United States District Court, D. Alaska
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
K. SINGLETON, JR., SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
August 15, 2019, Costia Inga, a state prisoner proceeding
pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”). Docket
No. 1. Inga challenges his 2002 judgment of conviction
following a jury trial entered by the Superior Court for the
State of Alaska, Case Number 3AN-00-10074CR, because it
allegedly violates various protections of the U.S.
reviewing the Petition and the state court dockets, this
Court issued an Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) on
September 23, 2019, directing Inga to file a Response
addressing the facial untimeliness of the Petition and
whether there are grounds for equitable tolling. Docket No.
2. The OSC explained why the Petition was facially untimely
and why the statutory tolling available did not render it
timely. Id. at 3-4. The OSC laid out the equitable
tolling doctrine and expressly directed Inga to explain how
the Petition is timely (if he so contends) and to provide any
available competent evidence to establish such timeliness.
Id. at 4-7. Inga responded to the OSC on September
19, 2019. Docket No. 3. In his Response, Inga contends that
equitable tolling is warranted here because he “was
trying to find a lawyer to help [him] with the
filings.” Id. at 2.
Court has considered the Petition, the record, and
Inga’s Response and must conclude that dismissal of
this action with prejudice is warranted due to untimeliness.
The Court takes judicial notice that the state court record shows
that Inga was convicted on September 27, 2002. See
https://records.courts.alaska.gov/ (State v. Inga,
3AN-00-10074CR). The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction
on March 31, 2004, Inga v. State, No. A-8456, 2004
WL 719626 (Alaska Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2004), and the Alaska
Supreme Court denied his petition for review on June 30,
2004, see http://www.appellate.courts.state.ak.us/
(Inga v. State, S-11455). Inga’s conviction
became final 90 days later on direct review when his time to
file a petition for certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court
expired on September 28, 2004. See Jiminez v.
Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 119 (2009); Spitsyn v.
Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 798 (9th Cir. 2003). The one-year
period under the AEDPA in which to file a federal petition
for habeas relief thus expired on September 28, 2005.
his conviction became final, Inga did not further litigate
his claims until nearly four years later when, in June 2008,
he filed a post-conviction relief application. Costia v.
State, No. 3AN-08-09000CI (dismissed, 2/14/2011). The
June 2008 post-conviction relief application was filed more
than two years after the deadline for Inga to file his
federal habeas petition, and it did not serve to restart the
statute of limitations. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321
F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the one-year
habeas statute of limitations does not restart where that
period ends before petitioner’s state petition for
post-conviction relief is filed).
support of his argument that equitable tolling applies due to
his difficulties finding an attorney, Inga attaches
correspondence from the Alaska Public Defender’s Office
indicating that Inga wrote a letter dated December 28, 2006,
asking for a review of his case based on newly-discovered
evidence, as well as handwritten notes detailing his attempts
to locate an attorney in July and August 2017. Docket Nos.
3-1, 3-3. But Inga’s response does not address the
one-year time period between when his conviction became final
on September 28, 2004, and the September 28, 2005, deadline
for filing a § 2254 petition. Moreover, although the Court
is not unmindful of the plight of unrepresented litigants, a
pro se petitioner’s “lack of legal
sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary
circumstance warranting equitable tolling” of the AEDPA
limitations period. Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d
1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). Inga thus fails to show that he
was diligently pursuing his claims between September 2004 and
September 2005 or that an external factor beyond his control
prevented him from timely filing a habeas petition.
IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
Petition is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for untimeliness.
pending motions are DENIED as moot.
Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Banks v.
Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 705 (2004) (“To obtain a
certificate of appealability, a prisoner must
‘demonstrat[e] that jurists of reason could disagree
with the district court’s resolution of his
constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the
issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.’” (quoting Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003))). Any further
request for a Certificate of Appealability must be addressed
to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Fed. R.
App. P. 22(b); 9th Cir. R. 22-1.
Clerk of Court is directed to issue a judgment accordingly.
 Judicial notice is the
“court’s acceptance, for purposes of convenience
and without requiring a party’s proof, of a well-known
and indisputable fact; the court’s power to accept such
a fact.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014);
see also Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. Forest Service, 399
F.3d 1047, 1051 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Materials from a