCEEDINGS ORDER FROM CHAMBERS
Honorable Timothy M. Burgess, United States District Judge.
The
matter comes before the Court on Defendant Gian Carlo
Clemente Pangilinan’s Motion in Limine (the
“Motion”).[1] The United States filed a
Response[2] opposing the motion, no reply was
permitted, [3] and the matter is now ripe for resolution.
For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is
GRANTED.
In the
time leading up to Pangilinan’s arrest, the Anchorage
Police Department (“APD”) suspected Pangilinan of
“Eluding, Assault, and [Misconduct Involving Weapons],
” which took place on May 31, 2019; involvement in a
subsequent shooting on June 6, 2019; and involvement in five
other shooting incidents.[4] Additionally, prior to his arrest,
Pangilinan had multiple warrants issued for his arrest for
“Violating Conditions of Release and for Fail[ure] to
Appear.”[5] On July 9, 2019, APD was alerted that
Pangilinan was identified getting into a “red Chevrolet
Suburban.”[6] APD followed the vehicle and arrested
Pangilinan.[7] At the time of his arrest, Pangilinan
allegedly possessed over 50 grams of
methamphetamine.[8] He is now charged with one count of
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to
Distribute under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(B).[9]
Pangilinan
now moves pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) to request that the
Court order in limine the United States to instruct
its witnesses to limit any testimony regarding the
APD’s reasons for following the “red
Suburban” in which Pangilinan was traveling prior to
his arrest.[10] Namely, Pangilinan wishes to avoid
disclosure of Pangilinan’s warrants or APD’s
suspicions that Pangilinan was involved in
shootings.[11] Pangilinan argues that this evidence
should be excluded as evidence of “prior bad
acts” under Rule 404(b).[12]
The
United States asserts that it does not intend to present any
evidence that goes to the substance of Pangilinan’s
warrants.[13] However, the United States intends to
present evidence that APD was attempting to arrest Pangilinan
pursuant to multiple arrest warrants.[14] The United
States argues that “[t]his information is relevant to
the jury as to why [APD] sought out and contacted
[Pangilinan]. . . .”[15]
Generally,
“[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not
admissible to prove a person’s character in order to
show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character.”[16] However, such
evidence “may be admissible for another purpose, such
as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
accident.”[17] When determining admissibility under
Rule 404(b) the Ninth Circuit applies a four-factor test:
[E]vidence of prior or subsequent criminal conduct may be
admitted if (1) the evidence tends to prove a material point;
(2) the other act is not too remote in time; (3) the evidence
is sufficient to support a finding that defendant committed
the other act; and (4) (in certain cases) the act is similar
to the offense charged.[18]
“If
the evidence meets this test under Rule 404(b), the court
must then decide whether the probative value is substantially
outweighed by the prejudicial impact under Rule
403.”[19]
Here,
the United States has not shown that the evidence of
Pangilinan’s arrest warrants overcome Rule
404(b)’s exclusion. Applying the Ninth Circuit’s
four-factor test, the Court holds that evidence of
outstanding arrest warrants unrelated to the crime charged
must be excluded. First, the existence of warrants to arrest
Pangilinan does not tend to prove a material point. The
United States argues that this evidence tends to prove the
reasons APD contacted Pangilinan on July 9,
2019.[20]However, the reasons for APD arresting
Pangilinan are not material to proving whether he possessed
controlled substances or intended to distribute them.
Particularly in light of the fact that it is not disputed
that Pangilinan was lawfully in APD custody when the
contraband was allegedly discovered. Therefore, the first
factor counsels against admitting evidence of the arrest
warrants.
Second,
it is unclear when any of these warrants were issued or when
the underlying conduct was alleged to have occurred.
Therefore, the second factor-whether the prior acts are
remote in time- neither supports nor cautions admission.
Third, arrest warrants are not probative evidence of guilt.
Therefore, the third factor weighs against admission as the
arrest warrants are not sufficient to prove Pangilinan
committed the underlying prior bad acts. Fourth, the warrants
were not issued for offenses similar to the one for which
Pangilinan is being tried. Because three of the four factors
weigh against admitting evidence of the arrest warrants, the
evidence should be excluded.
Furthermore,
even if evidence related to the warrants was admissible under
Rule 404(b), the United States has not shown that such
evidence is admissible under Rule 403. The United States has
not explained how the existence of arrest warrants for
unrelated crimes tends to show that Pangilinan committed the
crime alleged in the Indictment. Furthermore, disclosing to
the jury that Pangilinan was subject to multiple unrelated
arrest warrants exposes him to substantial prejudice.
Therefore, on balance, the evidence also ought to be excluded
under Rule 403.[21]
Accordingly,
Pangilinan’s Motion in Limine is
GRANTED. The United States is HEREBY
ORDERED to refrain from eliciting testimony from its
witnesses that Pangilinan was or is the subject of any arrest
warrants or that he was suspected of criminal activity
unrelated to the charge in the Indictment.[22] The
limitation thus extends to both the existence of the warrants
and the underlying arrest. As Pangilinan concedes, the United
States’ witnesses-without identifying Pangilinan-may
testify that the one of the occupants of the “red
Suburban” had an outstanding arrest warrant to explain
why APD contacted the vehicle. This limitation will allow
mention of the warrants only insofar as they are probative to
the case as required by the Ninth Circuit.[23]
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