United States District Court, D. Alaska
TIMOTHY M. BURGESS, JUDGE
PROCEEDINGS:
ORDER FROM CHAMBERS
The
matter comes before the Court on Defendant Antoni
Peralta's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to
Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c) (“Motion for
Acquittal”)[1] and Motion for a New Trial Pursuant to
Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 (“Motion for New Trial, ” or
collectively, the “Motions”).[2] Through his
Motion for Acquittal, Peralta requests that the Court enter a
Judgment of Acquittal notwithstanding the jury verdict on the
grounds that the United States failed to produce sufficient
evidence to convict him.[3] Likewise, through his Motion for New
Trial, Peralta requests a new trial on the grounds that his
conviction was against the great weight of the
evidence.[4] The United States opposes the
Motions.[5] The Parties did not request an oral
argument and the Court finds it would not be helpful. For the
reasons stated below, Peralta's Motion for New Trial and
Motion for Acquittal are DENIED.
Peralta
was charged with one count of being a Felon in Possession of
a Firearm and Ammunition under 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1).[6] A jury trial was held September 3-6,
2019.[7] At the conclusion of the trial, the jury
found Peralta guilty of being a Felon in Possession of a
Firearm and Ammunition.[8]To establish Felon in Possession of a
Firearm and Ammunition, the United States had to prove:
(1) that Peralta knowingly possessed one Smith and Wesson .40
caliber semiautomatic pistol and associated Federal Brand .40
caliber Smith and Wesson ammunition;
(2) that the Smith and Wesson .40 caliber semi-automatic
pistol and associated Federal Brand .40 caliber Smith and
Wesson ammunition had been shipped or transported from one
state to another;
(3) that at the time Peralta possessed the Smith and Wesson
.40 caliber semiautomatic pistol and associated Federal Brand
.40 caliber Smith and Wesson ammunition, Peralta had
previously been convicted of a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; and (4) that at
the time Peralta possessed the Smith and Wesson .40 caliber
semiautomatic pistol and associated Federal Brand .40 caliber
Smith and Wesson ammunition, he knew he had previously been
convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year and his prior felony conviction prohibited
him from possessing firearms.[9]
Peralta
stipulated to the facts that he “was convicted of a
crime punishable by a term of one year of imprisonment; [he]
knew he had been convicted of a crime punished by a term of
one year of imprisonment[; and he] knew that his felony
conviction prohibited him from possessing firearms and
ammunition.”[10] Thus, the government definitively proved
these facts beyond a reasonable doubt.[11] The elements
left for the jury to determine were (1) whether Peralta
knowingly possessed the firearm and ammunition and (2)
whether the firearm and ammunition traveled in interstate
commerce.
Peralta,
through his Motion for Acquittal, argues that “the
government has failed to produce evidence from which the jury
could reasonably and reliably find [ ] Peralta guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt as to each element of the crime of
conviction.”[12] Likewise, in his Motion for New Trial,
Peralta argues that he is entitled to a new trial because
“the interest of justice so
requires.”[13] Each of his Motions relies on the same
facts and arguments and are jointly discussed
below.[14]
Pursuant
to Rule 29, a defendant may move to set aside a verdict and
enter a judgment of acquittal if the jury has returned a
guilty verdict.[15] When reviewing a motion for acquittal,
the Court must “enter a judgment of acquittal of any
offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
conviction.”[16] To evaluate the sufficiency of the
evidence, the Court “first construe[s] the evidence in
the light most favorable to the
prosecution.”[17] Where the factual record supports
conflicting inferences, the Court “must presume-even if
it does not affirmatively appear in the record-that the trier
of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the
prosecution, and must defer to that
resolution.”[18] After construing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, the Court must
determine “whether any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.”[19] If the Court concludes that the trier
of fact could have found the essential elements, then the
motion for acquittal must be denied.[20]
Alternatively,
Rule 33 provides that a “court may vacate any judgment
and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so
requires.”[21] If the Court determines that,
“despite the abstract sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain the verdict, the evidence preponderates sufficiently
heavily against the verdict that a serious miscarriage of
justice may have occurred, it may set aside the verdict,
grant a new trial, and submit the issues for determination by
another jury.”[22] However, the Court may grant a Rule 33
motion “only in an exceptional case in which the
evidence weighs heavily against the
verdict.”[23]
In his
Motions, Peralta argues that the United States' evidence
“came from circumstantial evidence, Mr. Peralta's
statements, a search warrant, and expert
testimony.”[24] Peralta also asserts that the on
cross-examination Janeice Amick, the United States'
fingerprint examiner, admitted she was not current with the
scientific literature and that she could not have identified
the fingerprint if she had not been given Peralta's name
and fingerprint.[25] Peralta claims Amick further
“acknowledged the dangers of confirmation bias that
exist when she is given one potential
suspect.”[26] Furthermore, Peralta asserts that
defense witness John Robertson's testimony should have
been given greater weight.[27] These circumstances, Peralta
argues, render his conviction unreasonable and unjust under
Rules 29 and 33.[28]
Here,
the United States put forth sufficient evidence to support
each of the elements. The United States called several
witnesses who testified that Peralta was found at the scene
suffering from multiple gunshot wounds.[29] Further,
Detective Scott Niwa was called to testify that, during an
interview, Peralta admitted to using the firearm to return
fire during a shootout.[30] Niwa's testimony was accompanied
by audio recordings of interviews he conducted with
Peralta.[31] Latent print examiner Amick, who was
qualified by the Court to testify as an expert witness,
testified that a fingerprint found on the magazine of the
firearm belonged to Peralta.[32] Additionally, the United
States called ATF Special Agent Sarah Foreman, who was
qualified by the Court to testify as an expert witness, to
testify that the firearm and ammunition found at the scene
were manufactured outside of Alaska and necessarily traveled
in interstate or foreign commerce.[33]
During
the trial, Peralta called only one
witness-Robertson.[34] Robertson testified that it was his
firearm that was found in the Peralta's car, that he
brought it without Peralta's knowledge, and that
Robertson was the one who fired it on the night of the
shooting.[35]
Construing
evidence and factual contradictions in favor of the
prosecution, a rational trier of fact could-and did-find that
Peralta knowingly possessed a firearm and ammunition and that
said firearm and ammunition traveled in foreign or interstate
commerce. Through cross-examination and putting on his own
witness, Peralta attempted to discredit and contradict the
United States' evidence. However, this only raised
questions of the evidence's credibility-questions best
left to the provenance of the jury. Here, the jury made its
credibility determination in favor of the United States.
Therefore, Peralta is not entitled to relief under Rule 29.
Likewise,
this is not “an exceptional case in which the evidence
weighs heavily against the verdict.”[36] The United
States put forth evidence sufficient to support finding each
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Although
Peralta produced some evidence tending to show that he did
not knowingly possess a firearm, ultimately, the jury decided
that Peralta's evidence did not create a reasonable
doubt. The ...