United States District Court, D. Alaska
ORDER RE “DEMAND FOR RECUSAL”
SHARON
L. GLEASON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before
the Court at Docket 252 is Mr. Bachmeierâs âDemand for
Recusal.â The Government responded in opposition at Docket
260. Also, at Docket 267, Mr. Bachmeier requested a hearing
on the motion, to which the Government responded in
opposition at Docket 271.
In his
motion, Mr. Bachmeier seeks to recuse the undersigned judge.
The basis for the request appears to be Mr. Bachmeier’s
assertion that he has “lodged [a] criminal
complaint” against this judge and thus she is
“not impartial.”[1] Mr. Bachmeier’s motion
references a letter he indicates that he wrote to the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and references the
DOJ’s reply[2]; however, neither letter was attached to
his motion or otherwise received by the Court. In his motion
for a hearing on recusal, Mr. Bachmeier acknowledges that the
copy of his motion that was sent to him by the Clerk of Court
did not include the letters; he indicates contends
“maybe those 8 pages did not get
filed.”[3] In opposition to Mr. Bachmeier’s
motion for a hearing, counsel for the United States indicates
that she is “not aware of any communications between
the defendant and the Department of Justice regarding a
potential recusal.”[4]
A judge
is required to recuse herself under 28 U.S.C. §§
144, 455 if an objectively reasonable person with knowledge
of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned were the judge to
continue to hear the case.[5] Actual bias is not required; “the
appearance of impropriety can be a sufficient basis for
judicial recusal.”[6] And yet a judge “must not simply
recuse out of an abundance of caution when the facts do not
warrant recusal. Rather, there is an equally compelling
obligation not to recuse where recusal [is] not
appropriate.”[7] Section 455 is limited by the
“extrajudicial source” factor which generally
requires as the basis for recusal something other than
rulings, opinions formed or statements made by the judge
during the course of trial.[8] Where the source of alleged bias
or prejudice is a judicial proceeding, a party must show a
disposition on the part of the judge that is “so
extreme as to display clear inability to render fair
judgment.”[9]
Mr.
Bachmeier bears the burden of proving facts that would
justify recusal.[10]Mr. Bachmeier’s motion for recusal
is based on an unsupported allegation that he has complained
to the Department of Justice about the undersigned judge. Mr.
Bachmeier has not explained the basis for the complaint or
provided any evidence of its existence. Accordingly, there
are “no facts presented which [give] rise to an
appearance of bias.”[11] Moreover, a private citiczen
cannot bring a criminal action against another person nor can
they petition the federal courts to compel the criminal
prosecution of another person.[12]
In
light of the foregoing, Defendant’s Demand for Recusal
at Docket 252 is DENIED. A hearing on the motion was not
necessary to the Court’s determination; therefore,
Defendant’s Motion for Hearing on Recusal at Docket 267
is DENIED.
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Notes:
[1] Docket 252 at 1.
[2] Docket 252 at 1.
[3] Docket 267 at 1.
[4] Docket 271 at 1.
[5]
See DeNardo v. Municipality of
Anchorage, 974 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th
Cir. 1986); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 630 ...